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China Papers  
Dec 4 Sect 6  
Nov 11 " 4

POLITICAL AND SECRET DEPARTMENT.

P.

539

1912 .

Subject:

China: situation in Mongolia.

The Russian treaty.

This File contains the following papers:—

YEAR.

1912. P. 151 156 419 539 564 753 1371 1551 1640<sup>a</sup> 3925 4273

4350 4445 4545 4638 4768 4916 4978

1913. P. 103 145 195 266 318 362 449 532 636 657

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Memoranda.

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1235/13

If any papers are removed from this File, please inform the Political Registry.

MINUTE.

The receipt of these papers affords<sup>a</sup> good opportunity for drawing special attention to the point recently used by the Pol. Officer in Sikkim, viz: - the charge that will be brought about in the Tibetan question by Russian absorption of Mongolia. That Russia, with all the openings that the new Treaty & protocol have given her, will absorb Mongolia, may be taken for granted. She will then find herself, as Mr. Bell <sup>indicates</sup> ~~presents~~ <sup>points</sup> out, on the N. & N.E. border of Tibet. In the preamble to the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, Russia recognised an "special interest" in Tibet by reason of our "geographical position." But when Russia has herself acquired a "geographical position" similar to our own, she will probably claim that she has also acquired a similar "special interest" - which <sup>will be both able &</sup> she ~~is~~ likely to exploit in a way that we have never tried or wished to do. This is a strong argument against a Russo-British Agency at Lhasa.



WMS B. W.  
Political Committee,

With reference to what  
was said at last Tuesday's meeting,  
the Comm<sup>tee</sup> may perhaps like  
to add to the Draft a paragraph  
in the sense of that submitted  
on the separate sheet below.

The main objection to doing so is  
the possibility - perhaps probability - that  
Russia wd. retort by asking for a  
new Afghan agreement, on the ground  
that the present one is nullified by  
the Amir's non-adherence, & that she



is suffering great loss owing to her inability  
to deal direct with the Afghans. As to the  
a very strong letter has ~~been~~ been received  
today from the I.O., & will shortly be sub-  
mitted.

ABA

26/2/13



Please see addition proposed by  
Political C<sup>ee</sup>

AM

4/3/13

Book

8/11.70. Sir,

5 March 1913

With reference to Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 11, dated the 8<sup>th</sup> January 1913<sup>x</sup>, discussing the effects of the Russo-Mongolian Agreement & protocol of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Nov. 1912, I am directed by the S. of S. for India to invite attention to the telegram from the Political Officer in Sikkim to the G. of I., No. 7 S, of the 13<sup>th</sup> January 1913, copy of which was communicated to the F.O. on the 17<sup>th</sup> February.

The Marquess of Crewe desires to express his concurrence in Mr. Bell's views in regard to two of the results likely to ensue from the consolidation of Russian influence in Mongolia, viz:- (1) that the power Russian Govt. will find itself in a much stronger position than at present for intervening in Tibetan affairs; and (2) that the special influence enjoyed by Great Britain in

sub<sup>x</sup> copy enclosed in letter from F.O. dated 20 Feb. 1913

(606-7/13)

Approved Pol Com'ee.,

4 MAR 1913

COPY TO LIA  
7 MAR 1913  
SECRETARY'S N<sup>o</sup> 10



in Tibet by reason of her geographical position will to a large extent be neutralised.

It is important, in H.L.'s opinion, that these considerations should be borne steadily in mind in all future discussions of the Tibetan Question.

~~(sd) W. H. Holderness.~~

See additional  
para. on separate  
sheet.

S.B.  
H.H.

M.  
TR



The Political Committee  
would add this para:  
to the draft -


S.D.

I am also desired in this  
connection to invite reference  
to my letters of the 15<sup>th</sup> Aug.  
1912, No. P. 2933, and of the  
3<sup>rd</sup> Dec. 1912, No. P. 4440, & to  
say that Lord Crewe sees nothing  
in recent events tending to modify  
the view expressed by him in  
Dec. last that Russian action  
in Mongolia might be made  
the basis of a transaction by  
which a free hand could be  
obtained for H. M.'s Govt. in Tibet.  
On the contrary, in view of the  
far reaching character of the  
concessions which it is now  
clear that Russia has obtained  
in



a region hitherto regarded as  
part of the Chinese Empire, there  
need, in H. L.'s opinion, be the  
less hesitation in proposing to  
the Russian Govt some relaxation  
of our obligations <sup>under the</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>section of</sup> Tibetan ~~under~~  
the Anglo-Russian Convention.

DB (sd) T. W. Holderness.



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

February 5.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 6.

[3825]

No. 1.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

Sir,

*Foreign Office, February 5, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd ultimo, commenting on the terms of the protocol to the recent Russo-Mongolian Treaty and suggesting that His Majesty's Minister at Peking should be called on to report on the subject.

I am to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch which has just been received from Sir J. Jordan,\* with which are enclosed a memorandum comparing the protocol with the provisions of the various treaties between Russia and China on the subject of Mongolia and a translation of the protocol.

It will be observed that this translation differs considerably in detail from the version forwarded to you in the letter of the 9th January from this department, which was communicated by the Russian Government. These differences may, however, be attributed to the fact that this translation has probably been made from a Chinese version of the original beset.


Sir E. Grey would be glad to be informed whether the Board consider that this despatch contains sufficient information to enable them to give a final opinion on the question raised in the letter from this department of the 9th January, or whether they still desire that Sir J. Jordan should be instructed to report on the special points raised in their letter of the 22nd ultimo.

I am, &c.


W. LANGLEY.

\* Sir J. Jordan, No. 11, January 8, 1913.

[2807 e-6]







AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[February 4.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 7.

[5320]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 4.)*

(No. 34.)

*St. Petersburg, January 31, 1913.*



Sir,

WITH reference to recent telegraphic correspondence respecting the Russo-Mongolian agreement, I have the honour to inform you that the "Novoe Vremya" of to-day's date publishes an account of a conversation between the editor of that journal and the members of the Mongolian Mission on the subject. M. Suvorin is reported to have asked what exactly is meant by the term Mongolia in the agreement. The head of the mission replied that they understood thereby all Mongol races. The different districts of Mongolia must be regarded as a whole, and it was therefore the first duty of the mission to persuade the Russian Government to treat Inner Mongolia in the same manner as they had treated Outer Mongolia, and to afford the same support to the eastern as it had shown to the western part of Mongolia. The head of the mission on being asked whether he had succeeded in convincing the Russian Government on this point gave no direct reply.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.


[2807 d-7]



[B]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 25.]

SECTION 6.

[3825]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)*

(No. 11.)

Sir,

*Peking, January 8, 1913.*

THE memorandum which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, and for the preparation of which I am indebted to Mr. Lyons, enters into a comparison of the Urga protocol with the various provisions of the treaties between Russia and China on the subject of Mongolia. A copy of the protocol is also enclosed for convenience of reference, and it will be seen that, contrary to statements emanating from Russian sources, the protocol confers upon Russia many privileges and advantages which she did not enjoy under her treaties with China.

Hitherto Russian subjects were only permitted to rent and buy land, and reside permanently for purposes of trade in places where Russia had a treaty right to establish consulates. This latter right was confined to Urga where there has been a Russian settlement for some fifty years, to Uliasutai, Kobdo, and Sharasume. These two latter places, it may be remembered, were only added to the list in the present year, and have been placed under one consul who resides at Kobdo.

Instead of being confined to these four places, the Russians are entitled under the present protocol to rent and buy land, and settle down for purposes of trade in all the towns and cities of Mongolia; and to give official support to their traders, the Russian Government are to arrange with the Mongolian Government for the establishment of consulates wherever they may be considered necessary. Further, in all places where consulates are established, or Russian business carried on, arrangements are to be made for the establishment of trade settlements which are to be under the administration of the Russian consuls, and are apparently to be the counterparts of the concessions at the treaty ports. It is scarcely necessary to point out that this is a sweeping change of a far-reaching nature which will enable Russia to consolidate her position in Mongolia in much the same way as she and Japan have succeeded in doing in Manchuria.


Another important feature which distinguishes this treaty from all preceding ones is the privilege which Russian subjects acquire under it of obtaining concessions with respect to mining, forestry, fishing, and other business enterprises. Railways, it is true, are not specifically mentioned, but it is safe to conclude that they will be regarded as coming within the scope of "business enterprises," and eventually form the chief interest of the article seeing that the shortening of the railway journey from Peking to London by some two or three days is the object to be attained.

So far as I can recollect at the moment, this is the first time that an agreement, concluded with any Far Eastern country, has openly stipulated for the grant of concessions, and the departure is probably not without significance.

The right to navigate the rivers of Mongolia is, as Mr. Lyon points out, the extension to Mongolia of the privilege which Russia obtained under the treaty of Aigun for the navigation of the Amur, Sungari, and Ussuri, and she has secured the important addition of having wharves and godowns established at the stopping places, probably in analogy with the similar privileges which foreign merchants enjoy in China proper in virtue of the Inland Navigation Regulations. It is interesting to note that the postal facilities from Kiachta to Peking, which were a marked feature in early Russian intercourse with China, have now assumed the form of Russian post offices established on Mongolia soil, and, with the posts and telegraphs both in her possession, the Russian control of the communications will be complete.

Although we have never formally claimed the benefits of the Russian overland treaties with China, we have to a considerable extent successfully obtained their enjoyment in practice. After prolonged negotiations we secured in 1908 the Chinese assent to the establishment of a British consulate in Kashgar, and our British Indian subjects have for many years past enjoyed all the trading facilities, including exemption from duties, which the Russians possess under treaties in Chinese Turkestan.

[2767 bb-6]



B

21 FEB 1913

SECRETARY'S NO 8



Our present trade with Mongolia consists principally, if not entirely, of wool, which passes through Tien-tsin, and it is not likely to attract much attention until the country is opened up by the development of railway communication.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Memorandum by Mr. Lyons: The Urga Protocol as compared with Russo-Chinese Treaties regarding Mongolia.*

*Articles 1 and 2.—Right to free Movement, Residence, and Trade.*—The general sense of the treaties of 1869 and 1881 is to open the whole of Mongolia to Russian traders, but to treat them as itinerant merchants rather than as possible permanent residents. For instance, in article 2 of the Revised Convention for Land Trade of April, 1869, it is laid down that "Russian merchants shall be at liberty to proceed to all parts of Mongolia subject to China, in which Chinese officers are stationed, as also to all the tribes under the government of the said officers for purposes of trade, and shall likewise be exempt from the levy of duty. China will throw no impediment whatever in the way of Russian merchants wishing to proceed for purposes of trade to parts of Mongolia where no Chinese officers are stationed." This clause is reaffirmed in article 12 of the treaty of 1881, which reads: "Les sujets russes sont autorisés à faire, comme par le passé, le commerce en franchise de droits dans la Mongolie soumise à la Chine, tant dans les localités et les aimaks où il se trouve une administration chinoise que dans ceux où il n'en existe point."

The whole of Mongolia was thus open to Russian traders under the provisions of existing treaties, and the only extensions of Russian rights granted under the protocol are to be found in the words "to freely live in" and "to establish factories." No reference to a general right to reside is to be found in the treaties, and it is curious that the above phrases should be qualified by the words "as in the past."

*Article 3. Establishment of Branches of Russian Bank.*—A new and valuable concession.

*Article 4. Right to buy and sell.*—This is in part copied direct from the last paragraph of article 12 of the treaty of 1881: "Les sujets russes pourront faire des achats et des ventes, soit au comptant, soit par voie d'échange," &c.

*Article 6. The right to rent and buy Land, build Houses, &c., in all Towns and Cities throughout Mongolia.*—The best terms previously obtained on behalf of Russian traders in the above respects seem to be contained in article 13 of the treaty of 1881 which reads: "Dans les localités où le Gouvernement russe aura le droit d'établir des consulats, les sujets russes pourront construire des maisons, des boutiques, des magasins et d'autres bâtiments sur les terrains qu'ils acquerront par voie d'achat ou qui leur seront concédés par les autorités locales, &c." Russian subjects, in fact, enjoyed in Mongolia much the same privileges as they, in common with other nationalities, enjoy in China proper with regard to residence. Article 6 of the protocol thus entails a very wide extension of their rights in this respect.

*Article 7. Concessions.*—Are not mentioned in any treaties with the Chinese Government.

*Article 8. Establishment of Consulates.*—The right of the Russian Government to establish consulates was extended very sparingly under article 5 of the Additional Treaty of Commerce of 1860, and article 10 of the treaty of 1881. The former definitely gave permission for the residence of a consul at Urga, and the latter extended the privilege to Kobdo and Uliasutai but only "au fur et à mesure du développement du commerce et après entente avec le Gouvernement chinois."

*Article 9. Russian Settlements to be under Russian Administration.*—Previous articles of the protocol having granted the right to erect Russian consulates and to establish business relations at any point in Mongolia, this article proceeds to grant what amounts to extraterritorial rights to Russian settlers at all such points. The question of extraterritoriality does not arise in any of the Russo-Chinese treaties regarding Mongolia. Under article 9 there seems nothing to prevent any town in Mongolia from coming partially under Russian administration.

*Article 10. Postal Service.* Another new and valuable concession. It is specially laid down in article 10 of the treaty of 1881 that Russian consuls in Mongolia shall make use of the Chinese post.

*Article 12. Navigation of Rivers.*—Confirms and extends the privilege already enjoyed under article 1 of the treaty of 1858 (Aigun).

*Article 13. Construction of Bridges and collection of Fees.*—The collection of bridge tolls will doubtless be a useful weapon in the hands of the Russians for extending their administration.

*Article 14. Grazing Rights.*—The right to three months free grazing for flocks of which the numbers are not limited, and over a tract of land also unlimited as to area sounds in theory a concession of great value. But whether it would be so in reality in a country already inhabited by nomadic herdsmen owning large flocks of their own remains to be proved. The grant of these grazing rights should at least lead to a speedy trial of the efficacy of the mixed courts to be established under article 16.

*Article 16. Mixed Courts.*—In view of the grant under article 9 of the right for Russian settlements to be under Russian administration, it might have been expected that the Russians would have demanded an extension of the extraterritorial rights of their subjects by the erection of consular courts. The mixed courts to be established under article 16 do not, however, appear to aim at the complete removal of Russian subjects from Mongolian jurisdiction, since Mongolian officials are apparently to play an equal part with Russian in the constitution and deliberations of such courts. Nor are these tribunals to be mixed courts in the ordinary sense of the term, that is, courts for the trial of Mongolian defendants, the plaintiffs being Russian. The wording of the article is so obscure that it is difficult to gather exactly what form of tribunal will be the result. But the fact that Russian consuls are to execute the findings of the courts when Russian subjects are concerned, entails the grant, in practice if not in name, of extraterritorial privileges to the latter.

Under the terms of the protocol Russian subjects receive the definite right to participate in most departments of Mongolian commercial life:—Banking (article 3), agriculture and general trading (article 6), concessions (article 7), grazing (article 14), and the Russian Government the right to interfere in such questions of internal administration as the postal service (article 10), river navigation (article 12), construction of bridges and collection of tolls (article 14), and courts of justice (article 16). Under these circumstances it is difficult to compare the position occupied by Russia in Mongolia under the terms of her treaties with China and under the provisions of the Urga protocol. In place of the very loosely defined trading rights allowed under the treaties she appears to have become possessed, under the agreement of the 3rd November, of privileges which should give her a firm commercial grip of the country, and—if the privileges are judiciously applied—a political position almost equally strong.

#### Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

*The Urga Protocol, dated November 3, 1912.*

IN accordance with article 2 of the Russian-Mongolian agreement signed this day, the Russian plenipotentiary, M. Korostovetz, and the Mongolian plenipotentiaries, authorised thereto by the Mongolian Sovereign and Princes, have agreed on the following in regard to the rights and privileges to be enjoyed by the Russians in Mongolia and by the Mongols in Russia:—

#### ARTICLE 1.

Russian subjects shall have the right and privilege, as enjoyed in the past, to freely live in, and move about in, all parts of Mongolia, to conduct business, establish factories, and to manage and settle affairs with all individuals, all companies, whether official or private, Russian, Mongolian, or Chinese.

#### ARTICLE 2.

Russian subjects shall have the right and privilege, as enjoyed in the past, to import and export at any time the products and manufactures of Russia, Mongolia, China and other countries free of duty, and to conduct free trade, exempted from all duties and taxes; but any combination of Chinese and Russians, or Russian subjects, declaring falsely the origin of their goods shall not be entitled to this privilege.



## ARTICLE 3.

The Russian Bank shall have the right to establish branch banks in Mongolia and to do business, &c., with all individuals and companies.

## ARTICLE 4.

Russian subjects can buy and sell goods with ready money or exchange goods by barter, and can do so on credit, but the Mongolian princes and the Mongolian Treasury cannot guarantee such credits or private individuals.

## ARTICLE 5.

The Mongolian authorities shall not prohibit the Mongols and Chinese from conducting trade and business with Russian subjects, and shall not prevent them from serving in Russian commercial and manufacturing enterprises. In Mongolia, no official or private companies or individuals shall have a monopoly in commerce or manufacture, such enjoyment as already granted and permitted by the Mongolian Government previous to this agreement shall continue until the term expires.

## ARTICLE 6.

Russian subjects shall have the right and privilege to rent or buy land in all towns and cities throughout Mongolia, establish commercial enterprises and manufactures, build houses, stores and godowns, and rent vacant land for agricultural purposes. These lands shall be leased to the Russians according to the Mongolian existing regulations; pastures and places for religious purposes are not included.

## ARTICLE 7.

Russian subjects are free to arrange with the Mongolian Government concessions regarding mining, forestry, fishing and other business enterprises.

## ARTICLE 8.

The Russian Government shall have the right to arrange with the Mongolian Government to establish consulates wherever may be deemed necessary. The Mongolian Government can also arrange with the Russian Government to appoint Mongolian representatives along the Russian frontier as may be deemed necessary.

## ARTICLE 9.

Wherever Russian consulates are established or Russian business carried on, the Russian consul can arrange with the Mongolian Government to establish trade settlements for the use of Russian subjects there to live and carry on business. These trade settlements will be under the administration of Russian consuls. In places where there are no consuls these will be under the administration of the senior Russian merchants there established.

## ARTICLE 10.

Russian post offices can be established throughout Mongolia at the cost of the Russians, and postal services can be created from Mongolia to the Russian frontier for the transmission of mails and parcels. The administration of all such post offices and services shall be under the control of the Russians as provided in article 9.

## ARTICLE 11.

The Russian consuls in Mongolia, for the purpose of transmitting official despatches are entitled to use the Mongolian post stations, but in one month the number of horses used without charge shall not exceed 100, and the number of camels shall not exceed thirty. Private Russian individuals are also granted the privilege of using these stations, but for this they shall be charged at a rate to be agreed upon with the Mongolian Government.

## ARTICLE 12.

All rivers in Mongolia flowing into Russia, with their branches, can be navigated by Russian subjects with their own vessels, who can conduct business and trade with the people along the banks. The Russian Government shall assist the Mongolian Government to improve the navigation of these rivers and buoy the channels. The Mongolian Government shall, according to article 6 of this agreement, grant lands along the banks as stopping places for these vessels, and in order to establish wharves, godowns, and houses.

## ARTICLE 13.

Russian subjects, for the purpose of transporting goods, flocks, and herds, shall have the right to make use of the roads and the rivers throughout Mongolia, and can arrange with the Mongolian officials to build bridges with their own money, and they shall be permitted to collect fees from the people making use of these bridges.

## ARTICLE 14.

Flocks belonging to Russian subjects travelling in Mongolia shall be granted the use of grazing lands. These lands can be made use of for three months without charge, after three months they shall be paid for accordingly.

## ARTICLE 15.

Russian subjects along the frontier who in the past enjoyed the privilege of hunting, fishing, and cutting grasses, are confirmed in a continuance of this privilege.

## ARTICLE 16.

Russian subjects can conduct business with Mongols and Chinese either verbally or in writing. The contracting parties can send these documents to the local authorities for approval. If the local authorities on scrutinising these documents think that there are some obstacles, they should notify the Russian consuls at once and consult them so as to remove misunderstanding.

It is specially provided that business regarding immovable property shall be done by written agreement, such agreement to be submitted to the Mongolian officials and the Russian consul for approval. The agreement with regard to natural resources must be submitted to the Mongolian Government for approval. In case of dispute, either contracted verbally or by written documents, both parties may choose someone to act as arbitrator. If the dispute cannot be settled peacefully it should be sent to a mixed court. The mixed court shall be of two kinds—permanent and provisional. The permanent mixed court shall be established in places where there are Russian consulates, to be organised by the Russian consuls or their representatives, and the Mongolian officials and their representatives of equal rank. The provisional mixed court shall be established in places where there are no Russian consuls, and are established temporarily as deemed necessary by the representatives of the Russian consuls and by the representatives of the Mongolian Princes, within whose territory the defendants reside.

The mixed court can summon Mongols, Chinese, and Russians to be jurymen. When the case is settled, the Russian consuls shall execute it at once in regard to the Russians, and the Mongolian Princes shall execute it in regard to the Mongols or Chinese under their jurisdiction.

## ARTICLE 17.

This protocol shall come into force immediately after signature. It is written in Russian and Mongolian, and is in duplicate.

Signed and exchanged on the 21st October, 1912 (Russian calendar), 3rd November, 1912, that is the 24th day of the last month of autumn of the 2nd year of the Mongolian Sovereign at Urga.



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 23.]

SECTION 8.

[3519]

No. 1.

*Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 23.)*

*Board of Trade, January 22, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th January, transmitting copies of despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg with translation of the agreement and protocol recently concluded between the Russian Government and the Mongolian Government.

1. The provisions of the protocol in question do not appear to the Board to secure to Russian subjects or Russian commerce any exclusive or preferential rights in Outer Mongolia which it may not be competent for other countries to secure also by agreement or otherwise. The Board gather that the Mongolian Government, though recognised by Russia, has not yet been recognised by His Majesty's Government, and they presume, therefore, that for the purpose of ascertaining our treaty rights Mongolia must still be regarded by us as forming part of the Chinese Empire. If this view is correct, it would appear that we are formally entitled under our existing treaties with China to share in the benefits which are now secured by Russia in Mongolia, although the Board find some difficulty in understanding how any such claim could be practically enforced.


2. The various articles of the protocol purport to secure merely to Russian subjects rights and privileges which they enjoy already. The Board are unable from the information in their possession to state whether in fact the agreement goes further in this respect than it purports to do. They accordingly suggest, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that it would be desirable in the first instance to call for a report on the subject from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, and in particular to ascertain whether Russian subjects are at present entitled, as indicated in article 2 of the protocol, to import and export merchandise into and from Mongolia free of all import and export duty. The provisions of article 12 of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1881 give Russian subjects the right to trade in Mongolia "en franchise de droits," and the general terms of the article, and especially its second paragraph, appear to suggest that this immunity may be intended to include the entire exemption from customs duty of all merchandise imported and exported. The Board, however, would be glad to obtain an authoritative confirmation of this interpretation of the treaty of 1881, before expressing a final opinion on the question submitted to them by the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.

H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[2767 z-8]

20 FEB 1913



P. 4440.

INDIA OFFICE,  
3rd December 1912.

SIR,

With reference to the telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, No. 237, of 16th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to offer the following observations for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

2. It appears to the Marquess of Crewe that advantage should be taken of the lull in hostilities in Eastern Tibet to bring the Chinese Government to a definite settlement on the lines of the Memorandum of 17th August. His Lordship apprehends that if this is not done, hostilities will be resumed after the winter and the Chinese advance continued into Tibet. A situation of "direct conflict" between the Chinese Government and His Majesty's Government will then have arisen, which it is desirable to avoid, and the difficulty of securing a settlement will be much greater.

3. Lord Crewe agrees with Sir J. Jordan that it is not advisable to invoke the co-operation of Russia in this matter. Such co-operation could only take the form of diplomatic pressure at Peking, which would be likely to be both expensive and ineffectual. If the refusal to recognise the Chinese Republic should (as the Government of India apprehend) prove to be an insufficient threat to the Chinese Government, I am to suggest that Sir J. Jordan should be instructed to inform them that unless they are prepared to negotiate on the lines indicated, and to carry the negotiations through within three months, His Majesty's Government will regard the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1904 as no longer holding good, and will hold themselves free to enter into direct negotiations with Tibet. Moreover, should Chinese troops enter Tibet, they will be prepared to give active assistance to the Tibetans in resisting their advances and in establishing and maintaining Tibetan independence.

4. It seems probable that the prospect of direct negotiations with Tibet would affect the Chinese more powerfully than a simple threat that we should give the Tibetans active assistance in opposing their advance. At the same time we should be in the advantageous position of having offered to make a friendly agreement with the Chinese themselves, and of being refused, before transferring our friendship to another quarter.

5. In this connection I am to observe that the memorandum of 17th August will need elaboration in one important respect if it is to form the basis of a new Convention—that is to say that it must contain some definition of the limits of Tibet within which Chinese troops are not to be stationed. Lord Crewe is in communication with the Government of India on this point, and will address Sir E. Grey again on receipt of their reply. As at present advised he would favour a definition which, while, leaving

The Under Secretary of State  
Foreign Office.



Zayul to Tibet, would leave to China the districts the conquest of which she has shown herself able effectively to maintain, *i.e.*, substantially Derge and Chiamdo. This definition would have the advantage of corresponding with the views of the President as described in Mr. Acting Consul-General King's Despatch No. 86, of 5th October last, to Sir J. Jordan. North of Derge the definition presents great difficulties and will require careful consideration.

6. If it is decided to proceed at once on these lines, it is obvious that, even if Russian co-operation is not sought, the acquiescence of the Russian Government must be obtained in the measures contemplated. Sir J. Jordan, it is observed, favours the idea (advocated in this Office letter of 15th August) of a fresh agreement with them on the subject of Tibet although (in common with the Government of India) he is averse to including Chinese Turkestan. In spite of the somewhat discouraging nature of M. Sazonoff's language on the occasion of his recent visit, Lord Crewe is not without hope that some new agreement may be practicable. He would not press the question of Chinese Turkestan (especially as M. Sazonoff disclaimed designs upon it); but he would support the suggestion of Sir J. Jordan that Russian action in Mongolia might form the basis of a transaction. M. Sazonoff would doubtless repeat that Tibet and Mongolia are not *in pari materia*, and that is obviously true so far as the one is the subject of a convention with this country and the other is not. But the fact remains that the Russo-Mongolian agreement, by declaring the autonomy of Mongolia, has altered the status of an integral part of the Chinese Republic, with which this country stands in treaty relations, and His Majesty's Government may fairly claim that their acquiescence in it cannot be taken for granted. On the other hand, the object which His Majesty's Government are pursuing in Tibet is one to which the Russian Government could not in good faith take exception; for it is not the extension of British influence, but simply the restoration of the *status quo* recognised by the Anglo-Russian Convention, and its maintenance by more effective means than are admitted by that instrument. For this purpose what is required is a modification of the arrangement of 1907 in the direction of allowing Great Britain to enter into negotiations with Tibet and to send a representative to Lhasa when the relations between Great Britain and Tibet render such a course necessary.

7. But if Sir E. Grey thinks that no such modification is practicable, it only remains to apprise the Russian Government in due course of the action which His Majesty's Government propose to take in present circumstances. It might at the same time be desirable to sound them as to their attitude in the event of it appearing advisable, for the purpose of assisting the Tibetans against Chinese aggression, to lend them money, arms, and (temporarily) British officers for the organisation of their army.

8. In his Despatch No. 79 of 4th September last, Mr. Consul-General Wilkinson suggests that the Chinese Government should again be warned that we consider the whole basin of the Irrawaddy north of Manang Pum to be British territory. The desirability of repeating this intimation is emphasised by the recent Chinese expedition against the Lishus on the Salween and the threat of an advance to Hkamti, as well as by the restoration of the notoriously anti-British Li-ken Yuan to authority in Yunnan. Lord

Crewe would therefore suggest that the opportunity of a settlement with regard to Tibet should be taken to settle the Burma-China frontier also upon the basis of Sir E. Satow's Note of 1st May 1906, subject to any minor rectifications or adjustments which the further investigation now being made into Chinese claims may show to be equitable.

4/12/06 Row  
9. To sum up, I am to suggest that Sir J. Jordan should now be instructed to press for an immediate reply to the memorandum of 17th August, taking as his excuse the reported conversion of Zayul into ~~the~~ Chinese Civil District (as to which please see enclosed copy of the telegram from the Government of India), and explaining that His Majesty's Government regard this as an aggression upon undoubted Tibetan territory, in which they cannot possibly acquiesce. Should the Chinese reply to the memorandum be delayed for more than a fortnight or prove unfavourable, he should then convey a warning in the sense of paragraph 3 above; and should that warning produce no effect before the end of the year, it would be for consideration whether negotiations with Lhasa should not at once be opened. Sir E. Grey will doubtless judge at what time and in what manner the views and wishes of His Majesty's Government should be made known to the Russian Government.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Signed) T. W. HOLDERNESS.



Confidential.

P. 2933.

INDIA OFFICE,  
15th August 1912.

Sir,

With reference to the Despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, No. 263, dated 24th June last, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated 27th July 1912, that has been received from the Government of India regarding the occupation of Kashgar by Russian troops.

In their Secret Letter No. 74, of 9th May 1901, the Government of India expressed the opinion that Kashgar and the New Dominion would inevitably, sooner or later, fall into the hands of Russia, but they regarded this event as one to be postponed as long as possible by the diplomacy of His Majesty's Government. This general view the Marquess of Crewe shares—less because of any specific military danger to India than because of the political disadvantages likely to follow from so violent a disturbance of the balance of power in those regions, and the inconvenience likely to arise out of the rights of Hunza in Raskam and the Taghdumbash Pamir. This consideration His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg was instructed to put informally before the Russian Government as recently as 20th May last (*see* Sir E. Grey's Despatch, No. 173)—with what result Lord Crewe is not aware.

His Lordship shares the objection of the Government of India to the despatch of Indian troops to Kashgar, and, on the other hand, the information received at this Office does not indicate that the time has come when it would be possible to press the Russian Government for the withdrawal of their own troops on the ground that their presence is no longer necessary. There would, therefore, seem to be no plausible case for diplomatic action at present, and, indeed, it is for consideration whether it would not rather be advantageous to acquiesce in an eventual Russian occupation, provided that Hunza's rights are secured and that suitable compensation is given elsewhere. Such compensation, Lord Crewe would suggest, might be found in Tibet, where the terms of the Anglo-Russian Convention are making it increasingly difficult for His Majesty's Government to regulate their relations with the Dalai Lama and the Chinese in a manner consistent with our interests. In His Lordship's opinion the progress of events in China is tending to make a reconsideration of our policy in the countries bordering on Northern India and Burma not only desirable but inevitable; while the attitude of Russia towards Mongolia, her general policy in China, and M. Sazonoff's avowal that her interests there are mainly political (*see* Mr. O'Beirne's Despatch No. 212, of 8th July), seem likely to involve a recasting of the relations between the three Powers in those regions.

The attitude of Nepal in view of the unexpected events which are occurring in Tibet is another factor in the situation which could not have

The Under Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office.

been foreseen when the existing treaties were negotiated, but it has now forced itself into consideration. It will be remembered that the policy of that State is not formally under British control; and though the Prime Minister has hitherto shown himself amenable to advice, effective coercion would be, if only for military reasons, impracticable. On the other hand he has been formally assured that "so long as he consults the British Government and follows their advice when given, and preserves his present correct and friendly attitude, His Majesty's Government will not allow the interests and rights of Nepal to be affected or prejudiced by any administrative changes in Tibet." But in fact those interests are suffering, and, so far from being able to prevent it directly or indirectly, His Majesty's Government have seen Ladakhis, who are entitled to their own protection, dependent upon the good offices of the Nepalese representative at Lhasa. We are therefore not on firm ground for advising Nepal to abstain from taking action on her own account, while the effect of such action might at any moment be to confront His Majesty's Government with the alternatives—either of which would be equally disagreeable—of having to justify it to the Russian Government or to disavow it. It is indeed far from improbable that Russia would use such circumstances as a pretext for seeking "compensation" herself.

Lord Crewe would therefore suggest that the situation should be reviewed comprehensively in the light of these remarks.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Government of India, and their views invited. On receipt of their reply a further communication will be made to you.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

(Signed) R. RITCHIE.



Register No.

636

Put away with

529/12

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from

Jo.

Dated

13 February 1913.

Rec.

W

Date. Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 14 Feb. AX

Secretary of State..... 20 E.W.H

Committee..... 20 E

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia.

The Mongolian Mission to St. Peters-  
burgh.

Copy to India 14 Feb. Secy 7

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol (once)  
4 March 1913  
(with 657)

Previous Papers:—

532

14/532 n.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

[B]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 29.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[4371]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)*

(No. 27.)

Sir,

✓ St. Petersburg, January 26, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the Mongolian Mission was received on the 23rd instant by the Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo, when numerous gifts were presented to His Majesty.


On the 24th instant the mission was received by the Minister of War and the chief of the mission, according to the "Novoe Vremya," whilst expressing his deep indebtedness to Russia for the work of reorganisation already effected by Captain Vassilief and the ten non-commissioned officers who had succeeded in placing on an efficient war footing four sotnias of Mongolian cavalry, pointed out that that force was not sufficient to protect the Mongolian frontier from Chinese troops, and added that Mongolia was in special need of modern arms and army instructors. General Soukhomlinof had replied that he would do all he could towards meeting the wishes of the Mongolian Government, especially as the question had already been decided in an affirmative sense by the Emperor. He had pointed out, however, that machine-guns and cannon are complicated machinery requiring capable men to handle them, and he had therefore advised that special care be taken in recruiting men for that branch of the army.

The mission was received yesterday by the Chief of the General Staff, and Prince Hando Van informed that officer that the Mongolian Government were most anxious to obtain the services of about ten Russian officers and a suitable number of non-commissioned officers with as little delay as possible, with a view to utilising their services before the summer, when the grass-grown roads would enable the Chinese army to assume the offensive.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2767 ff—4]





AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 23.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[3420]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 17.)

Sir,


(532) *St. Petersburg, January 19, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the "Novoe Vremya" published an account of an interview granted to one of its representatives by Prince Hando-Van, the leader of the Mongolian Mission, regarding the objects of that mission. First of all, it was to convey the thanks of the Mongolian people to the Emperor, the Government, and all the people of Russia for the help and support given to Mongolia in her first days of existence as a State. Secondly, to strengthen the friendly ties which had existed between the two countries from time immemorial. In this connection it was to be hoped that Russia would not desert Mongolia should China resort to arms. Mongolia, to create a national army, needed good arms and instructors for which the mission had asked M. Sazonof, as it was extremely important for Mongolia to fortify Kobdo and other outlying places. That was the principal object of their visit. But there were other important questions, such as the delimitation of their frontiers. The historic frontier of Mongolia should include all territory to the north and west of the Chinese wall. But as in the course of time the Chinese had settled everywhere, the Mongolians recognised as comprising the State of Mongolia the whole region of Kobdo, the Khulunbuir region, and the Shilingol Diet. The Russian Government had not yet replied about Khulunbuir and Shilingol. All the other Diets of Inner Mongolia had been suppressed by the Chinese, and were not in direct communication with Mongolia, but the Iliia region must also finally be joined to her, and the President of the Sodnomo Diet had recently arrived at Urga with a petition to that effect. Alatan was the only province which remained undecided, while the province of Kukunor was trying to be united with Thibet. M. Sazonof had informed the Prince that Russia had already recognised Mongolia as a State and not a Chinese province, and the question of her being internationally recognised as such would decide itself when she developed and became stronger. Mongolia desired to develop her trade, to improve the education of her people, and to construct a railway from Urga to Kiakhta and good roads, first of all in the Uliasutai and the outlying regions, and to establish the telegraph throughout the country, for all of which urgent questions M. Sazonof had promised the full support of the Russian Government. As regards the opening of a bank, his Excellency had stated that he was not competent to deal with this question, which would probably be dealt with by M. Kokovtsof. Mongolia attaches great importance to putting her finances in order and to establishing trade relations with Russia, and she had therefore purposely raised the price of Chinese goods by imposing heavy duties on them, that being the only way to free herself from economic dependency on China. M. Sazonof had stated that the question of appointing a Mongolian representative at St. Petersburg would be considered, but his Excellency had pointed out that there was now a Russian representative at Urga with plenipotentiary powers, and that M. Korostovetz would probably be maintained there for the present. Prince Hando-Van, in conclusion, expressed doubt as to China's being able to declare war on Russia, as any such declaration would serve as a pretext for a rising of all Inner Mongolia, which, in spirit, was already with Mongolia. The agreement concluded between Mongolia and Thibet would still further complicate any war operations for China.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2767 z-4]



SECRETARY 7

Minute Paper.

Register No.

532

Put away with 539  
11/11/12

Secret Department.

4 Letters from 20.

Dated } 6 Feb. 1913.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	11 Feb.	J.E.S.	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	12	J.W.H.	The situation.
Committee.....	16	<u>C.</u>	Mongolian deputation to St. Petersburg.
Under Secretary.....			Attitude of Chinese Govt towards Russo.
Secretary of State.....			Mongolian Agreement.

Copy to India, 7 Feb, Secy. 6.

FOR INFORMATION.

Maj. Robertson's report on the  
military situation is very interesting.

18 FEB 1913

Previous Papers:—

449



### The Future of Mongolia.

The vast region of Mongolia, the birthplace of hordes which have time and again altered the current of history, has definitely ceased to be part of the Chinese Republic. Such is the purport of the Parliamentary paper issued last week, containing the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol signed last November. One of the articles of the Agreement discusses the possibility that "the Mongolian Government" may find it necessary to conclude a separate treaty "with China or another foreign Power." There could be no blunter statement of complete severance. Mongolia does not merely become autonomous. All vestiges of Chinese suzerainty vanish: Russia even undertakes to assist Mongolia in preventing the admission of Chinese troops and colonists. The process by which the edges of the Gobi Desert were being brought under the plough by Chinese settlers is perhaps permanently arrested, though that is not yet certain. At any rate, the greatest province of China ceases to be coloured with Chinese yellow. A new State has been born in Asia, though in reality it is a partial revival of a very old State. As in Turkey, the real firstfruits of revolution in China have therefore been huge losses of territory. In each case the sudden introduction of representative government into an Oriental country has led to a painful awakening. The people in certain areas wished to be represented, but not in the capital which claimed control over them. The inhabitants of Macedonia sought union elsewhere. The princes and nobles of Mongolia wanted to make their territories independent, and asked for the help of Russia. Clearly the leaders of Mongolia cut themselves off from China of their own free will. They said they had been conquered by the Manchus, but the Manchu dynasty had been overthrown, and they were not prepared to bow the knee to a Chinese President. There is evidence that they have been handled unwisely. The Peking authorities were well aware that the new Administration would not exercise the same glamour over the Mongols as the fallen dynasty had done. They therefore tried to extend their control by vigorously pressing forward the process of "peaceful penetration," which had begun almost automatically. They also devised various more or less ineffective military measures. To the Mongols the revolution only seemed likely to portend increasing subjection, and it is not surprising that they very soon turned to Russia for sympathy and practical aid.

Russia responded to the appeal with an alacrity which was probably due in part to the annoyances caused by recent Chinese policy in Mongolia. "Young China" has shown itself singularly regardless of treaty provisions, and the allegation is that Russian trading and other rights in Mongolia have been repeatedly violated by the Chinese. Great Britain can well believe these statements to be true; for our own treaty rights in Tibet and under the Opium Agreements have been flagrantly and provocatively set at naught. Russia has other motives for contemplating with benevolence the new aspirations of Mongolia. She fears the day when the outward pressure of myriads of Chinese may place in jeopardy her thinly-peopled Siberian territories. Her desire to exclude Chinese colonists from Mongolia, in order that it may serve as a vast buffer State, can readily be comprehended. The fears that the proposed "national army" of Mongolia will mean eventually the appearance of another horde may be dismissed at once. Mongol hordes are no more a danger to the modern world than Red Indians are to the United States. The Protocol gives Russia a strong preferential position in Mongolia, but Great Britain cannot peer very far beyond the situation as it is publicly, and apparently quite correctly, represented. The deputation of Mongolian Ministers which has just been officially received by the Tsar unquestionably seems to have represented Mongolian desires. In the circumstances, there will hardly be

much sympathy with the Chinese Government, which has persistently done its best to ruin a case never very strong. There are, however, certain considerations which at least require to be noted. We observe that, although Russian subjects acquire various privileges under the Protocol, not a word is said about railways. Nearly the whole of the projected Kalgan-Urga-Kiakhta line is aligned through Mongolian territory. What will now be the fate of that much-discussed scheme? Again, what is Mongolia? The new documents are curiously vague, and attempt no geographical definitions. There is an "Inner" and an "Outer" Mongolia, and the whole of the Mongolian notables have not signified their adherence to the Agreement with Russia. A semi-official statement issued in St. Petersburg in November suggested that the Agreement only related to Northern and Western Mongolia, but the statement finds no support in the document itself, which simply speaks of "Mongolian territory" as a whole. What part of Mongolia is "Inner" and what is "Outer"? The Chinese at an early stage of the dispute claimed that Kobdo, far away on the western confines of the province, was part of "Inner" Mongolia. This claim was obviously unfounded, but it may be taken as certain that "Inner" Mongolia at least includes all the lands south and east of the Gobi Desert and the extensions of that dreary waste. It therefore takes in territory very near Peking and Harbin and the Eastern Chinese Railway. On this point Japan is likely to desire further light.

We have said, in effect, that these great changes in Asia are not the direct concern of Great Britain; but this statement cannot be taken without qualification. Some sort of treaty has apparently been recently concluded between the Tibetan Government and the Mongolian Government, through the agency of the notorious DORJIEFF, who is again engaged upon one of his mischievous pilgrimages, and is now in St. Petersburg. Under the Treaty of Lhasa, it is doubtful whether Tibet has any right to negotiate with "a foreign Power," such as Mongolia now is, without the previous sanction of Great Britain. Our St. Petersburg Correspondent is informed that, whatever DORJIEFF's business in the Russian capital may be, the Russian Government will decline to recognize any authority that may have been given him as extending to St. Petersburg. In other words, he will not be received as an envoy with authority to discuss political matters with the Russian Government. DORJIEFF may be disappointed at this decision; but he could expect nothing else. Any countenance given to his pretensions would be counter to the spirit of the preamble to the Tibetan clauses of the Anglo-Russian Convention. Our Correspondent assures us that the British attitude with regard to Tibet is fully understood in Russia. We believe that it is; but we remain convinced that the best and, indeed, the only way to prevent misunderstandings, whether with Russia or with China, is for Great Britain to have a competent representative at Lhasa. We continue to warn China that she must not invade Tibet, and that Tibetan autonomy must be respected; but, so long as we ourselves refrain from direct relations with the Tibetan Government, our position is difficult to defend. The necessary reconstruction of a single clause of the Anglo-Russian Convention should be undertaken without delay.

"Times", 10 Feb. 1913

## CHINESE DESIGNS AGAINST MONGOLIA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, FEB. 5.

According to a message from Mukden, the commanders of the Chinese troops in Manchuria and Mongolia have received orders gradually to concentrate their forces on the frontier of Northern Mongolia. It is added that operations, presumably against Mongolia, are to begin in March.

"Times,"

6 Feb. 1913

## THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN TREATY. TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT PUBLISHED.

A Parliamentary paper [Cd. 6604] was issued last night giving the text of the despatches from Sir George Buchanan, his Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Sir Edward Grey, transmitting the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol of October 21 (O.S.). A full summary of the Protocol appeared in *The Times* of December 26; while the text of the principal clauses of the Treaty was published on January 6.

The Treaty contains three capital articles and was signed by M. Korostovetz, Minister Plenipotentiary on behalf of Russia, and by the Prime Minister and other Ministers acting as Plenipotentiaries on behalf of Mongolia. The Treaty recognizes Russia's special rights in Mongolia, and in return for Russian assistance in retaining her autonomy Mongolia undertakes to make no separate Agreement which might traverse the present Treaty without first obtaining Russian assent.

The Protocol amplifies and explains the special rights granted to Russians, while setting forth clearly safeguards for each of the contracting parties.

"Times,"

7 Feb. 1913



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 23.]

SECTION 2.

[3411]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 10.)

Sir,

*Peking, January 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received from the Wai-chiao Pu a memorandum, translation of which is enclosed herewith, in which they communicate to me the contents of a telegram addressed to them by the Tutu of Heilungchiang regarding the question of Mongolian independence.

The meaning of the telegram is obscure, but I take it to signify that, on the occupation of Khailar by the Mongols, the Mongolian authorities of that place were instructed by the Hutuktu to notify the Russian consul at Harbin of their adherence to the new Urga Government. This notification was probably never made but the Chinese Government are taking the precaution of warning His Majesty's Government of an attempt to place under Urga a town situated well within the borders of Manchuria.

I am asking His Majesty's consul at Harbin to furnish me with a report on the present position of affairs at Khailar, and with his observations on the rumours communicated to me by the Wai-chiao Pu.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Wai-chiao Pu to Sir J. Jordan.*

Sir,

*December 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you of the recent receipt of the following telegram from the Tutu of Heilungchiang:—

"According to intelligence reports, about the end of November the Khailar office received the commands of the Lama of Urga, stating that, the Russian-Urga Treaty being an accomplished fact, Urga comes under Russian protection. Khailar's adherence to Urga is to be notified direct in the name of the Khailar banner itself to the Russian consul, with a request to communicate the information to the Governments of all countries concerned and request their recognition.

"Nine despatches have been prepared by the Khailar office for the following countries, namely: Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Belgium, Japan, America and Russia, and towards the middle of December, a Buriat with a knowledge of Russian was sent to convey the despatches to Harbin, request the Russian consul for an introduction and deliver them to the consuls of the different countries; if any of these countries had no consul at Harbin, he was to proceed to Shanghai to deliver his despatches."


Although the assertions of the intelligence reports are the utterance of rumour and not worthy of serious credence, none the less Khailar has been plotting sedition, which makes it impossible to guarantee that no such outrageous action has taken place.

I feel convinced that His Majesty's consul, being thoroughly conversant with international law and fully respecting the comity of nations, cannot possibly be influenced by such happenings; in view, however, of the fact that reports of this nature have been received, I have the honour to communicate them to your Excellency for purposes of record.

I avail, &c.

(Seal of Wai-chiao Pu.)

[2767 z-2]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 16.]

SECTION 3.

[2252]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)*

(No. 10.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a Mongolian deputation from the Khutukhta, consisting of sixteen delegates, with the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs at its head, arrived in St. Petersburg on the 9th instant, "in order," as the "Rech" says, "to express the gratitude of the Mongolian authorities for Russia's recognition of the independence of Mongolia."


The press publishes details as to the career of the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which it appears that he has always been a strong advocate of close and friendly relations with Russia as being the most practicable method of developing Mongolia. He was head of the deputation which visited St. Petersburg in September 1911, when he begged for Russian protection. On his return to Mongolia, the Minister, who was about 40 years of age and was very popular there, was marked out for punishment by the Chinese Government, and his position was extremely precarious until the revolutionary movement took place. He is said to enjoy the close confidence of the Khutukhta, who desires to visit St. Petersburg. It is stated that the deputation will stay here for about three weeks, and will be received by the Emperor at Tsarskoe Selo, and by various official persons. The mission is supposed to have considerable political significance, and to be about to establish closer relations with Russia. M. Shishmaref, Russian consul-general at Urga, who has served for 40 years in Mongolia, is attached to the mission during its stay in the capital.

The "Rech" says that in the audience which the deputation will have with M. Sazonof on the 15th instant, the question of appointing a permanent Mongolian representative at St. Petersburg will be raised, this being the wish of the Khutukhta. It is said that the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs is not averse to this idea in principle, but that it considers it to be premature.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2767 q-3]





AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL

532

1913

[January 9.]

SECTION 11.

[1264]

No. 1.

*Mr. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9, 1913.)*

(No. 327.)

Sir,

*Tokyo, December 23, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Prince Katsura to-day held his first reception of the foreign heads of missions since his appointment to the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

When my turn came to see his Excellency, the Prince began by saying that he had left a post of great responsibility near the person of the Emperor in order to direct the Government of the country for the third time.

He then went on to talk about China. He said that although the situation in that country had somewhat improved, it was still very complicated ("sehr verwickelt"). Alluding to the rising in Mongolia, Prince Katsura said that the first thing the Chinese Government should do should be to establish order in China proper. They might then turn their attention to the outlying territories. I remarked that the process of establishing order in China proper might be a lengthy one, and the outlying territories might, in the interval, definitely emancipate themselves from the influence or control, however shadowy, of the Central Government.

His Excellency admitted this possibility, but again emphasised the necessity for China to first of all establish order in China proper.


Prince Katsura was remarkably cordial during our interview, being perhaps relieved that we could dispense with an interpreter, the conversation being carried on in German, which the Prince speaks quite fluently.

He gave me the impression of a man who was unmistakably pleased to re-enter politics after the seclusion of the court, and all I have heard confirms this impression.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

[2767 i--11]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 2.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 5.

[230]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey. (Received January 2, 1913.)*

(No. 494.)

Sir,

*Peking, December 18, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose, with a view to its communication to the War Office, copy of an extremely interesting report furnished to me by the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation on the military situation in Mongolia. Major Robertson's report is compiled principally from information given to him by Colonel Walter, the Russian military attaché here, whose description, however, of the agreement signed at Urga on the 3rd November (new style) as conferring independence on Mongolia is not in accordance with the Russian official view. That is a further step which may be expected to result from the reception by the Emperor of Russia of the Mongolian mission now at St. Petersburg.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Report by Major Robertson on the Military Situation in Mongolia.*


COLONEL WALTER, Russian military attaché at Peking, has very kindly given me some information on the military situation in Mongolia generally, as expressed in a letter he had written on the subject dated the 19th November. The gist of this information is as follows :—

During the time which elapsed between the declaration of Mongolian independence by the living Buddha at Urga in November 1911, and its recognition by Russia last October, the Chinese Government, first Imperial and then Republican, was too much occupied with interior events to give attention to Mongolia. Consequently, the success of the Mongols in the capture of Hailar on the 2nd January, and the occupation of Uliassutai on the 16th January, did not call forth any measures for the re-establishment of Chinese power in Mongolia. Later on, when order had been to some extent established in China, the Chinese Government failed to take decisive measures in Mongolia on account of the continued opposition by Russia to the despatch of Chinese troops thither, and the serious warnings made by the Russian Minister in Peking.

The beginning of August may be considered as the turning point in the methods adopted by the Chinese Government as regards Mongolia. The change to a more decisive form of action is marked by two almost simultaneous events, the rising, beginning in the neighbourhood of T'aonan-fu on the 4th August, of the Chassaktu banner of the Khorchin tribe of Inner Mongols under Prince Wu tai, and the taking of Kobdo by Mongols on the 7th August. These events took place in opposite ends of Mongolia, and called forth strong measures by the Chinese Government. The measures taken in the first case were more energetic than in the second, a strong force being moved into the T'aonan-fu district in August and the first half of September, and the rising crushed. In the second case the steps taken were the concentration of troops for an expedition against Kobdo. These troops are still being concentrated, and if the warnings on the part of Russia are not given effect to, a rapid passing of Kobdo into Chinese hands may be expected.

Having disregarded the warnings of Russia by preparing an expedition against Kobdo, and having crushed the T'aonan-fu rising without protest from anyone, the Chinese Government gradually became more enterprising, and began to send troops into the country between these two areas, i.e., into the Jehol and Chahar districts. The troops sent into these two areas were at first few in numbers, and the object of their despatch was the suppression of local disorders. Thus, at the beginning of August there was some excitement among the inhabitants of the salt district around Dolonor, &c., owing to oppression by the authorities, and this caused the despatch of a few hundred men of the artillery of the 1st division from Peking, converted into

[2767 b—5]





extemporised cavalry, followed by a squadron of provincial troops from Hsuan-hua-fu, and a battalion of infantry and a squadron of cavalry of the 1st division from Kalgan.

A further despatch of troops was called forth by the attacks made by Mongol bands who had moved southwards towards Jehol. Thus, as a result of the rising of Prince Wutai in the T'aonan-fu district, parties of Mongol bandits appeared to the north of Jehol towards the end of September, and commenced looting near Kai-lu Hsien. A detachment of the Jehol mixed brigade, quartered in the Jehol district, estimated at one battalion of infantry and one battery artillery, were moved out against them, and later on, at the request of the Jehol Military Governor, a squadron of cavalry of the Wu Wei Tso Chün from Tungehou was sent to Jehol to take its place.


Another movement of troops was caused by the appearance of Mongols on the road from Urga to Kalgan, by the defection of the officials of the Imperial horse-breeding grounds at Talikangai to the cause of the Living Buddha of Urga, and by the threats of a Mongol attack on Kuei Hua Ch'eng. A detachment, numbers unknown, from the 1st division, and 300 Manchu Banner troops, were despatched northwards from Kalgan, these troops being replaced by detachments of the 1st and 3rd divisions from Chih-li and Ho-nan.

The daring shown by the Mongols caused the Government to appoint to the more important posts on the Mongol frontier officials on whom they could rely. On the 30th September, Chang Shao Ts'eng, formerly in command of the 20th division, was nominated assistant military governor at Kuei Hua Ch'eng, and left Peking hurriedly four days earlier, without waiting the announcement of a presidential order. On the 18th October the assistant commissioner of the military office of the President, Fu Liang Tso, was nominated assistant military governor of Chahar, with instructions to remain at Dolonor. These two officials took with them small mixed detachments as escorts.

The weakness of these measures appears to have been due to the warnings from Russia rather than to lack of means or of troops, or to the conviction that strong measures such as those taken for the suppression of the rebellion in the T'aonan Fu district were unnecessary. However, the dispatch by the Russian Government of a Plenipotentiary to Urga and the signing on the 21st October of the agreement recognising the independence of Mongolia, came as a shock to the Chinese Government, and created a decisive impression in every part of China. The Chinese Government remained undecided for a few days, and after trying by peaceful means to alter the agreement, made a sudden change in their policy on the 3rd November, and decided not to recognise the agreement, contracted without their consent, but to re-establish their power in Mongolia. This decision, notwithstanding its apparent rashness in view of the repeated warnings of Russia, is to be explained by pressure of public opinion, which has been stirred in all parts of China by the appeals made by various provincial military governors for the necessity of bold action against Russia, by the offers of funds which have been received by the president from various sources, even from Chinese living abroad, and by the wishes expressed by various well-known military commanders, such as by the commander of the new 27th division in Manchuria, Chang Tso Lin, and Chang Hsün, commanding the troops in South Shantung, to be sent with their forces against Mongolia. Under these conditions, the Government had reason to fear loss of authority if it did not make energetic efforts for the retention of Mongolia and if it did not make a reply to the insult given it. It is, therefore, possible that the Chinese Government may send troops to Mongolia for the crushing of the rising, reckoning on the fact that Russia will not show any practical opposition when matters come to the actual taking of a decisive step. Finally, no small rôle is played by the strong conviction that Russia is not in a position to send forces to Mongolia, that she is wholly occupied with internal disorder, and by an inevitable revolution encouraged by the success of the Chinese revolution. These ideas have now been strengthened by events in the Balkans. The Chinese authorities are consequently convinced that Russia merely intends to make threats, and is not in a position to take action.

Beginning from the last days of October, therefore, the following military measures were reported to have been taken:—

The troops in the neighbourhood of Jehol were reinforced by 1 battalions infantry and 20 guns of the Wu Wei Tso Chün from Tungehou, and 450 Huai Chün cavalry were sent from near Kaiping to Kalgan. The transfer began of the 3rd division to Peking from various stations on the Peking Hankow Railway, beginning with the 9th infantry regiment. Later on news (not corroborated) was received of the intended



(No. 1/13 2428) R.O. China 2967 B-5

Scale:  $\frac{1}{20,000,000}$



sending of one mixed brigade from the 2nd division from Pao-ting-fu towards Jehol, and of another mixed brigade from troops of the Kung Wei Chün from Peking to Kalgan. According to the latest news in the press the Minister of War has ordered four mixed brigades to be prepared from Imperial Guards, Wu Wei Tso Chün, Huai Chün, and 1st division for dispatch towards Jehol, Kalgan, and Kuei Hua Ch'eng, and orders have been given to the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th divisions to be ready to send each one mixed brigade. This information has not been confirmed. Another significant step is the presidential order of the 4th November giving the rank of full general to Ho Tsung Lien, general officer commanding 1st division and military governor of Chahar; to Chang Shao Tseng, assistant military governor of Kuei Hua Ch'eng; and to Chang Hsi Luan, the new military governor of Mukden. All three persons would be the first to take part in a campaign against Mongolia if such were to take place. Some such military measures are likely to appease public opinion, even if they do not actually have as objective a campaign against Russia. It is necessary to note that in China many think that a campaign against Russia is quite impracticable, amongst this number being the War Minister, Tuan Ch'i Jui, who, in answer to a question in the National Assembly, announced that a campaign against Urga was at present impossible, for the following reasons: firstly, the routes in Mongolia were very bad; secondly, Chinese troops, being unaccustomed to withstand cold, would not be able to carry out a campaign in the winter, while the Russians, being accustomed to cold, would be in a better position; thirdly, it would be impossible to send supplies to Mongolia; and, fourthly, troops of different provinces are hostile to each other, and if they took part in an expedition against Mongolia would fight amongst themselves. It was necessary to send troops to Eastern and Inner Mongolia to protect important points, and to prevent the remaining Mongolian Princes from joining the Living Buddha, and in the spring it might be possible to send troops to Urga.

As regards the position of affairs in the Kobdo-Altai district, the turning point was the falling of Kobdo into the hands of the Mongols on the 7th August. The Chinese (about 700 officials, soldiers, merchants, &c.) turned for protection to the Russian consul, and at their request were sent under escort via Siberia. On the 2nd and 3rd September they left Kobdo and reached the border at Khosh-Agatch. This is similar to what happened in Tibet, where the Chinese were sent by the British via India to China. After the fall of Kobdo, in view of the danger threatening the town of Sharasume, the Chinese Government ordered the authorities of Ili and Hsinchiang to send troops into the Kobdo-Altai district. From information at hand to the present time these movements were as follows:—

1. *Troops sent from Ili.*—On the 3rd September a Chinese force, estimated at about 1,300, started out from Kuldja (Ili) towards Kobdo, marching via Borotol, Kobuk, and Saur. They reached the River Irtysh in the beginning of October, and subsequently marched into the Altai district. The force was under the command of a Tungan (Mahometan), called Ma Tu Lin, who had acquired a good reputation during former campaigns, and consisted, according to consular reports, of approximately the following:—

Cavalry from Kuldja	..	..	..	..	..	..	500
"    "    Borotol	..	..	..	..	..	..	500
Artillery (6 guns)	..	..	..	..	..	..	60
Engineers	..	..	..	..	..	..	200

Many of the above troops were Tungans.

2. *Troops sent from Hsinchiang to Sharasume.*—Chinese troops from Manas began to arrive in Sharasume about the middle of September, and by the beginning of October the following had arrived there:—

Cavalry	..	..	..	..	..	..	500
Infantry	..	..	..	..	..	..	600
Artillery	..	..	..	..	..	..	2 guns.

In addition to these, 200 Tungans were sent from Urumchi on the 31st October to Sharasume.

3. *Troops sent from Hsinchiang to Kobdo.*—Before the capture of Kobdo by the Mongols on the 7th August, a Chinese force, estimated in Kobdo at 1,000, was sent towards that town, and arrived within 60 miles of it at the beginning of September. After a few days it retired, owing to the intervention of the Russian consul at Kobdo, who proposed to its commander that, to avoid bloodshed, he should turn back

temporarily, in view of the fact that peaceful negotiations with the Mongols had commenced.

In August there were practically no Chinese troops at Urumchi. Of the Luchün formerly there, some were scattered in small bodies in different towns (*e.g.*, 100 at Urumchi, 300 at Kucheng, and 200 at Barkul), while the remainder had disappeared during the fighting with the Ili troops in the winter and spring.

From the middle of September, however, rumours began to be spread about in Kobdo of the movements of considerable forces from Kucheng, estimated at 1,000 according to latest information. These forces were reported in October to have made their appearance along the whole southern border of the Kobdo district from Sharasume to Zagan Nor, and the Russian consul at Kobdo considered the situation very serious in view of the non-arrival in Kobdo of Russian troops. According to information from Mukden, dated the 1st November, there were 1,000 Chinese troops on the Kucheng-Kobdo road, 200 cavalry and infantry had been dispatched from Kucheng to Kobdo, and 200 Hami Sarts from Hami to Kucheng.

From the above, it appears that the military situation in the Kobdo district is not very clear at present, even to the Russians, who have good sources of information. Colonel Walter states that his information as to the events in the Kobdo district is derived from consular reports, which are necessarily somewhat late in arriving at Peking. The recapture by the Chinese of Kobdo has been reported in the native press.

The Governor of the Altai district is a Mongol prince named Palta, appointed on the 18th April last. Lieutenant G. C. Binsteed, who visited Urga last February, tells me that from conversations with the Russian frontier commissioner at Kiakhta, an expert on Mongolian affairs, he gathers that Prince Palta is very much opposed to Russian influence in Mongolia.

With regard to the Chinese troops sent to the Kobdo-Altai district from Hsinchiang, Major G. E. Pereira, C.M.G., D.S.O., who travelled in Hsinchiang in the summer of 1911 and the winter of 1912, reported that the Chinese were in a bad way from a military point of view, and that their troops were the worst he had seen in the Chinese Empire. He states that the troops at Sharasume were absolutely worthless, and that the regular troops at Ili, the nucleus of a mixed brigade, now consisted chiefly of Mongols, aged 15 to 16. According to Colonel Walter's information, the other Chinese regular force in Hsinchiang, the Urumchi mixed brigade, was practically broken up during the fighting with the Ili revolutionaries, so that it appears the Chinese are attempting to recover Western Mongolia with the Hsinchiang provincial troops ("hsün fang tui"). Most of these latter troops, estimated in 1910 at 8,500, were normally scattered about in small detachments, chiefly at places on the Hami-Urumchi-Ili road and the Hami-Kashgar road. Major Pereira describes the troops at Urumchi in February last as follows:—

"Owing to lack of soldiers during the recent troubles, the Governor of Urumchi had to enlist some Tungans. These men are totally lacking in discipline. He even had to have recourse to assistance from the Sart soldiers of the Hami princes. The Chinese have made attempts in the past to enlist Sart soldiers, but they have always proved useless. On the road from Urumchi to Hami I passed a troop of seventy Hsi-po Manchus, sent from Hami to swell the rabble collected by the governor at Urumchi, a ragged lot, with antique single-loading carbines, lances, and banners, whom I should have mistaken for a theatrical troupe on tour if I had had no previous experience of the military resources of the Chinese Empire."

With regard to the mixed brigade of Luchün at Urumchi, Major Pereira wrote:—

"As an example of the inefficiency of the Urumchi Luchün, only one officer was acquainted with the manner of working the guns, and as he happened to have been one of the few men killed in putting down the revolt, the artillery was rendered useless."

To attempt, as the Chinese seem to be doing, to organise out of such troops a force strong enough to hold Kobdo against the Mongols will probably be a difficult matter, if the latter are supported by Russia and are given some training and supplied with arms.

D. S. ROBERTSON, *Military Attaché.*

Peking, December 18, 1912.



Register No.

449

Put away with <sup>7611</sup> 529  
Secret Department. 12

Minute Paper.

● 3 Letters from F.O.

Dated } 30 Jan. 1913.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	4 Feb.	J.R.S.	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	5	P.W.H.	The Russo-Mongolian Convention.
Committee.....			Request for British recognition of Mongolian
Under Secretary.....			"independence".
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 31 Jan. 1913, Seq. No. 5

Seen Pol Com. Sec.,  
11 FEB 1913

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers:—

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## CHINESE WARNING TO MONGOLIA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 28.

China is urging the Khutukhta to recognize the Republic. He is reminded of the fate of Korea, and warned that in the event of war the responsibility will fall upon him.

"Times", 29 Jan. 1913

## MONGOLIAN FEARS OF CHINESE AGGRESSION.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 30.

The Mongolian envoys have been informed by their Government that Chinese incursions constitute a growing menace. It will be for the Russian Government to decide when the moment has arrived for armed intervention in the sense of the Russo-Mongolian Treaty. The Mongolians are reported to be nervous and anxious that Russia should send out arms and men as soon as possible.

"Times", 31 Jan. 1913



11318 ✓

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 16.]

SECTION 2.

[1251]

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 21.)

*Foreign Office, January 16, 1913.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Peking, enclosing a translation of a letter from the Mongolian Board of Foreign Affairs to this Office, in which His Majesty's Government are requested to recognise Mongolia's declaration of independence. I do not propose that any reply should be made to this communication.\*

I should be glad if your Excellency would keep me informed of the results of the Mongolian Mission to St. Petersburg reported in the last paragraph of Sir J. Jordan's despatch.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

• Sir J. Jordan's No. 502, December 20, 1912.

[2767 q-2]



SE 5

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 13.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[1682]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)*

(No. 4.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 6, 1913.*


WITH reference to your despatch No. 430 of the 27th of last month, I have the honour to report that, in reply to the enquiries which I addressed to him as to the meaning of the word "Mongolia," as used in the Russo-Mongolian agreement and protocol, M. Sazonof informed me that the arrangement embodied in those instruments apply only to Western and Outer Mongolia, and not to the whole of that country.

His Excellency added that he had already given assurances to the Japanese Government to the above effect.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2767 n—1]





[A]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 9.]

SECTION 8.

[1251]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9, 1913.)*

(No. 502.)

Sir,

*Peking, December 20, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to forward copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Harbin, enclosing a document issued under the auspices of Chi Pu Tsun Tan Pa La Ma, better known simply as the Hutukhtu of Urga, in which His Majesty's Government are requested to recognise Mongolia's declaration of independence. Under ordinary circumstances the request would not merit attention, but the Russian Minister apparently regards it as by no means an empty declaration, and it may therefore possibly prove to be a forerunner of recognition at St. Petersburg. M. Kroupensky has several times asked me if I was transmitting the document to His Majesty's Government and seemed especially anxious to emphasise its importance.

I may mention that according to telegrams from Kiakhta, dated the 19th November, and published by the St. Petersburg Telegraph Agency, a detachment of Cossacks was at that time being dispatched to Urga, while the Mongolians had taken over the Chinese Government telegraph which meets the Russian system at Kiakhta, and at Urga itself the Chinese telegraph operator had been removed and replaced by a Russian. The report also stated, that Russian troops were being sent to Western Mongolia for the protection of Russian interests, but whether their destination was Koko, Uliassutai, or elsewhere, is not known. 16

A deputation of Mongols, including the Foreign Minister of the new Government at Urga, starts for St. Petersburg to-morrow and, according to my Russian colleague, they will probably ask for recognition. The Chinese Government were duly informed of this mission by the Russian Minister and made ineffectual efforts to have it cancelled.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Consul Willis to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 44.)

Sir,

*Harbin, December 13, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose, in original, a document handed in to this office this morning by a Mongolian, which purports to be a letter addressed to the British Foreign Office by the Mongolian Foreign Board.

I also forward an English translation of the letter.

The bearer was unable to speak Chinese, and I was consequently unable to obtain any information from him.

I have, &c.

ROBERT WILLIS.


Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

*Mongolian Foreign Board to the British Foreign Office.*

(Translation.)

THE Mongolian Foreign Board has received instructions from the Mongolian Government to the effect that Mongolia, with the view of securing the possession of her original territory, and the maintenance of her religion, has, on account of the division of the Manchu Empire, decided to establish her independence, and that the Chief of the Mongolian Yellow Sect, Chi Pu Tsun Tan Pa La Ma, has been elected King of Mongolia and Protector of the Religion. The style of the year has been changed to Kung tai. The Foreign Board should therefore inform all foreign countries in this sense.

[2767 i-8]



Accordingly, in addition to informing every country, the Board writes this despatch to the British Foreign Office, with the request that its contents may be brought to the notice of the British Government, so that the said Government may grant recognition and make a commercial treaty in furtherance of good relations.

*Kung tai, 2nd year, 10th moon, 9th day.*

(Letter handed to His Britannic Majesty's consulate, Harbin, by a Mongolian on the 13th December, 1912.)

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 9.]

SECTION 4.

[1889]

No. 1.


*Question asked in the House of Commons, January 9, 1913.*

Mr. Ginnell,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is now in a position to say with what Government were made Russia's previous treaties relating to Mongolia which Russia was getting confirmed by a convention with Lamas at Urga.

*Answer.*

The treaties, to which the honourable member presumably refers, were concluded with the Chinese Government.

[2767 i—4]



CHINA. No. 1 (1913).

## DESPATCHES

FROM

HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT ST. PETERSBURGH

TRANSMITTING THE

RUSSO-MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT AND


PROTOCOL OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> OCTOBER

(3<sup>RD</sup> NOVEMBER), 1912.

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty.  
February 1913.*

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2	" " ..	Dec. 1,	Transmits translation of the protocol annexed to the Russo-Mongolian Agreement ..	3

Despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg transmitting the Russo-Mongolian Agreement and Protocol of the 21st October (3rd November), 1912.

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)*

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, November 8, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the recently signed Russo-Mongolian Agreement, which has been communicated to His Majesty's Embassy by the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Accord.*

PAR suite du désir unanimement proclamé par les Mongols de maintenir la constitution nationale et historique de leur pays, les troupes et les autorités chinoises furent obligées d'évacuer le territoire mongol, et Djebzoun Damba-Khutukhta fut proclamé Souverain du peuple mongol. Les anciens rapports entre la Mongolie et la Chine prirent ainsi fin.

A l'heure actuelle, prenant en considération les faits ci-dessus exposés ainsi que l'amitié réciproque qui a toujours existé entre les peuples russe et mongol, et vu la nécessité de définir exactement le régime auquel est soumis le commerce mutuel russo-mongol ;

Le Conseiller d'État actuel Jean Korostovetz, dûment autorisé à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie ; et

Le protecteur des dix mille doctrines Sain-noin Khan Namnan-Souroun, Président du Conseil des Ministres mongol ;

Le plénipotentiaire Tchinsouzkou Tzin-van Lama Tzerin-Tchimet, Ministre de l'Intérieur ;

Le plénipotentiaire Daitzin-van Handa-dorji, ayant le grade de Khan-erdeni, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ;

Le plénipotentiaire Erdeni Dalai Tzun-van Gombo-Souroun, Ministre de la Guerre ;

Le plénipotentiaire Touchetou Tzun-van Tchakdorjab, Ministre des Finances ; et

Le plénipotentiaire Erdeni Tzun-van Namsarai, Ministre de la Justice ;

Dûment autorisés par le Souverain du peuple mongol, par le Gouvernement mongol, et par les Princes gouvernants, se sont entendus sur ce qui suit :—

ARTICLE 1<sup>er</sup>.

Le Gouvernement Impérial de Russie prêterait son concours à la Mongolie pour conserver le régime autonome qu'elle a établi, ainsi que le droit d'avoir son armée nationale et de n'admettre sur son territoire ni la présence des troupes chinoises ni la colonisation de ses terres par les chinois.

ARTICLE 2.

Le Souverain de Mongolie et le Gouvernement mongol accorderont, comme par le passé aux sujets et au commerce russes la jouissance dans leurs possessions des droits et des privilèges qui sont énumérés dans le protocole ci-annexé.

Il est bien entendu qu'il ne sera pas accordé à d'autres sujets étrangers en Mongolie plus de droits que ceux dont y jouiront les sujets russes.

### ARTICLE 3.

Si le Gouvernement mongol trouvait nécessaire de conclure un traité séparé avec la Chine ou une autre Puissance étrangère, ce nouveau traité ne devra en aucun cas ni porter atteinte aux clauses du présent accord et du protocole y annexé, ni les modifier sans le consentement du Gouvernement Impérial de Russie.

### ARTICLE 4.

Le présent accord amical entrera en vigueur à partir du jour de sa signature.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs, ayant comparé les deux textes, russe et mongol, du présent accord, fait en deux exemplaires, et ayant trouvé ces deux textes conformes, les ont signés y ont apposé leurs sceaux et ont échangé ces textes.

Fait à Ourga, le 21 octobre, 1912, correspondant au 24<sup>e</sup> jour du dernier mois d'automne de la 2<sup>e</sup> année du règne de l'Unanimentement Proclamé du calendrier mongol.

(Translation.)

### *Agreement.*

IN accordance with the desire unanimously expressed by the Mongolians to maintain the national and historic constitution of their country, the Chinese troops and authorities were obliged to evacuate Mongolian territory, and Djebzoun Damba-Khutukhta was proclaimed Ruler of the Mongolian people. The old relations between Mongolia and China thus came to an end.

At the present moment, taking into consideration the facts stated above, as well as the mutual friendship which has always existed between the Russian and Mongolian nations, and in view of the necessity of defining exactly the system regulating trade between Russia and Mongolia ;

The actual State Councillor Jean Korostovetz, duly authorised for the purpose by the Imperial Russian Government ; and

The protector of the ten thousand doctrines Sain-noin Khan Namnan-Souroun, President of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia ;

The plenipotentiary Tchinsouzkouktou Tzin-van Lama Tzerin-Tchimet, Minister of the Interior ;

The plenipotentiary Daitzin-van Handa-dorji, of the rank of Khan-erdeni, Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

The plenipotentiary Erdeni Dalai Tzun-van Gombo-Souroun, Minister of War ;

The plenipotentiary Touchetou Tzun-van Tchakdorjab, Minister of Finance ; and

The plenipotentiary Erdeni Tzun-van Namsarai, Minister of Justice ;

Duly authorised by the Ruler of the Mongolian nation, by the Mongolian Government and by the ruling Princes, have agreed as follows :—

### ARTICLE 1.

The Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous régime which she has established, as also the right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonisation of her land by the Chinese.

### ARTICLE 2.

The Ruler of Mongolia and the Mongolian Government shall grant, as in the past, to Russian subjects and trade the enjoyment in their possessions of the rights and privileges enumerated in the protocol annexed hereto.

It is well understood that there shall not be granted to other foreign subjects in Mongolia rights not enjoyed there by Russian subjects.



## ARTICLE 3.

If the Mongolian Government finds it necessary to conclude a separate treaty with China or another foreign Power, the new treaty shall in no case either infringe the clauses of the present agreement and of the protocol annexed thereto, or modify them without the consent of the Imperial Russian Government.

## ARTICLE 4.

The present amicable agreement shall come into force from the date of its signature.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries, having compared the two texts, Russian and Mongolian, of the present agreement, made in duplicate, and having found the two texts to correspond, have signed them, have affixed thereto their seals, and have exchanged texts.

Done at Urga on the 21st October, 1912, corresponding to the 24th day of the last autumn month of the 2nd year of the reign of the Unanimously Proclaimed, according to the Mongolian calendar.

## No. 2.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)*

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 1, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of the protocol annexed to the Russo-Mongolian agreement of the 21st October (3rd November) last.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

## Enclosure in No. 2.

*Protocol annexed to Russo-Mongolian Agreement of the 21st October (3rd November), 1912.*

BY virtue of the enactment of the second article of the agreement, signed on this date between Actual State Councillor, Ivan Korostovets, Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Russian Government, and the President of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Sain-noin Khan Namnan-Souroun, the Protector of ten thousand doctrines; the Plenipotentiary and Minister of the Interior, Tchin-souzouktou Tzin-van Lama Tzerin-Tchimet; the Plenipotentiary and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Daitzin-van Handa-dorji of the rank of Khan-erdeni; the Plenipotentiary and Minister of War, Erdeni Dalai Tzun-van Gombo-Souroun; the Plenipotentiary and Minister of Finance, Touchetou Tzun-van Tchakdorjab; and the Plenipotentiary and Minister of Justice, Erdeni Tzun-van Namsarai, on the authority of the Ruler of Mongolia, the Mongolian Government, and the Ruling Princes; the above-named Plenipotentiaries have come to an agreement respecting the following articles, in which are set forth the rights and privileges of Russian subjects in Mongolia, some of which they already enjoy, and the rights and privileges of Mongolian subjects in Russia:—

## ARTICLE 1.

Russian subjects, as formerly, shall enjoy the right to reside and move freely from one place to another throughout Mongolia; to engage there in every kind of commercial, industrial, and other business; and to enter into agreements of various kinds, whether with individuals, or firms, or institutions, official or private, Russian, Mongolian, Chinese, or foreign.

## ARTICLE 2.

Russian subjects, as formerly, shall enjoy the right at all times to import and export, without payment of import and export dues, every kind of product of the soil and industry of Russia, Mongolia and China, and other countries, and to trade freely in it without payment of any duties, taxes, or other dues.

The enactments of this (2nd) article shall not extend to combined Russo-Chinese undertakings, or to Russian subjects falsely declaring themselves to be owners of wares not their property.

## ARTICLE 3.

Russian credit institutions shall have the right to open branches in Mongolia, and to transact all kinds of financial and other business, whether with individuals, institutions, or companies.

## ARTICLE 4.

Russian subjects may conclude purchases and sales in cash or by an exchange of wares (barter), and they may conclude agreements on credit. Neither "khoshuns" nor the Mongolian Treasury shall be held responsible for the debts of private individuals.

## ARTICLE 5.

The Mongolian authorities shall not preclude Mongolians or Chinese from completing any kind of commercial agreement with Russian subjects, from entering into their personal service, or into commercial and industrial undertakings formed by them. No rights of monopoly as regards commerce or industry shall be granted to any official or private companies, institutions, or individuals in Mongolia. It is, of course, understood that companies and individuals who have already received such monopolies from the Mongolian Government previous to the conclusion of this agreement shall retain their rights and privileges until the expiry of the period fixed.

## ARTICLE 6.

Russian subjects shall be everywhere granted the right, whether in towns or "khoshuns," to hold allotments on lease, or to acquire them as their own property for the purpose of organising commercial industrial establishments, and also for the purpose of constructing houses, shops, and stores. In addition, Russian subjects shall have the right to lease vacant lands for cultivation. It is, of course, understood that these allotments shall be obtained and leased for the above-specified purposes, and not for speculative aims. These allotments shall be assigned by agreement with the Mongolian Government in accordance with existing laws of Mongolia, everywhere excepting in sacred places and pasture lands.

## ARTICLE 7.

Russian subjects shall be empowered to enter into agreements with the Mongolian Government respecting the working of minerals and timber, fisheries, &c.

## ARTICLE 8.

The Russian Government shall have the right, in agreement with the Government of Mongolia, to appoint consuls in those parts of Mongolia it shall deem necessary.

Similarly, the Mongolian Government shall be empowered to have Government agents at those frontier parts of the Empire where, by mutual agreement, it shall be found necessary.

## ARTICLE 9.

At points where there are Russian consulates, as also in other localities of importance for Russian trade, there shall be allotted, by mutual agreement between Russian consuls and the Mongolian Government, special "factories" for various branches

of industry and the residence of Russian subjects. These "factories" shall be under the exclusive control of the above-mentioned consuls, or of the heads of Russian commercial companies if there be no Russian consul.

#### ARTICLE 10.

Russian subjects, in agreement with the Mongolian Government, shall retain the right to institute, at their own cost, a postal service for the dispatch of letters and the transit of wares between various localities in Mongolia and also between specified localities and points on the Russian frontier. In the event of the construction of "stages" and other necessary buildings, the regulations set forth in article 6 of this protocol must be duly observed.

#### ARTICLE 11.

Russian consuls in Mongolia, in case of need, shall avail themselves of Mongolian Government postal establishments and messengers for the dispatch of official correspondence, and for other official requirements, provided that the gratuitous requisition for this purpose shall not exceed one hundred horses and thirty camels per month. On every occasion, a courier's passport must be obtained from the Government of Mongolia. When travelling, Russian consuls, and Russian officials in general, shall avail themselves of the same establishments upon payment. The right to avail themselves of Mongolian Government "stages" shall be extended to private individuals, who are Russian subjects, upon payment for the use of such "stages" of amounts which shall be determined in agreement with the Mongolian Government.

#### ARTICLE 12.

Russian subjects shall be granted the right to sail their own merchant-vessels on, and to trade with the inhabitants along the banks of, those rivers and their tributaries which, running first through Mongolia, subsequently enter Russian territory. The Russian Government shall afford the Government of Mongolia assistance in the improvement of navigation on these rivers, the establishment of the necessary beacons, &c. The Mongolian Government authorities shall assign on these rivers places for the berthing of vessels, for the construction of wharves and warehouses, for the preparation of fuel, &c., being guided on these occasions by the enactments of article 6 of the present protocol.

#### ARTICLE 13.

Russian subjects shall have the right to avail themselves of all land and water routes for the carriage of wares and the droving of cattle, and, upon agreement with the Mongolian authorities, they may construct, at their own cost, bridges, ferries, &c., with the right to exact a special due from persons crossing over.

#### ARTICLE 14.

Travelling cattle, the property of Russian subjects, may stop for the purpose of resting and feeding. In the event of prolonged halts being necessary, the local authorities shall assign proper pasturage areas along travelling cattle routes, and at cattle markets. Fees shall be exacted for the use of these pasturing areas for periods exceeding three months.

#### ARTICLE 15.

The established usage of the Russian frontier population harvesting (hay), as also hunting and fishing, across the Mongolian border shall remain in force in the future without any alteration.

#### ARTICLE 16.

Agreements between Russian subjects and institutions on the one side and Mongolians and Chinese on the other may be concluded verbally or in writing, and the contracting parties may present the agreement concluded to the local Government authorities for certification. Should the latter see any objection to certifying the contract, they must immediately notify the fact to a Russian consul, and the misunderstanding which has arisen shall be settled in agreement with him.



CHINA. No. 1 (1913).

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DESPATCHES from His Majesty's Ambassador at  
St. Petersburg transmitting the Russo-Mon-  
golian Agreement and Protocol of the 21st  
October (3rd November), 1912.

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*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-  
mand of His Majesty. February 1913.*

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LONDON  
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

Put away with *524* *Political* Department *12*

PARLIAMENTARY NOTICE.

SESSION 191<sup>3</sup>.

1913

	Date.	Initial.	HOUSE OF COMMONS.
Under Secretary.....	30 Jan.	J.S.	Question by <i>Mr. Lynch</i>
Parliamentary Under Secretary.			For <i>Monday 3<sup>rd</sup> Feb</i> 191 <sup>3</sup> .
Secretary of State.....	31	J.W.H.	

- \*22. Mr. Lynch, — To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the Russian Government has communicated the terms of the recent Russo-Mongolian Convention, and, if so, what are the precise terms; and whether His Majesty's Government is aware that the Convention in question has been formally repudiated by the majority of the Mongolian princes. [*Monday 3rd February.*]

MINUTE ~~OR SUGGESTION~~ REPLY.

*For information*

Register No.

318

Put away with

539

12

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 20. 2252

Dated 23 } Jan. 1913.  
Rec. 24 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	28 Jan	AW	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	28	J.W.H	Text of Protocol attached to the
Committee .....	29	E	Russo-Mongolian Convention.
Under Secretary.....			The Mongolian Mission to St-
Secretary of State.....			Petersburgh.

Copy to India - See within

## FOR INFORMATION.

As regards the point discussed in the F.O. notes on P. 145/13 below - viz:- how far Russia's new position in Mongolia under the Urga Convention & Protocol differs from her old one under the Treaties with China, - the most important provision in the Protocol seems to be Article 8 relating to the appt of Russian Consuls.

Under the Treaties (see Departmental note on P. 4916/12) Russia acquired the right to establish Consulates at certain specified places in Mongolia, viz:- Urga and Tarbatgai (Chuguchalk), as well

SEEN 401 562780  
4 FEB 1913

Previous Papers:—

266



well as the provisional right, subject to the development of trade & the consent of the Chinese Govt, to post Consuls at certain other specified places, viz: - Kobdo & Uliassutai. Under Article 8 of the Protocol Russia acquires the right, subject to the concurrence of the Mongolian Govt, which in practice is likely to be little more than a form, to place consuls anywhere in Mongolia that she may "deem necessary".

THE MONGOLIAN MISSION AT  
TSARSKOE SELO.

RECEPTION BY THE TSAR.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 23.

The Mongolian envoys were received by the Tsar at Tsarskoé Selo to-day, when they presented to his Majesty the gifts which they had brought with them from the Khutukhta and the Mongolian Government. The Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is at the head of the Mission, has been decorated by the Tsar with the First Class of the Order of Saint Anne, and the other envoys have likewise received decorations. The members of the party were escorted and presented by the former Russian Consul-General at Urga.

The envoys are understood to have expressed to the Tsar the Khutukhta's profound appreciation of the assurance of Russian support contained in the Russo-Mongolian Treaty, and the hope that this support would be secured to Mongolia for all time.

The reception of the Mission by the Tsar marks formal recognition of the state of affairs between Russia and Mongolia which was inaugurated by the treaty of last October.

"Times", 24 January 1913.

P.T.O.

## RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN MONGOLIA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 26.

The Mongolian Envoys have had an interview with the Minister for War, to whom they applied for the despatch of Russian military instructors and weapons to Mongolia. General Sukhomlinoff is said to have replied in a favourable sense. Several instructors have already been engaged in training Mongolian troops, and the extent to which the instructional staff can be increased will depend on the financial resources at the disposal of the Mongolian Government.

"Times", 27 January 1913

## MONGOLIAN GRATITUDE TO RUSSIA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 27.

The substance of the Mongolian Foreign Minister's address to the Tsar on the occasion of the reception of the Mongolian envoys at Tsarskoe Selo last week has been reproduced in the *Novoe Vremya*. According to this account, the speech of Chanda Dordshi described the Russo-Mongolian Treaty of October 21 as the foundation-stone of the autonomous State of Mongolia, and declared that, thanks to the Tsar's powerful protection, the welfare of the Mongolian people would now, more than ever, be secured. His Majesty expressed appreciation for these sentiments and wished prosperity to Mongolia.

"Times",

28 January 1913




In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 2252

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.




*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India*

*and, by direction of the Secretary of  
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

Foreign Office,

January 23, 1913.



*Reference to previous letter :*

*Description of Inclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
H. M. Ambassador at St. Petersburg No. 10  January 13, 1913	Visit of Mongolian Deputation to St. Petersburg.



*(Similar letter sent to*

No. 10

ST. PETERSBURG,

2252

January 13, 1913.

JAN 16 1913

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that a Mongolian Deputation from the Khutukhta consisting of sixteen delegates with the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs at its head arrived in St. Petersburg on the 9th. instant "in order", as the Reeh says, "to express the gratitude of the Mongolian authorities for Russia's recognition of the independence of Mongolia."

The Press publishes details as to the career of the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs from which it appears that he has always been a strong advocate of close and friendly relations with Russia as being the most practicable method of developing Mongolia. He was head of the deputation which visited St. Petersburg in September 1911 when he begged for Russian protection. On his return to Mongolia, the Minister, who was about 40 years of age and was very popular there, was marked out for punishment

by

The Right Honble.

Sir E. Grey Bart., K.G., M.P.,

etc., etc., etc.

by the Chinese Government and his position was extremely precarious until the Revolutionary Movement took place. He is said to enjoy the close confidence of the Khutukhta who desires to visit St. Petersburg. It is stated that the deputation will stay here for about three weeks and will be received by the Emperor at Tsarkoe Selo and by various official persons. The Mission is supposed to have considerable political significance and to be about to establish closer relations with Russia. Monsieur Shishmarev, Russian Consul-General at Urga who has served for 40 years in Mongolia, is attached to the Mission during its stay in the Capital.

The "Rech" says that in the audience which the deputation will have with Monsieur Sazonow on the 15th, instant the question of appointing a permanent Mongolian Representative at St. Petersburg will be raised, this being the wish of the Khutukhta. It is said that the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs is not averse to this idea in principle but that it considers it to be premature.

I have the honour to be

with the highest respect

Sir

your most obedient humble servant.

(Sd) George W. Buchanan.



*H. H. Grey*

318/13

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 9.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 1.

[1001]

No. 1.

*Foreign Office to Board of Trade.*

(Confidential.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of despatches from His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg enclosing translations of the agreement and protocol recently concluded between the Russian Government and the Mongolian Government.\*

Sir E. Grey would be glad to be informed whether, in the opinion of the Board, this protocol calls for any objections on the part of His Majesty's Government as infringing the most favoured nation rights of British subjects in Mongolia under the Anglo-Chinese treaties or the principle of the "open door."

It is understood that the agreement and protocol affect outer Mongolia only.


The favour of an early reply is requested.

I am, &c.

W. LANGLEY.

\* Sir G. Buchanan, No. 331, November 8; ditto, No. 354, December 1, 1912.

[2767 i-1]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

318/13  
[December 27.]

SECTION 4.

[51698]

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 430.)

Sir,

5 Foreign Office, December 27, 1912.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 334 of the 1st instant, enclosing a translation of the protocol annexed to the Russo-Mongolian agreement of the 21st October (3rd November) last.

I observe that both the text of the agreement and the protocol refer to the rights of Russian subjects in Mongolia, whereas the memorandum communicated to your Excellency by M. Sazonof on the 25th October (7th November) last describes the agreement as applying to Outer Mongolia only.


M. Sazonof further, in the course of his conversation with me on the 8th October last (see my despatch No. 336, Confidential, of the 8th October), stated specifically that the arrangements contemplated applied to Outer Mongolia.

I should be glad, therefore, if you would enquire from the Russian Government whether, as I had understood from M. Sazonof, the agreement and protocol now concluded apply to Outer Mongolia only, or whether their application extends to the whole of that country.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2737 dd-4]



[This Document

26.  
of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

AFFAIRS OF C

[December 4.]

CONFIDENTIAL

318/13  
SECTION 6.

[51698]

No. 1.

Sir G

Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)

(No. 354.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, December 1, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 331 of the 8th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of the protocol annexed to the Russo-Mongolian Agreement of the 21st October (3rd November) last.

68/12 The Russian Government in forwarding this document to me request that, until it be published, it may be considered as confidential.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Protocol annexed to Russo-Mongolian Agreement of the 21st October (3rd November), 1912.

BY virtue of the enactment of the second article of the agreement, signed on this date between Actual State Councillor, Ivan Korostovets, Plenipotentiary of the Imperial Russian Government, and the President of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Sain-noin Khan Namnan-Souroun; the Protector of ten thousand doctrines; the Plenipotentiary and Minister of the Interior, Tchin-souzouktou Tzin-van Lama Tzerin-Tchimet; the Plenipotentiary and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Daitzin-van Handa-dorji of the rank of Khan-erdeni; the Plenipotentiary and Minister for War, Erdeni Dalai tzun-van Gombo-Souroun; the Plenipotentiary and Minister of Finance, Touchetou Tzun-van Tchakdorjab; and the Plenipotentiary and Minister for Justice, Erdeni tzun-van Namsarai, on the authority of the Ruler of Mongolia, the Mongol Government, and the Ruling Princes; the above-named Plenipotentiaries have come to an agreement respecting the following articles, in which are set forth the rights and privileges, some of which are already enjoyed by Russian subjects in Mongolia, and the rights and privileges of Mongol subjects in Russia:—

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Russian subjects, as formerly, shall enjoy the right to reside and move from one place to another freely throughout Mongolia; to engage there in every kind of commercial, industrial, and other business; and to enter into agreements of various kinds, whether with individuals, or firms, or institutions, official or private, Russian, Mongol, Chinese, or foreign.

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
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The enactments of this (2nd) article shall not extend to combined Russo-Chinese undertakings, or to Russian subjects falsely declaring themselves to be owners of wares not their property.

#### ARTICLE 3.

Russian credit institutions shall have the right to open branches in Mongolia, and to perform all kinds of financial and other operations, whether with individuals, institutions, or companies.

[2737 d-6]





China print

Dec. 4, 1912

Sec. 6

26

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[December 4.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 6.

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
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[2737 d-6]



2

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Similarly, the Mongol Government shall be empowered to have Government agents at those frontier parts of the Empire where, by mutual agreement, it shall be found necessary.

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every occasion, a courier's passport must be obtained from the Government of Mongolia. When travelling, Russian consuls, and Russian officials in general, shall avail themselves of the same establishments upon payment. The right to avail themselves of Mongol Government "stages" shall be extended to private individuals who are Russian subjects upon payment for the use of such "stages" in amounts which will be determined in agreement with the Mongol Government.

#### ARTICLE 12.

Russian subjects shall be granted the right to sail their own merchant vessels, and to trade with the inhabitants along the banks, on those rivers and their tributaries which, running first through Mongolia, subsequently enter Russian territory. The Russian Government will afford the Government of Mongolia assistance in the improvement of navigation on these rivers, the establishment of the necessary beacons, &c. The Mongol Government authorities will assign on these rivers those places necessary for the berthing of vessels, construction of wharves and warehouses, for the preparation of fuel, &c., being guided on these occasions by the enactments of article 6 of the present protocol.

#### ARTICLE 13.

Russian subjects shall have the right to avail themselves of all land and water routes for the carriage of wares and the droving of cattle, and, upon agreement with the Mongol authorities, they may construct, at their own cost, bridges, ferries, &c., with the right to impose a special due from persons crossing over.

#### ARTICLE 14.

Travelling cattle, the property of Russian subjects, may be halted for the purpose of resting and feeding. In the event of prolonged halts being necessary, the local authorities will assign proper pasturage areas along travelling cattle routes, and at trading points for stock. Fees will be exacted for the use of these pasturing areas for periods exceeding three months.

#### ARTICLE 15.

The established usage of the Russian frontier population of harvesting (hay), as also hunting and fishing, across the Mongol border shall remain in force in the future without any alteration.

#### ARTICLE 16.

Agreements between Russian subjects and institutions on the one side and Mongols and Chinese on the other may be concluded verbally or in writing, and the contracting parties may present the agreement concluded to the local Government authorities for authentication. Should the latter see any objection towards certifying the contract, they must immediately notify the fact to a Russian consul, and the misunderstanding which has arisen shall be settled in agreement with him.

It is hereby laid down that contracts respecting real estate must be in written form, and presented for authentication and confirmation to the proper Mongol Government authorities and a Russian consul. Documents bestowing rights to work the natural wealth require confirmation of the Government of Mongolia.

In the event of disputes arising over agreements concluded verbally or in writing, the parties may settle the matter amicably with the assistance of arbitrators selected by each party. Should no settlement be reached by this method, the matter shall be decided by a mixed legal commission.

Mixed legal commissions shall be permanent and temporary. Permanent commissions shall be instituted at points of residence of Russian consuls, and shall consist of the consul, or his representative, and a delegate of the authorities of Mongolia of corresponding rank. Temporary commissions shall be opened outside the points specified as cases arise, and shall consist of representatives of a Russian consul and the prince of that "khoshun" to which the defendant belongs or in which he resides. Mixed commissions shall be empowered to call as experts informed persons from among Russian subjects, Mongols, and Chinese. The decision of mixed legal commissions shall be put into execution without delay, in the case of Russian subjects through a Russian consul, and in the case of Mongols and Chinese through the prince of the "khoshun" to which the defendant belongs or in which he is resident.



## ARTICLE 17.

The present protocol shall come into force from the date of its signature.

In verification of the above, the respective plenipotentiaries, finding, upon comparison of the two parallel texts of the present protocol—Russian and Mongol—drawn up in duplicate, that the texts are conformable, have signed each of them, affixed their seals, and exchanged texts.

Executed at Urga, the 21st October, 1912 (o.s.), and by the Mongol calendar, on the twenty-fourth day of the last autumn moon, in the second year of the administration of the "Raised by all."

In the original follow the signature of M. Korostovets, Minister Plenipotentiary; and in the Mongol language the signatures of the President of the Mongol Council of Ministers, and the Plenipotentiaries, the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, War, Finance, and of Justice.

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47

Register No.

Put away with 539  
12

Minute Paper.

266

Secret Department.

Letter from 70.

Dated 21 } Jan. 1913.  
Rec. 22 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	24 Jan	J.S.	<u>Mongolia</u>  Russo-Chinese negotiations
Secretary of State.....	24	P.H.H.	
Committee.....	25	E.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

SECRETARY'S NO. 4  
24 Jan. 1913  
COPY TO INDIA

FOR INFORMATION.

SENT FOR COM. 28.  
4 FEB 1913  
(with 288)

Previous Papers:—

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CONFIDENTIAL.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21, 3.45 P.M.)*

*Peking, January 21, 1913.*

*(January 21, 3.55 P.M.)*

(No. 16.) R.

MONGOLIA.

Following, according to Russian Minister, is the present state of negotiations:—

Chinese undertake to refrain from colonisation and are willing to concede to Mongolia an administrative régime, but they decline to agree to the exclusion of Chinese troops or to confirm commercial privileges which the protocol confers upon Russia.

Russia, on her part, naturally insisting upon the exclusion of troops and the fulfilment of the benefits of the protocol, undertakes that any political agreements with Mongolia shall be subject to approval of China. The latter has been warned that further delay will not improve her position.

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Register No.

195

Put away with

539 1/2

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

2 Letters from 20.

Dated } 16 Jan. 1913.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	18 Jan.	AA	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	20	P. W. H.	Russo-Mongolian Agreement: attitude
Committee .....	22	C.	of Chinese Govt
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India, 17 Jan. 1913, No. 3.

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Rot Comtee.  
4 FEB 1913

Previous Papers:—

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## THE MONGOLIAN ENVOYS IN RUSSIA.

### BANK SCHEMES FOR URGA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 17.

It is possible that the Mongolian envoys may be received at Tsarskoe Selo next week instead of to-morrow. The horses that are to be presented to the Tsar have only just arrived, and need rest in order to recover condition. Yesterday and to-day the principal members of the mission have had interviews with the competent Ministers, with whom they have discussed the objects of their visit.

A concession for establishing a bank in Mongolia was granted some time ago to two Russian subjects, one of whom is adviser to the Khutukhta. As it was believed that there was no immediate prospect of raising the necessary three million roubles (£300,000) in Russia, the *concessionnaires* were credited with the intention of appealing to the London money market. According to an Irkutsk telegram to the *Russkoe Slovo*, the representatives of Russian interests apprehended a diversion of Mongolian trade to China ports, and the Irkutsk Chamber of Commerce has adopted a resolution recommending the foundation of a Mongolian State Bank or the opening of a branch of the Russo-Asiatic Bank at Urga. The tentative experiment on the part of Mongolia and Tibet in establishing a joint bank with an initial capital of £2,000 or £3,000 seems destined to remain purely whimsical.

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"Times", 18 January 1913

MONGOLIAN ENVOYS IN RUSSIA.  
TIBETAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 15.

The Mongolian envoys called upon the Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonoff, this afternoon, and, according to present arrangements, will be received by the Tsar on Saturday. A gift of horses has been brought by the Mission for his Majesty.

The *Retch* learns from Urga that Dorjieff, who has arrived there on a special mission from the Dalai Lama, has formally notified the Khutukhta of the proclamation of independence by Tibet. The Tibetan emissary declares that he is authorized to conclude an agreement with Mongolia and to negotiate with Russia with a view to placing Tibet under an Anglo-Russian protectorate. The Dalai Lama is represented as being willing to grant Great Britain and Russia equal commercial rights and concessions.

The Russian Foreign Minister has been formally authorized to inform China that the Russo-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1881 has been renewed for another ten years, until August 7 (O.S.), 1921; and further, that after yesterday the provisions of the Treaty establishing freedom from Customs duties for frontier trade within a five *verst* limit on the Russian side of the Russo-Chinese boundary is abrogated.

Times,

16 January 1913

MONGOLIAN MISSION RECEIVED  
BY THE TSAR.

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 16.\*

The Tsar to-day received the deputation of Mongolian notables, headed by the Foreign Minister of the new Mongolian Government.

"Times",

17 January 1913



## RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA.

### DALAI LAMA'S POSITION.

From a Correspondent.

ST. PETERSBURG, Tuesday Night.

News from the Mongolian frontier states that in view of the alarm caused by the rumours of the approach of Chinese troops, the priests at Urga almost daily perform a public religious ceremony of cursing and anathematising the Chinese. The chief feature of the ceremony is the burning of a representation of the Spirit of Evil, accompanied by a hideous noise of trumpets and gongs.

In connection with the arrival at St. Petersburg of the special envoy from the new Government of Northern Mongolia, who will be received at the Foreign Office to-morrow, attention is being called to the fact that China is trying to regain her influence over the Mongols, and even to extend it into Russia, through the religious medium of Tibet.

According to the arrangements made or being made by China at Lhasa, the Dalai Lama of Tibet is to receive a large money allowance for the maintenance of his court, on condition that he accepts permanent Chinese representatives and appoints permanent agents to be attached to the khutukhta of Mongolia at Urga, and to the principal monasteries of the Russian Buriats.


Urga has just been visited by the Dalai Lama's well-known confidential emissary, Avgun Dordjieff, who some years ago excited the suspicious curiosity of England by several times appearing at St. Petersburg and attempting to interest Russia in Tibetan affairs.

Avgun Dordjieff is said to have succeeded in his mission to Urga, which was to establish more friendly relations between the head of the Tibetan Church and the Mongolian Khutukhta, who was not averse to the supremacy of the Dalai Lama in spiritual concerns, while, however, retaining independent control over the civil administration.

A telegram from Irkutsk to the *Etch* reports news from Urga to the effect that Avgun Dordjieff, the Dalai Lama's envoy to the Khutukhta, confirms the proclamation of Tibetan independence. Dordjieff is authorised to conclude a Tibetan-Mongolian Treaty, and also to negotiate with the Russian Government for the declaration of an Anglo-Russian protectorate over Tibet, while England and Russia would receive from the Dalai Lama equal concessions and commercial rights.

*"Daily Telegraph,"*

15 January 1913



[December 16.]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[53601]

No. 1.

*Mr. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 16.)*

(No. 304.)

Sir,

*Tokyo, November 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Chinese Minister visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days ago in order to ask, on behalf of the Chinese Government, for his Excellency's advice and support in the matter of the recently concluded Russo-Mongolian Treaty.

Viscount Uchida enquired whether the Chinese Minister had come under instructions from his Government, and, if so, what were the views and intentions of that Government with regard to the above-mentioned treaty.


Mr. Wang replied that he had come to see Viscount Uchida under instructions from his Government, but that he was quite ignorant of their views regarding the treaty. Viscount Uchida said that, failing a knowledge of the views and intentions of the Chinese Government, he was quite unable to express an opinion on the matter.


I have forwarded a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Peking.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

[2737 q—3]





AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[December 12.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 5.

[53038]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 12.)*

(No. 469.)

*Peking, November 28, 1912.*

Sir,

IN continuation of my despatch No. 458 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a presidential order on the subject of Mongolia,\* and a telegram which has been addressed by the President to the Living Buddha at Urga.\* Both of these documents have been published in the local papers, and are evidently issued with a view to influencing public opinion. The first explains the treatment to be accorded to the Mongols under the republican régime, and disclaims all intention of making any change in the political status of the tribes. Reference is made to the honours recently conferred upon the Dalai Lama and the various Mongolian Hutukhtus as evidence of a desire to extend to all five races the blessings of republican rule.

The telegram to the Hutukhtu at Urga is an appeal to that pontiff to recognise the hopelessness of endeavouring to establish an independent position, and suggestively promises him exceptional treatment if he will cancel the recent declaration of independence. It is to be feared that this appeal, like most Chinese measures, comes too late.

Petitions of protest against the pretensions of the Hutukhtu at Urga to represent Mongolia have been addressed to the President by several of the chieftains of the other Mongolian leagues. One of these, which appears in to-day's paper, and of which a copy is enclosed,\* states that less than one-tenth of even Outer Mongolia has thrown in its lot with the Lama at Urga, and indignantly denies the right of Urga to speak for the whole of Mongolia. On the other hand, the Russian Minister has in conversation significantly laid stress upon the fact that the recent agreement is, if China proves obdurate, capable of being construed as applicable not only to Outer but also to Inner Mongolia.


The non-publication of the protocol attached to the agreement continues to cause much uneasiness and speculation as to its terms.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

\* Not printed.

[2737 m—5]





Minute Paper.

Register No.

145

Put away with

Secret Department.

Dated

Rec.

9 Jan. 1913.

Letter from

Date.

Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary..... 14 Jan. act

Secretary of State..... 15 J.W.H.

Committee..... 15 C.

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia.

Russo-Mongolian Agreement: attitude  
of Chinese Govt.

Copy to India 10 Jan. 1913, Secy. 2

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Pol. Col. 11  
21 JAN 1913

Previous Papers:—

103

103  
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

11-5  
1913  
[November 13.]

SECTION 2.

[50465]

No. 1.

Minutes.

THE Chinese Minister called to-day by instructions from his Government to communicate the enclosed copy of a telegram respecting the agreement concluded between Russia and Mongolia.

Mr. Law said that he knew that Sir Edward Grey was very busy, but he hoped that he would give him an interview of a few minutes as the Chinese Government wish to know what view His Majesty's Government take of the action of the Russian Government in making this agreement.

I said that I would let the Secretary of State know what he had said, and I asked him whether he could tell me what exactly is the difference which the agreement would make in the position of Mongolia.

He said that the Chinese had not had troops in Mongolia nor had they colonised (which is only partially true), but the leading officials were appointed by the Chinese Government. The Chinese believed that they had arranged matters with the Mongolian Princes, but this agreement had now been sprung upon them under the inspiration of the Russian Government, who had sent M. Korostovetz, late Russian Minister at Peking, and always in favour of a policy of encroachment, to conclude it.

Though Mr. Law did not say so, the agreement is no doubt the answer of the Russian Government to the announcement that Mongolia was to become a Chinese province. They have taken fright as we did about Thibet, but it was easier for them to make a counter-move to preserve what they considered the *status quo*.

W. L.

Foreign Office, November 13, 1912.

I do not see that we are called upon to give our views to the Chinese Government on a matter between them and another Power.

A. N.

There is nothing in the text of this treaty to show whether it refers to All Mongolia or to Outer Mongolia only. I understood from M Sazonof that it was to refer to Outer Mongolia only: Have we any further information on this point?

And how do we stand as regards special commercial rights and privileges in Outer Mongolia? Is this something new or only the reaffirmation of previous Russian treaty rights?

E. G.


Mr. Law's communication only gives the substance, not the text, of the agreement. We have now received from St. Petersburg the text of the agreement, but not the text of the protocol, which is, however, promised in a few days (see paper 47892).

As regards point 1 raised by Sir E. Grey, it is evident from the Russian *aide-mémoire* that the discussion with the Chinese Government, which took place before the agreement was signed, had reference to *Outer* Mongolia. But the text of the agreement speaks of Mongolia throughout without limitation.

The Russian Government in the *aide-mémoire* express the hope that we will give a favourable reception to the agreement, and if the protocol when received throws no light upon this point we might enquire whether, as was understood from M. Sazonof's remarks, the agreement applies to Outer Mongolia only.

As regards point 2, it will not be safe to assume that Russia is getting nothing new until we have actually examined the protocol, but by article 2 of the agreement Mongolia is to give Russian subjects and commerce *as in the past* the rights, &c., enumerated in the protocol. Russia has already under her treaties with China, the last of which was concluded in 1881, special rights in Mongolia in regard to the frontier

[2695 n-2]



trade which we do not claim. The rights under the 1881 treaty have recently been the subject of dispute between Russia and China. When we get the text of the protocol from St. Petersburg we shall examine it with the treaties, but we shall probably find that it only renews the rights and privileges which Russia already possesses.

W. L.

*Foreign Office, November 15, 1912.*

A. N.

We must be careful, if a reply to Russia is required, to guard ourselves as to commercial privileges; if it is only those secured by the existing treaties we cannot object. I think I had better see the Chinese Minister next week as he has asked to see me, but I understand the Russian contention to be that it was China who disturbed the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia and refused to agree to re-establish it; if so, she has only herself to blame.

E. G.

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Enclosure in No. 1.

*Translation of a Telegram received from the Wai-chiao Pu, dated November 9, 1912.*

THE designs of the Russian Government on Mongolia date back to the 7th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan T'ung of the late régime (August 1911).

At the beginning of this month (November) this Ministry, as soon as the appointment of M. J. J. Korostovetz by the Russian Government to proceed to Kulun (Urga) to negotiate an agreement was made known in the newspapers, immediately addressed a despatch to the Russian Minister here to the effect that Mongolia being within Chinese dominion had no right to enter into any treaty or agreement with any foreign Power. We also formally notified him that the Chinese Government would not recognise any treaty made between Russia and Mongolia.

Notwithstanding, on the 8th of this month the Russian Minister called at this Ministry and handed us a copy of an agreement between Russia and Mongolia containing four articles, in substance, as follows:—

1. Russia assists Mongolia in establishing autonomy and in organising and training a Mongolian army. Neither the entry of Chinese troops into Mongolia nor the colonisation of Mongolian territory by Chinese will be permitted.

2. Mongolia grants Russian subjects special commercial rights and privileges within their jurisdiction as enumerated in the annexed protocol.

3. Should Mongolia desire to make a treaty or agreement with China or other Powers, such treaty or agreement must not modify or be contrary to the provisions in this treaty and the annexed protocol without the consent and permission of Russia.

4. The agreement is to come into force on the day of its signature.

Such articles the Chinese Government will on no account recognise, and we are now discussing what steps should be taken. No formal reply has yet been sent.

*Chinese Legation, November 13, 1912.*

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## Minute Paper.

Register No.

103

Put away with 539/12

Secret Department.

Letter from *72*.Dated 9 } *Jan.* 1913.  
Rec. 10 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	11 Jan <sup>2</sup>	<i>Att</i>	<u>Mongolia</u> Text of Protocol to Russo-Mongolian Convention published on 4 <sup>th</sup> January 1913.
Secretary of State.....	13	<i>P.W. 4</i>	
Committee .....	13	<i>—</i>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

COPY TO INDIA

17 JAN 1913

SECRETARY'S N2 3

## FOR INFORMATION.

We have not yet seen the text of this protocol; but it was summarised in a telegram published in the Times of 26 Dec. from their special correspondent at St. Petersburg: see extract on P. 4916/12. The exclusion of Inner Mongolia — where Japan claims paramount interests — from the scope of the protocol was only to be expected.

Seen for copy cc.,

21 JAN 1913

(with 145)

Previous Papers:—

4978/12 etc  
3/1

With reference to the Sec. of State's note enquiring on P. 4916/12 below as to the connection between the Mongolian princes & the Manchurian dynasty, reference is

is invited to the Departmental note of 31<sup>st</sup> Dec.  
1912, which H. L. has not yet seen. See also the  
annexed extract from the Times of 11<sup>th</sup> January  
1913.

## THE MONGOLIAN MISSION TO THE TSAR.

### A RUSSIAN HINT TO CHINA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 12.

The Mongolian Special Mission to the Tsar will remain here two or three weeks, and its members will be received at Tsarskoe Selo and by the Premier and other Ministers. The most prominent among the 16 members is the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Datsinvan Chanda Dordshi, who is reputed to be a descendant of Ghengis Khan. He is a firm friend of Russia and one of the most strenuous advocates of Mongolian autonomy. The recent Russo-Mongolian Treaty was concluded under his auspices. He visited St. Petersburg in 1911. It is stated that on their way through Irkutsk the Mission discussed with the local Governor-General the possibility of holding a Mongolian exhibition in that town.

According to a message from Peking, the Russian Government has intimated to China that it can see no ground for further postponing the payment of the indemnity instalment, since China, although professing financial embarrassment, is expending large sums for the purchase of arms and the formation and transport of troops.

"Times", 13 January 1913

P. T. O.



## THE MONGOLIAN MISSION TO RUSSIA.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 13.

In various quarters it is suggested that among questions which might with advantage be discussed during the visit of the Mongolian Mission to St. Petersburg would be the ways and means of securing recognition of Mongolian independence by the other Powers and the diplomatic representation of Russia at Urga and of Mongolia in St. Petersburg. Suggestions of this kind appear to be based on preconceived ideas of Russian policy. What China's ultimate intentions may be nobody seems to know. The Chinese Government would probably be well advised to treat the whole matter in the friendliest spirit. From the Russo-Mongolian Treaty itself it may be inferred that the construction of railways and the provision of other economic facilities are well within the scope of any conversations that may be initiated with the Mongolian envoys.

Note is taken of the Japanese Press arguments in favour of the independence of Eastern Mongolia and Manchuria under Japanese auspices.

"Times", 14 January 1913

## AUTONOMOUS MONGOLIA.

### RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 10.

The *Rossiya* denies that Russian diplomacy by recognizing the autonomy of Mongolia has been guilty of interfering in the internal affairs of China. During the Chinese Revolution Russia, like other Powers, abstained from intervention. But even in the days of the Empire Mongolia was not regarded as of exclusively Chinese concern. Mongolia, especially Outer Mongolia, is described as always having stood both politically and ethnographically apart from the rest of China, with which it was bound chiefly by dynastic ties that ceased to exist after the fall of the Manchu dynasty. So long as this bond survived Russia remained reserved. The Mongolian Princes took the initiative that belonged to them by virtue of autonomy of appealing directly to Russia for her friendly support. Russia replied recognizing the Mongolian declaration of independence, but at the same time proclaimed her willingness to treat with China. Chinese critics of Russian policy are bidden to remember that China is materially dependent on good relations with Russia, who cherishes no territorial designs in the Far East.

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 10.\*

The special Mongolian Mission of seven persons, with the Mongolian Minister for Foreign Affairs at its head, arrived here to-day.

"Times", 11 January 1913

CONFIDENTIAL.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7, 8.45 P.M.)*

*St. Petersburg, January 7, 1913.*

(No. 9.) R.

*(January 7, 8 P.M.)*

YOUR telegram No. 13

and your despatch No. 430.†

Text of Mongolian protocol published on 4th January, dated 1st January.

It only applies to Western and Outer Mongolia.





## RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN MONGOLIA.

### TEXT OF THE RECENT TREATY.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, JAN. 5.

The approaching visit of the Mongolian Special Mission to the Tsar emphasizes the importance of the Treaty recently concluded between Russia and Mongolia. The Press dwells with legitimate pride on the vast extent of the new territory brought within the Russian sphere of influence and describes the agreement as a triumph for Russian diplomacy. The text of the three capital articles of this Treaty is:—

1. The Imperial Russian Government shall lend Mongolia support in the maintenance of the autonomous régime established by the latter, and in vindication of her right to maintain a National Army and to prevent the invasion of her territory by Chinese troops or its colonization by Chinese subjects. 2. The Regent of Mongolia and the Mongolian Government concede to Russian subjects and to Russian trade in Mongolian territory the enjoyment of the same rights and privileges as heretofore and as set forth in the annexed protocol. It is understood that subjects of other Powers are not to receive in Mongolia more extensive rights than those conceded to Russians. 3. If the Mongolian Government considers it to be necessary to conclude a special Agreement with China or any other Foreign State such agreement is not to traverse or modify the articles of this Treaty and Protocol without the assent of the Imperial Russian Government.

The Russo-Japanese Agreement defining the Russian and Japanese spheres of influence in Mongolia and Manchuria preceded the Russo-Mongolian Treaty which is dated October 21. It is significant that this very considerable expansion of Russian influence in the Far East should have been brought about without prejudice to the effective assertion of the traditional position of Russia in the Near East.

There is no reason to infer that Russia entertains any territorial designs in Manchuria in order to satisfy her outstanding financial claims on China. The unmortgaged portions of the Salt Gabelle are more likely to be contemplated as security, but in any case Russia, who is a strong advocate of the principle of foreign control, is anxious as far as possible to co-operate with the other interested Powers.

"Times",

6<sup>th</sup> January 1913

Register No.

4978

Put away with

539

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 7.0.

Dated

Rec.

27 December

1912.

Date.

Initials.

SUBJECT.

Under Secretary.....

28 Dec.

AM

Secretary of State.....

31

J.W.H.

Committee.....

1. I. 13

C

Under Secretary.....

Secretary of State.....

Mongolia

The recent Russo-Mongolian Convention:  
Chinese indignation

Copy to India - See within

FOR INFORMATION.



Seen 201 - 211 00.

21 JAN 1913

(with 45)

Previous Papers:—

4916



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[December 5.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 5.

[51899]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 5.)*

(No. 458.)

Sir,

• Peking, November 20, 1912.

THE calm which I mentioned in my despatch No. 443 as following the conclusion of the Russo-Mongolian Convention was only the prelude to a storm of indignant criticism which has produced a sort of political crisis in Peking and has swept throughout the country with a violence unprecedented in the modern history of China. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. M. T. Liang, foreseeing what was coming, and following the example of other fallen statesmen, promptly deserted his post and sought in the foreign concession at Tien-tsin an escape from the penalties with which he was threatened. Frequent meetings of the Cabinet and National Council have served rather to expose the helplessness of the situation than to evolve any practical suggestions for dealing with a problem which is evoking widespread interest and anxiety. The various parties, while still unable to refrain from mutual recrimination, have shown a laudable desire to sink their differences in presence of the common danger, and there can be little doubt that public sentiment would support the Government were it foolish and rash enough to send a military expedition to Outer Mongolia. The newspapers in every part of the country are clamouring for warlike measures; the provincial governors are offering promises of assistance in men and money, and the provincial assemblies and other public bodies are warmly advocating a policy of resistance. There is something pathetic and even grotesque in all this futile agitation, but it indicates a consciousness of nationality which it would be unwise to overlook. China is not at present, nor will she be for a long time to come, in a position to offer effective opposition to foreign encroachment, but Powers whose interest are of a more vulnerable nature than those of Russia may in future have to reckon with the new spirit as a factor in determining their relations with this country.

As regards the immediate difference with Russia, the most hopeful sign of an amicable arrangement lies in the appointment as Foreign Minister of Lou Tseng-hsiang, who was for several years Minister in St. Petersburg, and has a thorough grasp of the whole question. Both sides appear to be making a display of force—Russia sending Cossacks to Urga, and China dispatching troops to Inner Mongolia—but Yuan Shih-kai and his advisers know perfectly well that they are in no position to try conclusions with Russia. Rumour here credits the French Minister with a desire to mediate, but foreign opinion generally, apprehensive of political unrest, is unfavourable to Russian action as tending to weaken the slight authority which the Central Administration exercises in the country.

The specimens of newspaper criticism which are enclosed herewith will show the virulence of the campaign which is being conducted against Russia.\*

I have, &c.



J. N. JORDON. /A.

\* Not printed.

[2737 e—5]







AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[December 5.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 6.

[52954]

No. 1.


*Question asked in the House of Commons, December 5, 1912.*

*Mr. Ginnell.*—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether, Russia having now taken that control in Chinese Mongolia hitherto sought through the six-Power financial group, and to obtain which was the reason for admitting her to that group, Russia will now be excluded from that group and its future negotiations in China.

*Answer.*

The statement made in the honourable Member's question is not true, and the answer is therefore in the negative.

[2737 e—6]



Register No.

4916

1912

Put away with

539

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 7.0.

Dated

Rec. 19 December 1912.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	27 Dec	Atb	<u>Mongolia</u>
Secretary of State.....	27	Atb	The Russo-Mongolian Agreement.
Committee.....	29	C	Russian activity in E. Mongolia.
Under Secretary.....			Attitude of Japanese Govt.
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India (see within)

FOR INFORMATION.

A note on the Mongolian question  
is attached.

Were not the Mongolian Powers etc.  
supposed to be closely bound up  
with the Manchurian regime?

C 29. XII. 12

(see note within)

Seen Pol Com. Co.,

21 JAN 1913

(with 4-)

Previous Papers:—

4768

57/ W

Political Committee,

With reference to the Secretary of State's minute below, it is believed to be the case that the Mongolian princes, or some of them at any rate, regarded themselves as closely bound up with the Manchu dynasty. But it has not been found possible to trace <sup>any</sup> direct evidence on the point in the records of the Dept.

It may be noted, however, that Yuan Shih-kai, in an interview with the British Minister on 1 January 1912, told Sir J. Jordan that the Mongol princes had decided to declare their independence if a republic were established in China.

The "Times" correspondent at Peking re-  
marked



marked on 9 January 1912 that "in the case  
"of Mongolia, the revolt against Chinese misrule  
"is especially interesting, because many of the  
"leading Princes have intermarried with the  
"Manchu Imperial family, & they have taken  
"this step confident that the Manchu dynasty  
"has ended in China."

Again, on 15 Nov. 1912 the Tunis correspondent  
remarked:— "Mongolia ... was vassal to the  
"Manchu rulers of China, and if China dis-  
"cards the Manchus, the Mongols may not  
"unreasonably refuse to accept the Chinese  
"in their stead."

At

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P  
4916  
1912

MINUTE.

Russia and Mongolia

Russia's special position in Mongolia is derived from 3 Treaties concluded with the Chinese Govt, viz:- the Peking treaties of 1860 and 1869, and the Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1881. Under these instruments Russian subjects enjoy the right of trading, free from payment of duties, all over Chinese Mongolia ("la Mongolie soumise à la Chine") - "tant dans les localités et les aïmaux où il se trouve une administration Chinoise que dans ceux où il ne n'en existe point;" in other words, Russian traders may go wherever they please in Mongolia for purposes of trade, instead of being restricted, as in the provinces of China proper, to recognised "treaty ports."

Russian subjects also enjoy certain special rights (e.g. of building houses, shops, etc.) at Kalgan & at all places in Mongolia where Russia has, by treaty, the right to establish Consulates (Urga, Tarbatgai, Uliasutai, etc.).

The Russians contend that the policy adopted  
by

by the Chinese Govt. in recent years of extending regular Chinese administration to Mongolia is inconsistent with the maintenance of their special interests in the country; and they cite one case — that of the recently-formed Chinese administrative district of Tas-nan Fu in E. Mongolia — in which the Chinese have taken the ground that the change in the political status of the region has extinguished the right of Russian subjects to complete freedom of trade therein.

Accordingly, with a view "to safeguard Russian rights in Mongolia, where Russia has important political & economic interests," the Russian Govt. have concluded a Convention direct with the Mongolian authorities at Urga\*, providing

- (1) for Russian assistance in the preservation of Mongolian autonomy;
- (2) for the maintenance, "as in the past," of Russian rights and privileges in Mongolia, as set forth in a protocol annexed to the Convention.

With regard to (2), until we see the text of the protocol<sup>s</sup> — which has not been communicated to

\* It will be remembered that the Mongolians at Urga declared their independence of China in Dec. 1911, and proclaimed the Hutukhtu or Bogd Lama — the 3rd highest dignitary in the Buddhist hierarchy — Sovereign of their country.

of see annexed extract from Times of 26 Dec



MINUTE.

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1912

to H. M.'s Court, though it appears to have been read to Si J. Jordan by the Russian Minister at Peking on the 29<sup>th</sup> Nov. — it is impossible to say for certain how far Russia's new position in Mongolia differs from her old one under the Treaties. It may be noted that M. Sazonov, in the Aide-Mémoire communicated by him to Sir G. Buchanan with the text of the Convention, described the protocol as merely "confirming and defining the rights and privileges which belong to Russian subjects in Mongolia in virtue of the Russo-Chinese treaties."

It is worth noting that some doubt exists as to how far the action of the Urga authorities, in <sup>renouncing</sup> ~~repudiating~~ allegiance to China and entering into direct relations with the Russians, commands the general support of the Mongolians. According to the Peking correspondent of the Daily Telegraph (whose attitude is strongly pro-Chinese) there is a vigorous movement on foot among the Mongolian "princes, dukes and chieftains" at present collected in Peking to repudiate the Urga Convention & to cast in  
their

their lot definitely with the Chinese Republic.

According to a manifesto<sup>x</sup> ~~shatubatahasan~~  
issued by these Mongol princes, <sup>who have formed themselves</sup> ~~as a political body~~  
into an Association at Peking, the "rebel community"

the Daily Telegraph the "rebel community"  
comprises less than  $\frac{1}{10}$  <sup>th</sup> of the whole of Mongolia,

and the claim of Uga "to arrogate to itself

"the right of deciding the political fate of Outer

"Mongolia, and far less of the entire region

"of Mongolia" is wholly rejected.

x The text of this  
manifesto was telegraphed  
from Peking by Reuters

Political & Secret Dept.

24 Dec. 1912

## RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA.

ST. PETERSBURG, DEC. 20.\*

A message received here from Mukden says that the commanders of the troops at Mukden, Kirin, and Tsitsihar have been summoned to St. Petersburg in order to take part in a council of war regarding the position in Mongolia.

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"Times", 21 Dec. 1912



## THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN TREATY.

### PRIVILEGES AND SAFEGUARDS.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, DEC. 23.

The text of the protocol of the Russo-Mongolian Treaty, which was signed at Urga on October 21 (O.S.), is to be published in the *Official Bulletin* in a few days' time, and will be reproduced in the *Russkoe Slovo* to-morrow. The protocol provides for the application of the Treaty, the effect of which is practically to exclude Chinese administration and settlement from Mongolia, and defines Russian rights in that region.

There are 17 articles. Russian subjects are to have the right to live and move at will in Mongolia, to trade, and to hold concessions. They are to have the right to export and import Russian or foreign (including Chinese) products free of duty and other charges. This does not apply to mixed Russo-Chinese enterprises. Russian banks may open branches in Mongolia, and Russian subjects may transact business on credit, but neither the Mongolian Princes nor the Government are to be responsible for private debts. Mongolians and Chinese are free to trade or to serve with Russians, but no official or private trading monopolies may be granted, and existing monopolies may not be renewed.

Russians may rent or buy land for building, trading, or similar purposes, or may rent unoccupied land for agriculture, but not for speculation. Pasture land and land belonging to religious orders are exempt from this option. Russians may work mines, forests, or fisheries concessions, which are to be granted by the Mongolian Government alone. Russian Consuls may be appointed where necessary in agreement with the Mongolian Government, which is entitled to appoint its own representatives in the frontier region. Factories may be established in Consular centres under the sole control of the Consul. Russia is to have the right to institute a postal service, and, within limits, to make free official use of the Mongolian services. Russian ships are to enjoy navigation rights on Mongolian rivers flowing into Russian territory, and all facilities such as buoys, lights, fuel, &c.


For the transport of goods and cattle Russians are to have the right to use roads and bridges, to build new ones, and to levy tolls. Cattle in transit are to have the right of pasture, but the field and fishing rights of the frontier population are to be respected. Concessions require the assent of the Mongolian Government. Private contracts are to be locally certified, and in case of dispute are to be submitted to a

mixed Russo-Mongolian commission of officials and experts, whose findings are to be applied, for Russians by the Consul, and for Mongols and Chinese by the local Prince.

The spirit in which these safeguards for both parties are framed furnishes an interesting commentary on the lucubrations of politicians in Peking, an account of which was published in *The Times* of December 3. Although the news of Chinese unrest is not altogether reassuring, no apprehension is felt here. A different situation might arise if any financial facilities to be obtained by China were utilized to promote a policy of military adventure. According to a telegram from Urga, a Mongolian mission is proceeding to St. Petersburg to thank the Tsar for Russian support.

"Times"

26 Dec. 1912



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[December 4.]

SECTION 2.

[51856]

No. 1.

*Mr. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 4.)*

(No. 288.)

*Tokyo, November 14, 1912.*

Sir,

I ASKED Viscount Uchida to-day about the convention defining the relations between Russia and Mongolia, which, as reported in the press, had been signed a few days ago by the Kegen of Mongolia and M. Korostovetz, the Russian special envoy.


His Excellency said that the terms of the convention in question had been communicated to the Japanese and to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg at the same time. He understood that there was a preamble, or a protocol attached to the convention, which was of considerable importance, but which had not, at the time, been communicated with the main instrument. Until he had seen the full and authentic text of this convention he could not pronounce an opinion on it. His Excellency understood, however, that the Chinese Government were excited and that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs had retired to Tientsin.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Sir John Jordan.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD.

[2737 d—2]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL

P  
4916  
1912

[November 28.]

SECTION 8.

[50839]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 28.)*

(No. 443.)

Sir,

*Peking, November 11, 1912.*


THE conclusion of the Russo-Mongolian agreement, the text of which was communicated to the Wai-chiao Pu by the Russian Minister on the 8th instant, has excited less attention here than might have been expected. The native newspapers, with one or two exceptions, have been silent on the subject, and even the official organ, the "Peking Daily News," which commented so bitterly on our Thibetan policy, has shown remarkable restraint in discussing the Mongolian incident. The Chinese have been confronted with an accomplished fact and, as usually happens in such cases, have ceased to criticise when they realise that action, and not words, will be of any avail. They have entered the customary formal protest; the President has held a long Cabinet meeting, which resulted in no decision, and there the matter will doubtless end, as China is not in a position to make her influence felt in Outer Mongolia, and is unlikely to accept the Russian suggestion that she should enter into negotiations for the recognition of a Mongolian autonomy which will exclude Chinese troops and the administrative and colonising activities of recent years. Russian action in this matter, of which the enclosed extract from a local newspaper may be accepted as an authoritative explanation,\* can claim no basis of treaty right, for in the case of Mongolia, unlike that of Thibet, China had never given any undertaking to abstain from altering the *status quo*, and for fifty years the Russian position at Urga was regulated by treaties with China to which Mongolia was not a party. On the other hand, Chinese control over the whole region was little more than nominal and the revolution gave the Mongols an opportunity of electing between Russian and Chinese domination, and they have, doubtless for sufficient considerations, been induced to throw in their lot with the former. The Government which has been set up at Urga cannot be taken very seriously, and if it meets with the fate of similar experiments in Eastern Asia the day cannot be far distant before Russian domination will extend to within a measurable distance of Peking and probably embrace the whole of the vast and practically derelict region now known as Chinese Turkestan. Russia may not gain much strength by this enormous accession of territory, but it will present new problems for solution between her and the two other Great Powers in Asia: Japan and Great Britain.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

\* Not printed.

[2695 ec-8]






AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[49870]



[November 23.]

SECTION 5.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 23.)*

(No. 439.)

Sir,

*Peking, November 6, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 393 of the 1st October, I have the honour to enclose two further papers which have been received from His Majesty's consul at Harbin in relation to the disturbances in Mongolia and the action of the Russian authorities in their frontier zone.

It would appear that the vigorous action of the Chinese has crushed the opposition of the Mongols and effectually dominated the Taonan Fu country adjoining the Teitsihar, Harbin, and Chang-chun districts of Manchuria; that the Russian troops have been withdrawn, whilst a considerable Chinese force is still retained in the disturbed area; that certain of the Mongol princes in the neighbourhood have declared their intention of recognizing the republican Government; and that the Chinese have succeeded in asserting their supremacy in this portion of Mongolia, which has been defined by Russia and Japan as the meeting place of their zones of special interest in Eastern Mongolia.

For some years past the Russian Government has watched with anxiety the increasing efforts of the Chinese to establish their influence in outer Mongolia, and it was scarcely surprising to learn of the arrival of M. Korostovetz at Urga as a sequel to the Chinese campaign. Reports were circulated in the press to the effect that the Russian envoy had been received at the capital of the Hutuktu with enthusiasm, and that he had formally recognized the independence of Mongolia.

On the 23rd October my Russian colleague availed himself of an opportunity to assure me that these reports were untrue, and that M. Korostovetz had merely been instructed to conduct an enquiry into the situation and to report on the attitude which could most properly be adopted in regard to the relations of the Hutuktu with the Russian and Chinese Governments.

M. Kroupensky confirmed the reports outlined in my despatch No. 26 of the 14th January last, as to the warnings which had been addressed to the Chinese by his Government in regard to the inauguration of civil and military administration and the extension of colonisation by the Chinese in Mongolia, assuring me that Yuan Shih-kai had appeared willing to accede to the Russian demands, but that he had refrained from any formal reply to them, and that succeeding foreign Ministers had professed their inability to grapple with so difficult a situation.

The Russian Government, however, are apparently determined to resist the extension of Chinese influence at the Mongolian capital, where a conference has been suggested from Peking with a view to securing the recognition of the republic, and M. Kroupensky indicated that the appointment of M. Korostovetz was intended as a protest against the dilatory manner in which the Russian demands had been received. He added that the Russian proposals did not preclude the retention of a Chinese resident at Urga, but that his Government was determined to prevent any forcible measures on the part of the Chinese for the purpose of coercing the Mongolians into submission.

The accompanying sketch map, drawn up by the military attaché to this legation, gives a clear indication of the area of the recent operations.


I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

P.S. *November 7.*—As reported in my telegram No. 235 of to-day, M. Kroupensky has since read to me the convention, which was signed on the 3rd instant, between M. Korostovetz, the Russian envoy, and the Mongolian authorities at Urga. A copy of this agreement is to be communicated officially to-morrow to the Chinese Government, who will be invited to adhere to its terms.

J. N. J

[2695 z—5]



## Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

*Consul Willis to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 36.)

Sir,

*Harbin, October 22, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of a telegram from St. Petersburg News Agency, which appeared yesterday morning in the local Russian press, reporting that M. Korostovetz had been dispatched to Urga to discuss the relations between the Urga Government and Russia and China.

The Mongolian uprising in south-eastern Mongolia seems practically over, more than 20,000 Chinese troops are quartered in the neighbourhood of Tao Nan-fu, and there is no organised Mongolian force to contend against them.

The leader of the movement, Prince Udaya, whose family have been killed, is stated to have fled to Urga in the hope of obtaining military assistance from the Hutuktu, whilst the other Mongolian chiefs have sent representatives to the Kirin Governor to announce their willingness to recognise the republican Government.

The governors of Fengtien, Kirin, and Heilungchiang provinces have appointed commissioners to treat with the Mongolian princes, who will meet them at Changchun. As at present arranged, the Peace Conference will open on the 6th November.

The above information is taken from the local press.

Since the return of the Russian cavalry squadrons dispatched from Fuliardy on the 8th September, as reported in my despatch No. 31 of the 20th September, no further reconnaissance parties seem to have been sent out. General Kornilof, who is in command of the division to which these troops belonged, has, in conversation with me, confirmed the press stories of the atrocities committed by the Chinese troops.

A Russian cavalry officer, who has been travelling for the past three months in that part of Manchuria and Mongolia south of the line between Hailar and Manchuria station, has informed me that the country is quite peaceful; he had been commissioned to buy horses for the frontier guard, and had obtained the number required with less trouble and at less expense than in preceding years.

I have, &c.

ROBERT WILLIS.

## Enclosure 2 in No. 1.

*Translation of Telegram from St. Petersburg News Agency.**Urga, October 19, 1912.*

THE Hutuktu received in audience Councillor Korostovetz, who has been sent to him by the Russian Government. In a speech addressed to the Hutuktu, M. Korostovetz presented the greetings of the Czar and the Russian Government, and stated that, in view of the necessity of determining the relations of Mongolia towards Russia and China, the Imperial Government had authorised him to discuss such relations with the Mongolian Government, what rights Russian subjects and Russian trade would have in these Mongolian provinces which were united under the Urga Hutuktu. In answering, the Hutuktu expressed his pleasure at the arrival of M. Korostovetz, thanked him for the greetings and the constant good relations that have existed between him and his nation and the Russian Government. The reception was of a hearty and cordial character, and showed the sincere disposition of the Hutuktu towards Russia.

## Enclosure 3 in No. 1.

*Consul Willis to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 38. Confidential.)


Sir,

*Harbin, October 29, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose translation of an army order recently issued by Lieutenant-General Martinof, commanding the Russian frontier force along the Chinese Eastern Railway.

After recapitulating two instances of alleged insolence towards Russian officers on the part of Chinese officials, the general instructs all the officers in his command in no

SKETCH MAP TO SHOW DISTURBED AREA IN INNER MONGOLIA.



- |                   |   |
|-------------------|---|
| Brown line        | Russian frontier.   |
| Red dotted line   | Boundary of Mongolia as shown on G.I.M. Atlas.                            |
| Green line        | Boundary as shown on Chinese map of Manchuria, published in Mukden, 1911. |
| Green shading     | Chinese Settlements.  |
| Chain dotted line | Boundary of spheres of influence of Russia and Japan as far as Taonan Fu. |



case to suffer any insolence from Chinese, even if they are forced to use fire-arms. To quote from the order in question: "The dignity of the Imperial Russian troops cannot be sacrificed for any consideration."

The order appears unnecessarily provocative, and hardly warranted by the examples of Chinese aggression brought forward by General Martinof.

I met the general casually a few days ago, and in the course of conversation he informed me that at the time the cavalry squadrons had been sent to Tao Nan Fu, as reported in my despatch No. 31 of the 20th ultimo, he had recommended to the Russian Government that a military demonstration in force should be made in the direction of Tao Nan Fu for the protection of the territory of Prince Udaya, but that he had been overruled by the home authorities.

General Martinof went on to say that, in view of Russia's internal difficulties and the Balkan complications, the Chinese were adopting a high-handed attitude, and that, in his opinion, there would be fighting within the next year or so.

The tone of the local Chinese press is certainly provocative.

I have, &c.

ROBERT WILLIS.

Enclosure 4 in No. 1.

*Order to Troops of Zamuisky Circuit of separate Corps of Frontier Guards.*

AFTER the massacre of the unarmed Mongols, the Chinese have commenced to bear themselves in a provoking manner towards the Russian troops. For example, Peter Kobanetz, under-officer of the First Cavalry Regiment of the Frontier Guards, who had been sent out from a company of troops near Fuliardi, was detained by a Chinese officer's squad and taken to the town of Tin Sin Tzu. Here the Chinese military and civil authorities subjected Kobanetz to enquiries, treated him with contempt and abuse, several times repeating "You and your commanders are robbers!" Lieutenant-General Martinof, commanding the Zamuisky circuit of the separate corps of Frontier Guards, immediately communicated the incident to the consul-general at Harbin and to the Imperial Russian Minister at Peking, asking them to demand satisfaction for the insult and the punishment of the guilty parties from the Chinese Government. No reply has as yet been received. Further, in copies of official Chinese documents recently transmitted by the assistant manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Lieutenant-General Affanasief, to the chief of staff, mention is made of a search of our gun-boat "Shestoy," commanded by Lieutenant-Captain Kudrevitch, by the Chinese authorities on the Nonni river, near the town of Da Lan Tin. Lieutenant-General Affanasief expresses the opinion that the search of a military gun-boat by Chinese officers is not permissible. An enquiry instituted regarding this matter by Lieutenant-General Martinof has proved that search of the gun-boat, in a literal sense, did not take place; but the Chinese Major Tey, and afterwards the headman of the town of Da Lan Tun, Pan Di Gen, with two armed soldiers, were allowed to board the gun-boat, and the Chinese officials examined the quarters of the crew, and even looked under their bunks. Besides that, the pilot Tulakim has deposed that when at first Major Tey was not allowed to board the gun-boat he was very angry. The chief of the gun-boat's crew, Under-Officer Yatzetcho, deposed that the Chinese officer bore himself rudely. The interpreter Reshetnikof deposed that Major Tey was shouting loudly in Chinese "that he would arrest the gun-boat," and that he adopted a provoking manner. Having observed from the above-mentioned facts indecision and absence of activity on the part of Lieutenant-Captain Kudrevitch, Lieutenant-General Martinof has removed him from the position of chief of the gun-boat department. At the same time, General Martinof requires from all military divisions and separate officers of the Zamuisky circuit that they should in no case allow any insulting action towards themselves by the Chinese, even if they are forced to make use of fire-arms. The dignity of the Imperial Russian troops cannot be sacrificed for any consideration.

(Translated from the Russian newspaper "Novaya Zizn" of the 27th October, 1912.)

Register No.

Put away with 539

Minute Paper.

4768

Secret Department.

Letter from 20.

Dated } 12/13 Dec. 1912.  
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	13 Dec.	AM	Russia and Mongolia
Secretary of State.....	14	P. W. A.	The Russo-Chinese negotiations
Committee.....	16	<u>C</u>	(Text of Russo-Mongolian Agreement of 21 Oct. 1912)
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India - See within

FOR INFORMATION.

The "amicable settlement" about which Sir J. Jordan was sanguine (see his telegram of 25 Nov. on P. 4545) is not yet in sight.

The Chinese Minister's remark to Sir E. Grey that "it was not so much the substance of the treaty that China objected as to the fact that Russia had made it direct instead of with China. Obviously meant to ignore China altogether", seems to bear out our view that the threat of direct negotiations with Tibet would probably be more potent than any other.

Seen Pol. Secy  
21 Jan 1913  
(with 145)

Previous Papers:—

4638

# CHINA AND MONGOLIA.

## DISQUIETING OUTLOOK.

From Our Special Correspondent

PEKIN, Tuesday (3.30 p.m.).

Though foreign observers out of touch with the main currents of Chinese life assert that the Mongolian agitation is dying down, indications beneath the surface actually point to Russo-Chinese enmity steadily increasing.

Wholesale Chinese military operations in Mongolia are inevitable when climatic conditions permit, unless the Urga Convention is cancelled.

In this connection your correspondent possesses certain information, which it is inexpedient to publish in detail, but virtually it shows that the life of the present Pekin Government depends on its carrying out what is considered to be the mandate of the political parties who are now in absolute agreement with the army.

A highly interesting feature of the situation is that German agents of the Krupp factories are scattering Chinese leaflets and pamphlets broadcast, insisting that the Krupp batteries were the chief reason for the Bulgarian and Servian victories, and recommending China to take time by the forelock.

PEKIN, Tuesday (10 p.m.).

I am in a position to state that the authoritative Russian text of the secret protocol annexed to the Urga Convention was officially communicated to China three days ago by the Russian Legation.

The Chinese Government maintains absolute secrecy pending the development of certain plans, but it is not improbable that the publication of this sensational document will shortly be made in London. I also understand—but this I cannot state absolutely—that a special Mongolian tribute mission, accompanied by Russian officers, will reach St. Petersburg this week, and will be received by the Tsar.

I reiterate to-day the effect of my earlier message, namely, that grave developments are inevitable.

"Daily Telegraph"

11 Dec. 1912

"Times"

13 Dec. 1912

## RUSSIAN WARNING TO CHINA. THE MONGOLIAN DISPUTE.

PEKING, DEC. 12.\*

The Russian Minister has warned China that the rupture of negotiations is imminent unless China ceases to delay the settlement of the Mongolian question.

This action is considered significant in view of the impending arrival in St. Petersburg of the Mongolian delegates, who, it is expected, will ask the Tsar to recognize the complete independence of Outer Mongolia.



CONFIDENTIAL



*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received December 11, 5 P.M.)*


*Peking, December 11, 1912.*

(No. 256.) R.

*(4638)*  
*(December 11, 8:10 P.M.)*

MY telegram No. 246 of 29th November: Mongolia.

Russian Minister informs me that he notified the Chinese Government to-day of the rejection by his Government of Chinese counter-proposals as quite inadmissible.



4768

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3

[49988]

No. 1.

*Question asked in the House of Commons, November 21.*

Mr. Lloyd,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether he has any information which he could give regarding the Russo-Mongolian agreement of the 3rd November, and whether he can state the nature of the agreement and its most important terms; and whether the protocol of that agreement assures any special commercial rights to Russian trade and Russian subjects.

*Answer.*

The semi-official statements issued in St. Petersburg and reported in the press contain, so far as I am aware, the salient points of the agreement. The protocol attached to the agreement has not yet been communicated to me. It would seem *prima facie* that the agreement is intended to confirm rights and privileges for Russian subjects which existed under previous treaties of many years' standing, and generally to secure the status, practically amounting to autonomy, which was the normal condition of Outer Mongolia; but I am awaiting further information on these points.

[2695 x—3]

Part with full  
about 100  
info



COPY TO  
13 DEC 1912  
SECRETARY'S NO 50

4768

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 28.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 7.

[51497]

No. 1.



*Question asked in the House of Commons, November 28, 1912.*

Mr. Ginnell—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the Korostovitz mission to Urga, in Chinese Mongolia, and the alleged treaty with a local Lama there, are the first fruit of M. Sazonof's recent visit to London; whether this is Russia's alternative method of aggression, rendered necessary by the failure of the Six-Power financial group, to enable her to attain the same end through them; whether the previous treaties, said to be confirmed with the Lama, were made with the Lama or with the Chinese Government; and whether the Chinese Government was consulted before British approval or recognition was given to the alleged treaty with a Chinese subject.

*Answer.*

The honourable member's question contains statements which are untrue, and I must content myself by saying that he is quite wrong in supposing that we are a party to the agreement.

[2695 cc—7]





4768

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 22.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[50241]

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rumbold.*

(No 194.)

*Foreign Office, November 22, 1912.*

Sir,


THE Japanese Ambassador informed me to-day that the Chinese Government had made a communication in Tokyo, similar to that which I had received, about the Russian treaty with Mongolia. The Japanese Government had given an evasive reply, saying that they did not quite know what the terms of the treaty were.

I told the Ambassador what I had said to the Chinese Minister on this subject.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2695 y-1]



4768

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 5.

[50172]

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 328.)

*Foreign Office, November 21, 1912.*

Sir,

THE Chinese Minister came to see me to-day about the Russian Agreement respecting Mongolia.

I handed him a copy of the answer which I had given this afternoon in the House of Commons, and told him that, until I had received the protocol, which I was expecting very shortly, I could not well say more. Outer Mongolia was, however, quite out of reach of any Powers but Russia and China, and it was not near any British territory.

The Chinese Minister said that he thought the agreement did apply only to Outer Mongolia: a place which was not so very important to China; but encroachments there might lead to still further encroachments, and that was what China feared most. It was not so much the substance of the treaty to which China objected, as the fact that Russia had made it direct instead of with China, and apparently meant to ignore China altogether.

I observed that I thought Russia had acted thus because she had found difficulty in confirming in Peking the treaty which she had made many years ago; but I did not understand that she intended to refuse to discuss the matter in Peking, and I thought that the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs was already discussing it with the Russians.

The Chinese Minister confirmed this.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2695 x-5]


THE RUSSO-MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT.

Mr. LLOYD (Staffordshire, W., Opp.) asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he had any information which he could give regarding the Russo-Mongolian agreement of November 3, and whether he could state the nature of the agreement and its most important terms, and whether the protocol of that agreement assured any special commercial rights to Russian trade and Russian subjects.

SIR E. GREY.—The semi-official statements issued in St. Petersburg and reported in the Press contain, so far as I am aware, the salient points of the agreement. The protocol attached to the agreement has not yet been communicated to me. It would seem *prima facie* that the agreement is intended to confirm rights and privileges for Russian subjects which existed under previous treaties of many years' standing and generally to secure the status, practically amounting to autonomy, which was the normal condition of Outer Mongolia, but I am awaiting further information on these points.

"Times", 22 Nov. 1912

(answer given 21 Nov. 1912)



4768

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 47892

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

*This is requested  
with 47892*

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for  
India — and, by direction of the Secretary of  
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*



*Foreign Office,*

*December 17, 1912.*

*Reference to previous letter :*

*Description of Inclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H. M. Ambassador at St. Petersburg No. 331.  November 8, 1912.</i>	<i>Russo-Mongolian Agreement.</i>



*(Similar letter sent to*



4768

AFFAIRS OF

[November 11.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 4.

[47892]

No. 1.

Sir G. Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

St. Petersburg, November 8, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* covering the text of the recently signed Russo-Mongolian Agreement, which has been communicated to His Majesty's Embassy by the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Sazonof.*

LES traités que la Russie a conclus avec la Chine en 1869 et en 1881 accordent aux sujets russes en Mongolie le droit de circuler librement dans ce pays et d'y faire le commerce. Dernièrement le Gouvernement chinois a cru pouvoir refuser à la Russie ces droits dans les parties de la Mongolie qu'il soumettait au même régime administratif que celui de la Chine intérieure. C'est ainsi qu'à la suite de l'incorporation de la principauté mongole de Djassaktou, dans la province de Moukden, sous le nom de district de Tao-nan-fou le Gouvernement chinois a soutenu que par le fait de ce changement administratif les sujets russes avaient perdu le droit d'y séjourner, la ville de Tao-nan-fou n'étant pas ouverte au commerce étranger. Le Gouvernement russe s'est vu alors dans la nécessité de chercher dans une opposition aux changements du *statu quo* administratif en Mongolie des garanties contre de pareilles violations de ses droits acquis en vertu de traités.

Aussi, lorsque les Mongols ont proclamé à Ourga leur indépendance de la Chine, le Gouvernement Impérial a fait comprendre au Gouvernement de Pékin que la Russie ne pouvait admettre la restitution du pouvoir chinois dans la Mongolie extérieure qu'à la condition que le Gouvernement chinois prît sur lui l'obligation de ne pas introduire d'administration chinoise dans ce pays, de ne pas y envoyer ses troupes et de ne pas coloniser les terres mongoles avec les Chinois, ces conditions paraissant fournir des garanties suffisantes contre la répétition d'incidents pareils à celui de Tao-nan-fou. Le Gouvernement chinois ayant refusé jusqu'ici d'entrer en négociations avec la Russie au sujet de ces garanties, le Gouvernement Impérial s'est vu obligé de traiter directement avec le Gouvernement de fait établi à Ourga pour définir les droits des sujets et du commerce russe dans les régions où l'autorité du Gouvernement mongol avait remplacé celle de la Chine. S'inspirant des mêmes considérations que celles qu'il avait fait connaître au Gouvernement de Pékin, le Gouvernement russe a promis aux Mongols son concours pour le maintien de la constitution nationale et historique de leur pays.

Un accord a été conclu à cet effet à Ourga le 21 octobre courant entre le plénipotentiaire russe M. Korostovetz et le Gouvernement mongol. Un protocole y annexé confirme et définit les droits et les privilèges qui appartiennent aux sujets russes en Mongolie en vertu des traités russo-chinois.

L'accord en question n'a pour but que de sauvegarder les droits russes en Mongolie, où la Russie a des intérêts politiques et économiques importants. Si le Gouvernement chinois adhère aux principes y énoncés, le Gouvernement Impérial est prêt à ne pas s'opposer à ce qu'un accord puisse intervenir entre la Chine et les Mongols au sujet des conditions de la reconnaissance par ceux-ci de la suzeraineté chinoise. Le Gouvernement russe aime à croire, par conséquent, que le Gouvernement anglais fera audit Acte un accueil favorable.

Le texte de l'accord du 21 octobre se trouve ci-inclus.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 25 octobre (7 novembre), 1912.

4768  
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 11.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[47892]

No. 1.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 11.)

(No. 231.)

Sir,

I HAVE the text of the record to His Majesty's

St. Petersburg, November 8, 1912.

transmit herewith copy of an aide-mémoire covering the Mongolian Agreement, which has been communicated to Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

China  
Ann.  
Nov. 11, 1912  
Sec. 4  
Enclosure in No. 1.

Aide-

communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Sazonof.

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Le texte de l'accord du 21 octobre se trouve ci-inclus.

Saint-Petersbourg, le 25 octobre (7 novembre), 1912.

Register No.

4638

Put away with 539

Secret Department.

Minute Paper.

Letter from 70.

Dated } 2 Dec. 1912.  
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
		lb	WV
Under Secretary.....	4 Dec.	at	Russia and Mongolia
Secretary of State.....	5	P. W. H.	The Russo-Chinese negotiations.
Committee.....	5	C.	
Under Secretary .....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

COPY TO INDIA

6 Dec. 1912

SECRETARY'S NO. 49

## FOR INFORMATION.

he cd. whole heartedly agree, as regards  
that, to ~~the~~ what the Chinese ask Russia  
to concede alternatively as regards  
Mongolia

Seen Pol Comm.,  
10 DEC 1912

Previous Papers:—

4545  
4350



CONFIDENTIAL

4638

1912

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 30, 5.45 P.M.)*

(No. 246.) R.

*Peking, November 29, 1912.*

*(November 30, 7.30 P.M.)*

ST. PETERSBURGH telegram No. 402

*(450)*

*(Russo-Mongolian Agreement)*

Russian Minister read to me to-day text of protocol. He expects that misapprehension regarding mining and fishing rights and establishment of consulates will meet with objections from Chinese. Negotiations are making little progress. Chinese insist on sovereignty, and wish to reserve rights of colonisation and quartering of troops in Mongolia subject to Mongolian consent. Failing this, they stipulate that abstention from colonisation, administration, and quartering of troops should be reciprocal.



# THE MONGOLIAN QUESTION.

## CHINESE RIGHTS AND RUSSIAN POLICY.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

PEKING, Nov. 15.

The British memorandum on the subject of Tibet, addressed to the Chinese Government at the end of August, raised a storm of protest in the Chinese Press. These ebullitions were repeated when the British Government notified its disapproval of the Crisp loan in London, and Sir John Jordan made representations on the subject to the President in Peking. British action in these two respects created marked resentment, which still smoulders, but which has not found further expression, probably because of the underlying faith in the sincerity of the British people and the general belief in the good intentions of their Government. But Russia can boast no such place in Chinese regard. All her doings give rise to suspicion, and even the Russian aviator who electrified Peking the other day by brilliant flights in a monoplane has been charged with spying out the land. The Russian agreement with Mongolia, therefore, falls like a spark upon gunpowder. Every politician in the capital has arisen in anger at the despoilment. Impotent against Russia, they vent their feelings in violent attacks upon their own Government, which is denounced as lukewarm in the cause of national honour and incapable of protecting the interests of the country.

The Press has been warned of late to moderate its tone in reference to foreign affairs, with the result that in the present case public opinion finds expression through the political societies and the National Council. The former have momentarily sunk their differences and have met together to condemn the Government and to discuss measures for the assertion of the rights of China over Mongolia. Military intervention is freely advocated, and if Young China had its way the whole of the army would now be marching upon Urga, in spite of the knowledge that behind the meagre forces of the Hutukhtu stand the armed posts of Russia.

The Government itself is deeply chagrined by events in Mongolia and by the consciousness of its inability to affect the situation. Constant meetings between President, Cabinet, and swarms of advisers have not been able to evolve any more efficacious plan than the registration of a protest, by which China denies the right of Mongolia to enter into relations with any foreign country and declares her refusal to recognize the present agreement with Russia in any shape or form. Smarting from the blow to the prestige of the country, and mercilessly criticized for a catastrophe which they could not have averted, the Cabinet threatened to resign, and for a day or two we were faced by the prospect of a political collapse. But at this stage of the crisis Mr. Liang Men-ting, who as Foreign Minister bore the brunt of the attacks upon the Government, resigned.

### A SECRET DISCUSSION IN PEKING.

The Cabinet then met the National Council in closed session. Clerks and secretaries were ordered to retire, and the Chairman opened the proceedings by cautioning those present that the discussion was secret. The Premier began by reviewing the policy of the Government in regard to Mongolia, and explained that a strong stand was impossible. He proposed that Russia should be urged to retract the step taken, failing which there was recourse to the Hague. The Minister of War explained the practical obstacles in the way of an expedition into Mongolia, such as fodder for horses and principally the difficulty of campaigning in the cold weather. He attributed Russia's conclusion of the agreement at this particular period of the year to design, Russia knowing that China could not move in the winter. He pointed out that China could not fight Mongolia if the latter had the assistance of Russia. The most they could do was to take precautions about Inner and Eastern Mongolia.

The ensuing debate was long and heated. Suggestions made by members did not show much acquaintance with practical politics. One proposed an alliance with Japan and a combined declaration of war against Russia. Another was ready to go to war independently of assistance. It was suggested that as Russia had not warned the Powers of the despatch of an Ambassador to Mongolia, the doings of M. Kovostovetz were null and void. The opinion was stated, in regard to the proposal to submit the case to The Hague, that the weak nation

Furthermore, the attitude of the Powers generally in regard to Russia's high-handed action was unknown. Moreover—a significant admission—the feelings of the Mongolians themselves towards China were not known. In the end the hope was expressed that the Cabinet would not resign at the present juncture, but would continue in office until Parliament meets three months hence. To this, apparently, the Ministers assented, promising to devote their energies to finding a satisfactory solution of the question, in concert with the Council, and with the provinces and the Tutuhs, to whom appeal would be made for counsel.

### BRITISH AND RUSSIAN STANDPOINTS.

So the matter stands for the present, and is likely to continue to stand in the future, for China is helpless in the face of a *fait accompli*. The politicians in Peking and other centres are unquestionably stirred by a deep sense of the injustice which they believe to have been done to China, and to some extent their helplessness arouses foreign sympathy. On the other hand, there is little serious criticism of the step taken by Russia. The analogy between the Tibetan and Mongolian cases is close. Over both territories Chinese claims were shadowy. Both regions were administratively independent until recent years, when China inaugurated the forward foreign policy that has resulted in two serious checks. Great Britain and Russia have both said practically the same thing in regard to Tibet and Mongolia respectively—no interference with their autonomy. Suzerainty is acknowledged in the one case, is not denied in the other, and will be admitted when China accepts the situation. We have stood only for the maintenance of the *status quo*, partly in our own interests as concerning a frontier State and partly in the interests of a primitive people who have been harshly treated of late by the Chinese. Russia has upset the *status quo*, for reasons, if the premises are correct, that will bear examination. Mongolia, for instance, was vassal to the Manchu rulers of China, and if China discards the Manchus, the Mongols may not unreasonably refuse to accept the Chinese in their stead. That is a domestic matter between the two peoples. Russia's justification for intervention is that she has for long desired to settle outstanding disputes with China about Mongolia, and that China has constantly infringed treaties and refused a settlement. Mongolia having thrown off the Chinese yoke, Russia acknowledges the new State and treats with it direct, as she was prepared to treat with China if the latter had shown more readiness to meet her.

### A CONFLICT OF VIEWS.

The Chinese view is that Russia has engineered the whole difficulty. They declare that the Hutukhtu is a debauchee who has passed under the influence of Russia, and that the Princes who rule in patriarchal fashion over the nomad tribes of Mongolia are opposed to his policy, but dare not object to it for fear of Russia. On the other hand, a deputation of Mongol Princes not long ago went to St. Petersburg to seek Russian protection against the Chinese, while the Princes in Eastern Mongolia have recently been at war with China. Both these steps may have been prompted by Russia, but at any rate they show on the part of the Mongolians a desire to be free from Chinese interference. The Russians declare that the Chinese have violated their Treaty rights as regards trade and other matters in Mongolia. This the Chinese deny, but they have continually delayed discussion of the question. The Mongols say that the Chinese have been dispossessing the tribes of the scattered patches of cultivable land in Mongolia and involving the Princes financially by lending them money at usurious rates and ruthlessly foreclosing on property. Moreover, the Chinese have sent troops into Mongolia—where formerly there were none—and have been interfering in administrative matters. The Chinese declare these steps to be within their rights.

On the points relating to the actual state of affairs in Mongolia there is no independent evidence. If Russian Treaty privileges in Mongolia have been consistently ignored—as is averred—then Russia would appear to be justified in entering into direct relations with the Mongolians and in agreeing to protect them from the consequences of treating with Russia. If, on the other hand, Russian grievances have been imaginary, China has ground for attributing any degree of Machiavellianism she likes to Russia. But in the absence of evidence as to what has been happening in Mongolia outsiders can offer no opinion on the point. They can, however, clearly see that China constantly acts as her own enemy in ignoring, evading, or positively violating the Treaty rights of countries with which she is in relation. We have experience of it with

and particularly as regards the Opium Agreement. The generally accepted view here is that, apart entirely from the ultimate designs of Russia in Mongolia, if designs there be, the Russians are bound to be in the right, because the Chinese are bound to have put themselves in the wrong.

Times"  
Dec. 1912

Register No.  
P  
4545  
1912

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Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70.

Dated } 25 Nov 1912.  
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
		150	W
Under Secretary.....	26 Nov.	AM	Russia and Mongolia
Secretary of State.....	27	W.A.	
Committee.....	27	E	Chinese attitude : on amicable solution expected
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

COPY TO INDIA  
29 NOV 1912  
SECRETARY'S NO 48

FOR INFORMATION.

Seen Phil 1110 cc.  
8 DEC. 1912


29 Nov. 2els from Sir J Buchanan and Sir  
Jordan, Nos. 413, 235, Nov. 5, 7 - added

Previous Papers :—

4445



CONFIDENTIAL.



*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 25, 9:30 A.M.)*

*Peking, November 25, 1912.*

(No. 242.) R.


*(November 25, 1:40 A.M.)*

YOUR telegram No. 189

Foreign Minister is in negotiation with Russian Legation, and, from conversations with Yuan Shih-kai and Russian Minister, I gather that an amicable solution is expected.



CONFIDENTIAL.



*Sir Edward Grey to Sir J. Jordan (Peking).*

(No. 189.)

*Foreign Office, November 23, 1912.*

✓ BY instructions from Peking, Chinese Minister called on 21st November to ask views of His Majesty's Government on Mongolian Agreement. I referred him to an answer given that day in the House of Commons, of which copy goes to you to-day, and added that, without seeing the protocol, which I expected shortly, I could not well express an opinion.

Chinese Government seem to object not so much to substance of treaty as to fact that Russia had apparently ignored them in making it.

Sir A. Hitzel

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~~ant~~ end  
29/12.



4545

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 7.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[47331]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 7.)*

(No. 235.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Peking, November 7, 1912.*

RUSSIAN Minister has communicated to me verbally contents of agreement signed 3rd November between Russian envoy and Mongol authorities at Urga. The document will be communicated officially to the Chinese Government to-morrow.

[2695 g—2]



COPY  
29 NOV 1912  
SECRETARY'S NO 48

4545

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 5.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[47050]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. -- (Received November 5.)*

(No. 413.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*St. Petersburg, November 5, 1912.*


MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me that arrangement with Mongolia, referred to in my telegram No. 402 had been signed, with some slight modifications, and that he would communicate text as soon as he received it by telegram.

He added that the next thing he would have to do would be to get China to recognise it.

[2695 e-3]



COPY TO  
29 NOV 1912  
SECRETARY'S No 48



Hansard.

21 November 1912.

**Russo-Mongolian Agreement.**

4. Mr. LLOYD asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any information which he could give regarding the Russo-Mongolian agreement of 3rd November, and whether he can state the nature of the agreement and its most important terms; and whether the protocol of that agreement assures any special commercial rights to Russian trade and Russian subjects?

Sir E. GREY: The semi-official statements issued in St. Petersburg and reported in the Press contain, so far as I am aware, the salient points of the agreement. The protocol attached to the agreement has not yet been communicated to me. It would seem *prima facie* that the agreement is intended to confirm rights and privileges for Russian subjects which existed under previous treaties of many years' standing, and generally to secure the status, practically amounting to autonomy, which was the normal condition of Outer Mongolia; but I am awaiting further information on these points.

Mr. GINNELL: Will the right hon. Gentleman say with what Governments previous treaties were made?

Sir E. GREY: Perhaps the hon. Member will give me notice of that.

Mr. LLOYD: Will the right hon. Gentleman get what information he can as regards the last part of the question?

Sir E. GREY: Yes, I am expecting it in a few days.



Extract from  
"Daily Telegraph"  
26 Nov. 1912.

## CHINA AND MONGOLIA

### RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE.

#### STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY.

From Our Special Correspondent,  
Dr. E. J. DILLON.

VIENNA, Monday Night.

Before the modified Near Eastern problem is even clearly formulated, the Far Eastern sphinx question is thrust into the foreground of international politics anew. China is alleged to be preparing to wage war against Russia for aiding and abetting Outer Mongolia to shake off its allegiance to Peking. The history of the successive phases of policy which has culminated in this deplorable conflict of views and interests will be found in my numerous telegrams from St. Petersburg. In September I announced that a struggle for the possession of China beyond the Wall would begin within six calendar months. And now it is at hand.

A diplomatist here, whose nationality and official status entitles him to be heard on this subject with respect, has allowed his opinion to be published in the *Neue Freie Presse* to-day. His narrative coincides with mine, but his forecast, emanating from a Japanese source, is new and worth reproducing. He declares that the more successfully Russia executes her plans in Mongolia the more threatened Japan feels herself in Manchuria, which would be hedged round completely if the rectification of frontiers which Russia demands were granted.

"For some time past invisible threads have been spun from China to Japan, and it is quite on the cards that a secret understanding between the two countries, without Russia's assent or knowledge, may already have been effected for the purpose of shaping the future of Mongolia as an independent State under the real, but unproclaimed, protectorate of Japan."

From this assumption I dissent. My own knowledge of Russo-Japanese relations and of the loyalty of the statesmen charged with cultivating them emboldens me to affirm that the two Governments are in perfect accord, and have discussed a variety of contingencies, one of which is the present crisis, with a view to determining their respective attitudes when it should become an accomplished fact.

I repeat, however, to-day what I have so often said this year, that far-reaching changes are impending in the Far East, that the Republic is foredoomed to lose most of China beyond the Wall, and that the country within the Wall will be transformed into a pale of settlement for the Chinese.

#### "SITUATION UNCHANGED."

From Our Special Correspondent.

PEKIN, Monday.

The Chinese Press is full of telegrams and editorials on the Mongolian situation, and contain numbers of statements indicative of the general anxiety felt with regard to the future, coupled with alarmist reports of Russian military preparations.

I understand, however, from the highest quarters that the situation has in nowise changed during the last few days, and that, indeed, hopes are cherished that a middle way may actually be found.

Similarly many unauthorised statements regarding loan negotiations are appearing here again. The same may be affirmed—viz., that nothing has materially altered, despite some Six-Power group pourparlers.

Generally speaking, the internal situation has vastly improved, giving hopes that the Chinese Government will be treated with more dignity and consideration.

Put away with 529

Register No.

4445

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

2 Letter from P.O.

Dated } 14 Nov 1912.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	19 Nov.	at	Russia and Mongolia
Secretary of State.....	19	J.W.H	Question by Mr. Simms, M.P.
Committee.....	21	E	Conversation with Japanese
Under Secretary.....			Ambassador as to Russian
Secretary of State.....			aims in Mongolia.


Copy to India 15 Nov. Secy. 46

FOR INFORMATION.

26 NOV 1912

Previous Papers:—

A35



[A]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[November 2.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 1.

[46987]

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Rumbold.*

(No. 180.)

Sir,

*Foreign Office, November 2, 1912.*


I TOLD the Japanese Ambassador to-day of a report which Dr. Dillon had sent home yesterday that Russia intended to proclaim the annexation of the whole of Mongolia. I believed that there was no truth in this, and that what was really about to happen was that Russia would stipulate for the autonomy of Outer Mongolia under Chinese suzerainty, by which I understood that the Mongolian princes should be free to make arrangements with Russia, just as, for instance, the Thibetan authorities had done with us, and that China should not enter upon a military occupation of Outer Mongolia.

The Ambassador observed that the control of China over Outer Mongolia had always been rather shadowy, and he did not think that Japan need be concerned about the matter. The annexation of Mongolia as a whole would be a different thing.


I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2695 b-1]







[October 24.]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 5.

[45346]

No. 1.


*Question asked in the House of Commons, October 24, 1912.*

*Mr. Ginnell.*—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether the Russian Government consulted the British Government before dispatching the present Korostovetz mission to Mongolia to dissuade the Mongols from their allegiance to China; and whether a mission for that purpose is a breach of international law and of all the treaties made for the preservation of the integrity of China.

*Answer.*

I am not aware that the object of the Russian mission is what the honourable Member states. I have no reason to believe that it is intended to alter the *status quo* in Outer Mongolia.

[2655 aa—5]



Extract from Daily Telegraph  
13, 15, 19 November 1912

## RUSSO-MONGOLIAN CONVENTION.

### RESIGNATION OF THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER.

PEKING, Nov. 13.\*

Liang Men-ting, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has resigned. The reason for this is understood to be his refusal to comply with the wishes of the Cabinet to begin negotiations with Russia concerning Mongolia, a step which Liang Men-ting considered tantamount to recognizing the autonomy of Mongolia.

According to a Chinese authoritative report, Russia has pledged herself in a secret Russo-Mongolian protocol to take any measures which may be necessary to maintain the independence of Mongolia, to extend Mongolian territory as far as the Great Wall of China, and to obtain international recognition of Mongolia as a new State. Mongolia, on the other hand, grants Russia the right to supervise Mongolia's foreign relations and also gives a general and comprehensive concession to Russian subjects to construct railways, open mines, and reclaim waste lands. Finally, Russians receive the exclusive right to purchase cattle and sheep from Mongols.

\*Liang Men-ting was appointed Foreign Minister on September 16. Our Peking Correspondent referred to the appointment as remarkable in that the Minister, although well educated from the Western point of view, is unable to read the Chinese language.

## CHINA AND MONGOLIA.

### HOSTILITIES IMMINENT.

From Our Own Correspondent.

PEKIN, Thursday.

The position is still more threatening. To-day the metropolitan Press, from sources believed to be in touch with the Japanese secret service, publish a summary of the secret protocol mentioned in Article 2 of the Russo-Mongolian Urga Convention. The protocol consists of twenty-one articles, in the chief of which Russia engages to take measures necessary for maintaining the independence of Mongolia, extending the territory affected to the Great Wall, and obtaining international recognition of the new State. In return Mongolia grants Russia the right of supervision over her foreign relations, and a general comprehensive concession to build railways, open mines, and reclaim waste lands, also the exclusive right of purchasing sheep and cattle.

This business has already aroused such widespread fury throughout China that hostilities with Mongolia are imminent.

President Yuan-Shi-Kai yesterday received telegrams from ten provincial governors, including Li-Yuan-Hung, requesting the Government immediately to lay war plans before the Advisory Council. The 34th Infantry Regiment has already advanced from Kalgan into Inner Mongolia, and a whole division follows.

An urgent telegram from the general commanding Chahar states that a Russian infantry battalion and a battery of artillery have already entered Urga with quantities of war munitions.

The Mongol Princes resident in Peking visited Yuan-Shi-Kai yesterday, and declared that they absolutely repudiate the Urga Convention, and requested the President to use force in dealing with the Khutuktu rebels, since they had no right whatever to make international agreements.

Important developments are now hourly expected.

## CHINA AND MONGOLIA.

### MOVEMENTS OF TROOPS.

#### VIGOROUS MEASURES.

From Our Special Correspondent,

PEKIN, Sunday.

Extraordinary interest attaches to the internal and external situation provoked by the Urga crisis. It is now no longer disputed that Yuan-Shih-Kai, summoning his camarilla early last week, practically decided to scotch the whole business, in order not to complicate the approaching general elections, and jeopardise his Presidency. But when the matter was brought up before the whole Cabinet the Foreign Minister, Liang-Meng-Ting, stood out, and absolutely refused to be a party to a disgraceful surrender of China's Mongolian rights. He demanded that the most vigorous diplomatic and military action should be taken, or else he would resign.

Owing to the Presidential animosity, coupled with threats reaching him from various quarters, Liang-Meng-Ting was forced to throw up his office. But the sequel was remarkable. As I have already telegraphed, all political parties, fastening on the question as vital to Chinese Nationalism, locked their ranks, and plainly intimated that the President should either accept the national mandate or resign.

Yuan-Shih-Kai thereupon made a rapid volte-face, adopted the popular view, and telegraphed to all the provinces, soliciting their support. Great military and political activity now prevails.

#### TREATY REPUDIATED.

A mass meeting of 110 Mongol princes, dukes, and chieftains collected in Peking decided, in the name of their tribes, representing an enormous majority of the various banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia, to repudiate absolutely the Urga Convention, which can only affect the territory in the immediate vicinity of Urga, comprising two tribes of eastern Khalka. Furthermore, it was unanimously resolved to send a memorial to the President, asking him immediately to afford military protection for those banners which definitely join the Chinese Republic.

Following upon this decision, which was endorsed by a unanimous vote of the Advisory Council, a large dislocation of the northern troops is occurring; 46,000 infantry are under orders, and many battalions are entraining for Kalgan. Very comprehensive plans have already been adopted, but are kept strictly secret.

A highly interesting feature is that China has confidentially sounded all the European Chanceries, and is receiving sympathetic replies from many Continental Governments. But, as usual, though three successive treaties with Japan and England have solemnly guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Chinese Empire, scant comfort is drawn from Downing-street.

The outcome of the whole imbroglio must provide many surprises. The situation is unique in that China, operating in Mongolia, must ignore Russia, which has no locus standi, save as a supporter of the small rebel Government created through her own intrigues, which is an undignified and disastrous precedent for a great European Power to establish.

## CHINA AND MONGOLIA.

### ENTHUSIASM FOR WAR.

#### DESPATCH OF TROOPS.

From Our Special Correspondent.

PEKIN, Monday (3.40 p.m.).

Telegrams from Jehol state that the Kailu districts lying within the extramural portion of Chihli Province have been invaded by Mongol troops.

Letters from Kalgan state that Chinese refugees are crowding in in great numbers, being driven in at the head-point by the Mongol raiders from many points of Mongolia.

The position is becoming more and more complicated, owing to the complete interruption of all the caravan routes, coupled with the beginning of a very severe winter.

War enthusiasm in China is, however, constantly growing, and divisions are volunteering wholesale for active service. Since yesterday troop trains on the northern railways have been constantly moving.

#### THE RUSSIAN TREATY.

PEKIN, Monday.

For several months the Chinese Government has allowed the Tibetan and Mongolian Bureau, which consists of Chinese experienced in the affairs of those dependencies, largely to control the questions relating to them. Within the past month numerous Mongolian chiefs and dignitaries have arrived at Peking, where they have formed an association, which is working in close touch with the aforesaid bureau. The association has now officially issued the following statement:

"Since the establishment of the Chinese Republic the six Leagues of Inner Mongolia, and also the Leagues of Kobdo, Uriankhai, Koko Nor, and Chinese Turkistan, have declared their approval of the new form of government, and have undertaken to co-operate with the Chinese Manchus, the Turkic tribe, and the Tibetans, in order to form one compact and solid country. Urga, in Outer Mongolia, alone stood out under foreign advice, and Obopsundampa, the Kutukhtu of Urga, with the support of certain Princes and Dukes of the Tushetu and Teetse Khanates, declared their independence. Two of the four Khanates in Outer Mongolia never assented to the action of Urga. Indeed, only Urga, in association with the minority of the tribes, whose administration is centred there, really was responsible for the so-called independence of Mongolia. The rebel community comprises less than one-tenth of the whole of Mongolia. Thus it is impossible for Urga to arrogate to itself the right of deciding the political fate of Outer Mongolia, and far less of the entire region of Mongolia.

"We are amazed to learn that the Kutukhtu and his associates have concluded a convention with Russia, whereby Russia has granted a practical title to what appears to be the whole of Mongolia. Therefore, we Princes, Dukes, and dignitaries of Inner and Outer Mongolia, having formed an organised association for the more effective representation of Mongolian interests, and being the hereditary and legal representatives of the people of Mongolia, hereby declare that we have not recognised, and will not recognise, the right of Urga, politically or otherwise, to represent or act in the name, or on behalf, of Mongolia. We announce to the world that any Treaty or Treaties made or concluded by the Urga Kutukhtu with any foreign country or countries are, and must be, null and without effect.

"By order of the association, the Princes, &c."—*Reuter*.

### RUSSIAN ACTION IN CHINA.

#### GRAVE SITUATION.

From Our Special Correspondent.

PEKIN, Tuesday (8.0 p.m.).

An extremely ugly situation is rapidly arising, owing to Russian action at Urga. The tone of the Chinese newspapers is daily more exasperated, demanding prompt military action; otherwise unchecked aggression may bring about the dissolution of the Republic. A grand military conference regarding the feasibility of certain military steps will shortly be opened at the Presidential Mansion. It is believed that the Government must yield to popular clamour and despatch a strong expeditionary corps across the Gobi Desert. I recommend the careful attention of England to what I have already, again and again, insisted—that China, under no circumstances, will consent to a shrinkage of her frontiers.



## THE FUTURE OF MONGOLIA.

### CHINA'S WANING INFLUENCE.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

PEKING, Nov. 11.

The Convention which has been concluded between the Russian Government and the Hutukhtu at Urga, who now claims to be the ruler of Outer Mongolia, has brought home to the Chinese Government the fact that an entirely new situation has been created, which precludes the possibility of incorporating North Mongolia in the Republic as a Chinese province, and dispels all hopes of compelling the Hutukhtu to return to his allegiance by force.

There is a strong party in Russia that openly advocates the annexation of North Mongolia, but the Russian Government disclaims any such intention, and, indeed, declares that annexation would remove the *raison d'être* of its recent move, which aimed at securing the establishment of an autonomous buffer State between the Russian and Chinese frontiers. Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted that the commercial rights and privileges for which provision is made in a secret protocol attached to the new Convention will have the effect of ensuring Russia's predominance in Outer Mongolia, and correspondingly diminishing Chinese influence therein. In a few years we shall probably see the Urga-Kiakha Railway completed, and when all is ready for an extension southward of the new line towards Peking, it will occasion no surprise if a certain amount of unrest and anti-Chinese sentiment becomes apparent in Inner Mongolia. Outer Mongolia is lost to China. It will be interesting to see whether she is able to retain her hold upon Inner Mongolia, where she is now making such strenuous efforts to pacify and conciliate the princes and people.

Meanwhile, the Urga Hutukhtu's followers are showing an aggressive spirit. A few weeks ago they attacked and looted the Imperial Stud Farm near Chahar. News has just been received by courier that a fortnight ago a Khalkha raid was made into the territory of a Prince of one of the Abaganar Banners, who was carried away captive with all his possessions. From Northern Kansu come news of continuous unrest and fears of a Mohammedan rising.

"Daily Telegraph,"

26(?) ~~Nov~~ November 1912

Register No.

Put away with

539

## Minute Paper.

4350

Secret Department.

2 Letters from *FO*.

Dated

Rec.

7.9 Nov. 1912.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
		<i>LS</i>	<i>TR</i>
Under Secretary.....	<i>12 Nov.</i>	<i>at</i>	<u><i>Mongolia</i></u>
Secretary of State.....	<i>12</i>	<i>T. W. H.</i>	<i>Russian Agreement with</i>
Committee.....	<i>13</i>	<u><i>C</i></u>	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to *India* - *See within*.

FOR INFORMATION.

seen-For Com-ee,  
20 NOV 1912

Previous Papers:—

4273

## RUSSO-MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT. MAINTENANCE OF AUTONOMY.

ST. PETERSBURG, Nov. 7.\*

The following semi-official *communiqué* is issued here :—

By the Russo-Mongolian Agreement concluded on November 3 the Russian Government undertakes to assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous régime she has established, to support her right to have a national army, and to admit neither the presence of Chinese troops on her soil nor the colonization by the Chinese of her territory. The Mongolian Sovereign and Government will assure to Russian subjects and Russian commerce as in the past the full enjoyment of their rights and privileges as enumerated in the Protocol, and it is clearly understood that no other foreign subjects in Mongolia shall be granted fuller rights than those accorded to Russian subjects. If the Mongolian Government should find it necessary to conclude a separate treaty with China or any other foreign Power, such new Treaty shall in no case either infringe the articles of the present Agreement and the Protocol attached to it, or modify them without the consent of the Russian Government. The present friendly Treaty comes into force from the day of its signature.

The Agreement throughout refers to Mongolia without specifying the northern or any other part.

According to despatches published by the *Novoe Vremya* to-day, the Chinese residing at Kobdo have been sent to Harbin under an escort of Cossacks. Only 13 Cossacks and one officer are now at Kobdo, but three sotnias of Transbaikalian Cossacks and a battery are on their way there. The Mongolian garrison numbers 500. The Chinese force of 6,000 is continuing its advance from Kucheng on Kobdo.

## MONGOLIAN INDEPENDENCE.

### AIMS OF RUSSIAN POLICY.

From Our Special Correspondent.

PEKIN, Sunday.

Official information received here places upon the Russo-Mongolian Convention, signed at Urga on Oct. 21, a complexion radically different from that officially communicated. The main point is that Russia suppresses entirely all mention of the secret protocol signed at the same time, which is in the nature of a virtual protectorate.

In face of this provocation, China not only vigorously protests, but absolutely declines to accept the violation of her territorial integrity. The Urga Khutuktu has no more legal authority to sign international instruments than any archbishop in Europe has power to do so. His power is only spiritual, and even that is limited to the Urga districts.

As I pointed out months ago, Russia's real desire is to secure an open title to the sources of the Siberian river system. Yesterday, in furtherance of the idea to dominate this vast stretch of territory north of the Tien-shan range, the Russian Minister called at the Wai-Chiao-Pu, and again requested that a date should be set for the discussion of the new trunk railway running from the heart of the threatened region to Peking.

The only result of these manoeuvres is to intensify the movement to negotiate a permanent understanding between Peking and Tokio.

*Daily Telegraph 11 Nov./12*

*Reuter 7 Nov./12*




in any further communica-  
tion on this subject, please quote

No. 47310

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.




*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for  
India  
and, by direction of the Secretary of  
State, transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned paper.*

*Foreign Office,*

*November 9, 1912.*

*Reference to previous letter:*


*Description of Inclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>H. M. Ambassador at St. Petersburg Telegram No. 402 November 1, 1912</i>	<i>Russian Agreement with Mongolia.</i> 

*(Similar letter sent to*

*)*

CONFIDENTIAL.



*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 1, 5.40 P.M.)*

*St. Petersburg, November 1, 1912.*


*(November 1, 3.15 P.M.)*

(No. 402. Confidential.) ✓

MY telegram No. 379 of 20th October.

Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that an arrangement would be shortly signed with Mongolian authorities, under which the latter would recognise all rights and privileges enjoyed by Russia under the treaty of 1881, while Russia would engage to support them against introduction of Chinese administration into Outer Mongolia, the quartering there of adventurous troops, and colonisation of lands by Chinese.


I remarked that this was a virtual recognition of Mongolian autonomy. His Excellency admitted this, but drew a distinction between independence and autonomy. It was, he said, the only course left open to Russia in order to secure recognition of treaty rights in Mongolia now the latter was cutting herself adrift from China.



[1120—309]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[October 20.]

SECTION 1.

[44124]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20.)*

(No. 379.)


(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR despatch No. 336. (3925)

*St. Petersburg, October 20, 1912.*

Press yesterday reported meeting of Russian special envoy with Khoutouktasy at Ourga on 11th October, at which envoy invited Mongolia to enter into direct trade relations with Russia.

[2655 u—1]





Put away with 29

Register No.

4273

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

2 Letters from 70.

Dated } 31 Oct. 1912.  
Rec.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	5 Nov.	att	<u>China</u> Situation in Mongolia Russian attitude.
Secretary of State....		J.W.H.	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State....			

Copy to India, 1 Nov. 1912  
Secy. 44

#### FOR INFORMATION.

#### RUSSIA AND MONGOLIA.

##### A TREATY CONCLUDED.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, Nov. 4.

The determination of Russia to treat Outer Mongolia as an autonomous State despite the active opposition of Peking, has become apparent. Since M. Korostovetz arrived at Urga he has formally recognized the Mongolian Government, and a telegram from Urga to the *Novoe Vremya* to-day now announces that M. Korostovetz has concluded a treaty between Russia and Mongolia.

From the same source comes the news that 6,000 Chinese troops with six guns are advancing to Kobdo from Kucheng. The Chinese being aware that Russia will not tolerate a revival of their domination in these regions, as this is incompatible with the security of the Siberian frontier, the movement of troops appears to be an act of provocation likely to compel Russia to proclaim a protectorate.

The eventual partition of Outer and Inner Mongolia between Russia and Japan appears to be merely a question of time.

Seen Pot Comtee.  
12 NOV 1912

"Times" 5 Nov. 1912

Previous Papers:—

1640 A

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

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4273  
1912

[October 16.]

SECTION 1.

[43502]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)*

(No. 393.)

Sir,

(3715)

Peking, October 1, 1912.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 193 of the 21st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Harbin, reporting the dispatch of two squadrons of Russian cavalry to Taonan-fu.

It is very difficult to obtain authentic information respecting the Mongol rising in this area, but the troubles apparently began early in August with the appearance of detachments of Mongols near Taonan-fu, where the local Mongol Prince declared the independence of his tribe and its alliance with the independent Government declared by the other Mongol tribes at Urga.

The Chinese garrison in the neighbourhood consisted of some 600 to 900 Fengtien provincial troops, who were not strong enough to cope with a rising in any great force. Steps were at once taken by the Chinese authorities to send an expedition to the disturbed area, and the total Chinese force now in that district is estimated at from 10,000 to 15,000 men with fifty-four guns. As a result, the local rising of the Mongols has completely collapsed, and, according to information from Russian sources, is being avenged with acts of barbarous cruelty.

The Russian troops would appear to be little more than a reconnoitring force dispatched on the pretext of protecting Russian subjects, and were not in sufficient strength to afford any material assistance to the Mongols.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Consul Willis to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 31. Confidential.)

Sir,

Harbin, September 20, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegrams Nos. 13 and 14 of the 14th and 20th instant with reference to the dispatch of Russian troops to the neighbourhood of Taonan-fu.

I am informed by Lieutenant Binstead, of the Essex regiment, who has just returned here from Tsitsihar, that the troops sent consisted of two "sotnia" of the 1st cavalry regiment, usually stationed at Harbin. They detrained at Fuliardi, a station about 250 versts west of Harbin, after dark on the evening of the 8th instant, and thence proceeded in the direction of Taonan-fu, distant approximately 200 versts.


Lieutenant Binstead also learnt that for the thirteen preceding days another "sotnia" had been reconnoitring in the same direction, and that during this time various Mongol chieftains had visited the Russian camp at Fuliardi to ask for Russian aid.

On the evening of the 12th I heard from a reliable source that the taotai had asked General Martinoff for an explanation of the presence of Russian troops in the neighbourhood of Taonan-fu, and that the general had denied flatly that any troops had been sent there. The same evening I met Captain Filipoff, General Martinoff's aide-de-camp, who volunteered the information that 400 cavalry had been dispatched to Taonan-fu for the protection of Russian subjects.

According to Captain Filipoff, the Mongol chieftain, who was the overlord of the Taonan district, borrowed a considerable sum some years ago from Russian sources; the loan was repaid by the Chinese Government, who thereupon commenced to fill up the territory with Chinese emigrants, to the disregard of any vested Mongol rights. Taonan-fu was now a town of about 15,000 inhabitants, almost all Chinese, though the Mongols resort thither freely for purposes of trade.

The city seems to have fallen into the hands of the Mongols towards the middle of August last without any serious opposition, and similarly the Chinese troops had no

[2655 q-1]



difficulty in recapturing the town. The district is now said to be comparatively quiet, though Russian reports allege that the Chinese are treating the Mongols with great severity.

It appears to me that the present Russian advance is intended as a countermove to the reported Japanese intrigues with the south-eastern Mongolians, for here Russian officials maintain stoutly that Taonan-fu is within the Russian sphere. There can be no doubt that there is considerable excitement amongst the military all along the line. The Russian officers of the frontier guard, if one may judge from opinions openly expressed, would welcome any forward movement even if it led to complications with Japan.

General Horwath, the manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, who exercises a restraining and moderating influence on the local military party, is at present in St. Petersburg.

General Martinoff left Harbin yesterday, his destination being nominally Hailar.

I have, &c.


ROBERT WILLIS.

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[October 14.]

SECTION 4.

[43872]

No. 1.


*Question asked in the House of Commons, October 14, 1912.*

*Sir J. D. Rees*,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether any change recognised by the Foreign Office has occurred in respect of the status of outer Mongolia in relation to Russia and China.

*Answer by Mr. Benn.*

The answer is in the negative.

[2655 o-4]



37/12  
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[September 21.]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECTION 3.

[39728]

No. 1.


*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)*

(No. 193. Confidential.)  
(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, September 21, 1912.*

CONSUL at Harbin telegraphs that two squadrons of Russian cavalry have been sent to Taonan-fu. Russian Minister spoke to me to-day of a possible Russian movement in Chinese Turkestan, regarding which His Majesty's Government would, || he said, be consulted.

[2623 x-3]



*CP*  
*Ind. R. d. 1890*  
*Immigration*  
AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[September 24.]

SECTION 4.

[40434]

No. 1.


*Note on the Question of Mongolia.*

M. SAZONOF told me very confidentially that in a very short time the Russian Minister at Peking would go to Urga to negotiate an arrangement with the Khoutouktar and some of the leading Khans under which they were to agree to resist Chinese immigration, administration, or military occupation, and in this Russia would help them if need be. But Russia desired only Mongolian autonomy and not to alter the *status quo*. He said in reply to a question from me this applied to Outer Mongolia. Russia also demanded the prolongation of the treaty of 1881 with China, which gave certain preferential rights for Russian trade and subjects in Outer Mongolia.

E. G.

September 24, 1912.

[2623 aa—4]





Minute Paper.

Register No.

3925

Put away with 539

Secret Department.

Letter from 7.O. No. 40434

Dated 9 } October 1912.  
Rec. 11 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
		LO	TR
Under Secretary.....	16 Oct.	att	<u>Mongolia</u> Russian policy : proposed despatch of a Russian Agent to Urga.
Secretary of State.....	16	at	
Committee.....	17	C.	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India, 10 Oct. 1912

Lg 42

## FOR INFORMATION.

According to a recent report from St. Petersburg (see attached extract from the Times of 8<sup>th</sup> Oct.) the Chinese are making vigorous efforts to restore their authority in Mongolia, & it seems possible, - if there is any foundation for the Times report - that the Russian Agent, when he arrives at Urga, may find the Chinese in possession.

= The "Kouboukhatai" mentioned in Sir E. Grey's despatch is presumably the so-called "Hutuktu" or Bogdo Lama

Seen for copy to.  
23 OCT 1912

Previous Papers:—

Lama, the high Lamaist dignitary of Urga, who ranks 3rd in the Buddhist hierarchy after the Dalai and Tashi Lamas of Tibet.

It will be remembered that one of the first acts of the Mongolians, on asserting their independence in December 1911, was to proclaim the Hutuktu monarch of the country.

MASSACRES BY CHINESE IN  
EASTERN MONGOLIA.

10,000 REPORTED KILLED.

(FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)

ST. PETERSBURG, OCT. 8.

While the attention of Russia is mainly directed to the Balkans there are signs of renewed trouble on the Far Eastern border. Wholesale massacres have been perpetrated by Yuan Shih-kai's troops in Eastern Mongolia with the object of stamping out the recent inclination to join Outer Mongolia. Over 10,000 Mongols were slain. The victorious troops are now advancing in a circle upon Urga. Bereft of Russian support, the Government at Urga now appears disposed to receive an emissary from Peking.

"Times", 9 Oct. 1912




In any further communication on this subject, please quote

No. 40434

and address—


The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.



*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for  
India and, by direction of the Secretary of  
State, transmits herewith 3 copies of the under-mentioned paper.*

*Foreign Office,*


*October 9, 1912.*



*Reference to previous letter:*

*Description of Inclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>To H. M. Ambassador at St. Petersburg No. 336 October 8, 1912.</i>	<i>Russia and Mongolia.</i>




*(Similar letter sent to*

*)*

Copy.

No. 336

(40/4/12)



WOFFICE OFFICE.

8th October, 1912.

*Confidential*

Sir:-

Monsieur Razoum told me very confidentially on September 28th that, in a very short time, the late Russian Minister at Peking would go to Urga to negotiate an arrangement with the Khotenko and some of the leading Khans, under which they were to agree to resist Chinese immigration, administration, or military occupation, and that if this Russia would help them if need be.

Russia, however, only desired Mongolian autonomy and did not wish to alter the status quo. This he said in reply to a question from me applied to Outer Mongolia.

Russia also desired the preservation of the Treaty of 1881 which gave certain preferential rights to Russian trade and subjects in Outer Mongolia.

I am, with great respect and respect,

Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient,

humble servant,

Edw. J. Grey.

His Excellency

The Right Honourable

Sir G. Buchanan, G.C.V.O., K.C.B.,

Mr., Mr., Mr.

Put away with 539/12

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[April 22.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 2.

[16861]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)*

(No. 164.)

*Peking, April 5, 1912.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 119 of the 12th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a further despatch from the acting British consul at Harbin on the subject of the recent Mongolian occupation of Hailar and Lu Pin Fu.

From this despatch it would appear that General Martinof, in command of the Chinese Eastern Railway Guards, has been made the scapegoat for what M. Konovalof described as a "blunder" on the part of the Russian authorities on this occasion.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 14. Confidential.)

*Harbin, March 31, 1912.*

Sir,

BEGGING reference to my despatch No. 9, Very Confidential, and earlier despatches of this year respecting the Mongolian occupation of the Chinese town of Hailar and Lu Pin Fu, I have the honour to report that information which has just reached me from a reliable source is to the effect that General Martinof, who commands the Chinese Eastern Railway Guards, was alone responsible for the active assistance rendered to the Mongols on the occasions in question. The colonel commanding the Russian troops at Manchuria Station was given secret orders by General Martinof to assist the Mongols at Lu Pin Fu with arms and men, and these commands were duly obeyed. General Martinof, who has in the past maintained that he was independent of General Horvat, has now, I understand, been telegraphically instructed by the high authorities in St. Petersburg to consider himself subordinate to the last-named official, who is, as you know, the local manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

I have, &c.

H. E. SLY.

[2433 y—2]

3 MAY 1912

SECRETARY'S N2 18



[B]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[April 22.]

SECTION 3.

[16755]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received April 22.)*

(No. 123. Confidential.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, April 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 112 of the 16th instant, I have the honour to report that I took advantage of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday to speak to him of the present situation in China.

M. Sazonof did not appear to have any very definite views on the subject. He had, he said, no positive data on which to found an opinion, though he spoke of rumours which had reached him of possible troubles in the north. He did not mention the source whence these rumours had sprung, nor could he say whether the anticipated troubles were likely or not to take the form of an anti-revolutionary movement on the part of the Manchus.

On my enquiring whether recent events in China had led the Russian and Japanese Governments to strengthen their agreement of July 1910, and whether under that agreement the contracting parties were bound to obtain each other's consent before taking any measures to protect their interests in their respective spheres of influence, M. Sazonof answered both these questions in the negative. He had, he said, no reason to believe that Japan was seeking a pretext to intervene, and he trusted that nothing would happen to force her to take such a step. Russia on her part would certainly not be the first to have recourse to active intervention, and she would not move unless compelled to do so in consequence of some unforeseen Japanese action in the south.

The language thus held to me by M. Sazonof, as well as the enquiries which I have made in other quarters, do not seem to confirm the statement made in Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 101, Very Confidential, of the 27th February last, as to some new development having recently taken place in the Russo-Japanese agreement. The situation is, however, naturally causing considerable anxiety to both Governments, and they would only be giving effect to their agreement were they, as they probably are doing, to take counsel together and to consider the measures which either one or both of them might have to take should their interests be seriously threatened. In the various conversations which I have had with him, M. Sazonof has always spoken as if he wished to keep clear of intervention in any form, and as if he was rather afraid that Japan might take some action that would render it difficult for him not to move.

With regard to Mongolia, M. Sazonof again assured me that the Russian Government had consistently advised the Mongols to be contented with autonomy and not to sever the tie of suzerainty that bound them to the Central Government. He repudiated once more any desire on the part of Russia either to create an independent Mongolia or to establish a protectorate over that province.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of these assurances, for the Russian Government probably realise that it is not to their interest to pursue a forward policy in Mongolia at the present moment. Such a policy would inevitably tend to weaken their position in Europe, and the European situation is not such as to permit them to run this risk. Their efforts will rather be directed to making Russian influence predominant in Mongolia and to preserving intact the privileges which Russian trade enjoys in that province under the treaty of 1881. Unless therefore the new Chinese Government should treat the Mongolian demand for autonomy in an irreconcilable or aggressive spirit, or unless it should adopt measures prejudicial to Russia's vested interests, Russia is not likely to intervene by force so long as M. Kokovtsov and M. Sazonof possess the confidence of the Emperor. Should they lose that confidence, and should their places be taken by Ministers belonging to the reactionary party, German influence at St. Petersburg would gain the upper hand, and every encouragement would then be given to Russia to embark on a new adventure in the Far East. I trust, however, that this is but a remote contingency.

[2433 y-3]



Lou Tseng Tsiang, the Chinese Minister, called at the embassy this morning and informed me that he had, somewhat unwillingly, yielded to the pressure brought to bear on him, and had accepted the post of Minister for Foreign Affairs at Peking. In reply to enquiries which I addressed to him he said that he had been favourably impressed by the conversations which he had had with M. Sazonof and the Japanese Ambassador, and that from the language which they had held to him he saw no reason to apprehend intervention by either Russia or Japan in Manchuria. His Government, on the other hand, would do all in their power to avoid any cause of friction with either of those Powers, as they desired to devote their undivided attention to the settlement of their internal affairs. Lou Tseng Tsiang took an optimistic view of the situation in general, and did not anticipate any serious movement in favour of a counter-revolution. In speaking of Mongolia, his Excellency said that he had received satisfactory assurances from M. Sazonof with regard to the attitude of the Russian Government, and did not believe that the latter had any aggressive designs on that province. Though he was not acquainted with the intentions of his own Government, he thought that they would be prepared to accord a large measure of autonomy to Mongolia; and this, coupled with the complete equality that had now been established between the five races of which China was composed, would he hoped reconcile the Mongols to the retention of Chinese suzerainty, and would deter them from cutting themselves entirely adrift from the Central Government.

Lou Tseng Tsiang then proceeded to say that there was a growing party in China that desired to see their country take her place among the nations on a footing of equality with the Great Powers, and to free her from the humiliation of having to submit to the exercise of foreign consular jurisdiction. It was perhaps premature to moot the question of the abolition of that jurisdiction at present; but there was another matter on which he would like to speak to me privately and to ask my advice. When once the Republic had been formally recognised by the Powers, it would be necessary to appoint fresh Chinese representatives at the various European capitals, and he thought that the time had now come when they should be raised from the rank of Ministers to that of Ambassadors.

I replied that this was a question which could not be decided by any one of the Powers acting alone, but which would have to be settled by them collectively after an exchange of views between the different Governments. My personal opinion was that the present moment was not well chosen for raising such a question. China was passing through a period of transition. She had but just shaken off the old autocratic rule of her Emperors and was now adopting a new régime on a republican basis. It would therefore, I thought, be wiser to wait till the republic had been firmly established, and till it had won the confidence of the Powers by the establishment of order and good government throughout the various provinces. These were my personal views; but I could assure him that the progress of his country on the path of reform would be followed with the greatest interest and sympathy by His Majesty's Government.

I am not aware whether Lou Tseng Tsiang has approached any of my colleagues on the question; but I know that he has broached the subject to M. Sazonof, and that, from what the latter has told me, he has received but little encouragement.

Lou Tseng Tsiang, who was my colleague at The Hague, is very intelligent and has excellent manners. He speaks French fluently, and is, I believe, inspired by the best intentions. He does not, however, give me the impression of being a strong enough man to act as Foreign Minister in a crisis like the present, nor of being able to hold his own should pressure be put on him by his colleagues. The Japanese Ambassador, whom I saw this afternoon, expressed the opinion that Lou Tseng Tsiang would exercise no authority in the Government, and that he would merely act as a clerk to Yuan Shih-kai. Baron Motono also remarked that the optimistic views to which he had given expression carried no weight, and were such as were usually found in the mouth of a Foreign Minister when speaking to Ambassadors about the situation in his own country. The state of affairs in China was, Baron Motono continued, anything but reassuring. The Government were not masters of the situation. Its members were more concerned with the advancement of their personal interests than with furthering those of their country. There were differences between them, and there were almost unsurmountable differences between the north and the south. Yuan Shih-kai was no doubt a strong and capable minister, but he was devoid of all moral sense. There had been a moment when, after the defeats inflicted on the rebels, he could have crushed the rebellion. He had refused, however, to say the word and had preferred to conclude a bargain with the rebel chiefs on the condition that he should be appointed President of the republic.

Baron Motono could not say whether there was likely to be a movement in favour of the restoration of the dynasty, but he was convinced that there would be movements against the Government. Troubles there were bound to be, though he saw no reason at present why Russia or Japan should intervene in Manchuria. A strong hand would be required to evolve order out of chaos, and he therefore believed that a dictatorship would be eventually established either under Yuan Shih-kai or one of his generals. Among the latter he mentioned one, whose name I did not catch, who had acted as chief of the staff at Nanking, and who had subsequently refused the post of Minister of War.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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Register No.

Put away with.....

539/12

## Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 7.0.

Dated 24 } April 1912.  
Rec. 25 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	26 Apr.	Abh	<u>Mongolia</u>  The present situation ; attitude of Russia.
Secretary of State.....	26	RK	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India (see within).

## FOR INFORMATION.

Recent Reuter telegrams (emanating from Russia) seem to show that the Chinese Govt is not disposed to acquiesce in Mongolian autonomy or Russian mediation. According to a Moscow telegram of 18<sup>th</sup> April, the Mongolians are ordering arms & ammunition in considerable quantities from Germany.

Previous Papers:—

1271

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[March 29.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

155

SECTION 5.

[13315]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 29.)*

(No. 119.)

Sir,

*Peking, March 12, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 87 and 112 of the 20th ultimo and 7th instant respectively, I have the honour to enclose copy of a despatch from Mr. Acting Consul Sly, recording a conversation with M. Konovalof respecting Russian aspirations in Mongolia.

M. Konovalof's only explanation of the part played by Russia in the Mongolian incursion into Manchuria is that it was a blunder. The charge scarcely seems susceptible of being explained away so lightly, and Mr. Sly still thinks, as will be seen from his despatch, that the Russians may have been looking to the economic advantages which the inclusion of Hailar and Manchuria station in an autonomous Mongolia under her supervision promised to offer to her trade. However this may be, there are indications that the Russian Government are alive to the possibilities afforded by the present situation in the north. If the information given to me by the French Minister and reported to you in my telegram No. 83 of the 9th instant is correct, the Russian Government have qualified their acceptance of Japan's proposal to recognise the Chinese Republic by a reservation regarding Russia's privileged position in Northern Manchuria, Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan. This would give her a powerful lever to obtain what she might not otherwise have been able to secure in the negotiations at St. Petersburg, especially if, as the French Minister appears to believe, she can count on a benevolent attitude on the part of Japan.

I have, &c.

J. M. JORDAN. /N.

P.S.—Since this despatch was drafted, M. Shékine, the Russian chargé d'affaires, has corroborated the French Minister's statement. He informs me that the Russian Ambassadors at London, Paris, and Washington were instructed to say that the Government at St. Petersburg, while accepting in principle the Japanese memorandum, reserved to itself the duty of safeguarding the special rights which it possessed in Mongolia, North Manchuria, and Western China. These rights, M. Shékine added, could not be made the subject of joint action by the Powers, and he cited Mongolia as an illustration of his meaning. According to him, the French Minister had instructed M. Casenave, the representative of the French group of bankers, to consider Manchuria, Mongolia, and Chinese Turkestan outside of the sphere of loans made by the four groups, and his manner rather than his language invited an expression of my views.

As M. Shékine has frequently shown a marked tendency to dwell upon the privileged position of Russia and the special considerations which it entitles her to receive, I thought it right to tell him that I had received no instructions which would authorise me to treat the question of recognition other than as a collective one, in which all the great Powers were equally interested.

From Sir C. MacDonald's telegram to you No. 36 of 11th March, which he has been good enough to repeat to me, it appears that the inference drawn by the French Minister that there is an understanding between Russia and Japan is incorrect.

J. N. J.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 9. Very Confidential.)

Sir,

*Harbin, March 5, 1912.*

M. N. A. KONOVALOF, who was for some considerable time previous to December 1910 in charge of the Imperial Maritime Customs at Harbin, and who has latterly [2402 ff—5]

COPY TO 1  
26 APR 1912  
SECRETARY'S NO 17



been assisting in the capacity of technical delegate at the negotiations in St. Petersburg connected with the revision of the Russo-Chinese Treaty of 1881, passed through Harbin last week on his way to Vladivostock to resume there a course of studies at the Oriental Institute.

I took advantage of the opportunity afforded me by a private and informal conversation which I had with M. Konovalof during the short stay which he made in this town to enquire as to the opinion entertained by the responsible authorities in St. Petersburg respecting the present situation in the Far East, more particularly as regards Manchuria and Mongolia.

The view taken in St. Petersburg, M. Konovalof informed me, was a very calm and sober one. There was no intention to venture upon any forward movement in Manchuria in company with Japan; on the other hand, the prospect of an autonomous Mongolia occupying the position of a buffer State between Russia and China was regarded with considerable favour. M. Konovalof's retort, when asked how he was able to reconcile the actions of the local Russian authorities regarding the recent Mongolian occupation of the Chinese town of Hailar and Lu Pin Fu with responsible opinion in St. Petersburg, was tersely expressed in the single word "blunders."

M. Konovalof is a personal friend of long standing, we were contemporaries in Peking in 1897, and I have every reason to think that during the conversation above recorded he spoke with considerable candour. It is possible, therefore, that, if the St. Petersburg view is what he stated it to be, the interpretation placed by him on the actions of the local Russian authorities in connection with the recent occupation of Hailar and Lu Pin Fu by the Mongols is correct. At the same time, it is not easy to think that the apprehensions issuing from the considerations forming the basis of the third of the three explanations of the Russian support of the Mongolians in Manchuria, ventured in my despatch No. 4 of the 8th ultimo,\* can be safely left out of count when endeavouring to appreciate the situation in all its aspects.

I understood from M. Konovalof that the discussions at St. Petersburg connected with the revision of the 1881 treaty continued until the 12th ultimo, the date, that is, of the abdication edicts.

I have, &c.

H. E. SLY.

\* i.e. "the hope of obtaining advantages such as w<sup>d</sup> accrue from the inclusion of Manchuria, Hailar, & other places in the Hulun district, within the limits of Mongolia, where Russian trade is free." (Sir J. Jordan's despatch No. 87, 20 Feb. 1912, p. 1371/12)

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[March 25.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[12647]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 25.)*

(No. 112. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Peking, March 7, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 87, Confidential, of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit copy of a further despatch from the acting British consul at Harbin on the recent Mongolian revolutionary movement.

I have no confirmation of the reported decision of the Hutuktu at Urga to forego the claim of Outer Mongolia to autonomy.

It will be seen that Mr. Sly brings additional evidence to bear in support of the theory that the Mongolians had the active assistance of the Russians in their incursions into Manchuria.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Acting Consul Sly to Sir J. Jordan.*

(No. 7. Confidential.)

Sir,

*Harbin, February 28, 1912.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 5 of the 14th instant regarding Mongolian matters, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy, in translation, of a telegram purporting to come from the Japanese Telegraph Agency, which was published in the "Harbinski Viestnik" of the 26th instant—also copy of an editorial thereanent, which appeared in yesterday's issue of the same publication.\* Both telegram and press article have reference to the reported decision of the Hutuktu at Urga to forego the claim to autonomy preferred by the Outer Mongolians, a determination which, if the writer of the editorial in the official organ of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company may be considered authoritative, does not find favour with the local Russian authorities.

It will be useful here to record a few additional items of information which have recently reached me concerning the Mongolian occupation of the Chinese town of Hailar and the Chinese area (Lu Pin Fu) at Manchuria station, respecting which I have had the honour to report in various despatches during the past and present months.


My American colleague has confidentially informed me that amongst other statements contained in a letter addressed to him from Manchuria station by Dr. Jee, a Chinese American-trained medical man, who has for some months past been stationed at that place in connection with the anti-plague measures of the Chinese Government, were the following:—

1. That, preliminary to the attack on Lu Pin Fu of the 2nd instant, many articles of Mongol clothing were taken by Mongols into the Russian barracks situated in the Russian Railway area at Manchuria station;
2. That, on the conclusion of hostilities, the Mongols returned to the Russian territory and deposited their arms in the Russian barracks;
3. That the shells of the attacking party found on the scene of the conflict were of Russian manufacture; and
4. That the body of Captain Kaplinsky, when discovered, was lying on Chinese soil.

Again, a member of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, whom I was able to engage in informal and private conversation a few evenings back, told me that a complicated and difficult situation had been created at Hailar owing to the assistance rendered to the Mongols by General Martinoff, action which entirely conflicted with the attitude adopted by General Horvat, who, in accordance with the declared Russian policy of strict neutrality, had previously expressed his inability to transport by rail the

\* Not printed.

[2402 bb—4]



troops of the Chinese Government. A solution of the difficulty suggested to General Horvat by my informant was, so he told me, that the Russians should occupy the Chinese town of Hailar and hold it at the disposal of whichever party, Chinese or Mongol, should prove successful in the conflict which had arisen between them. This proposal, however, General Horvat had lacked the courage to adopt.

The Russian grievance against Freiherr von Seckendorff, the assistant-in-charge of the office of the Imperial Maritime Customs at Manchuria station, was, my informant further stated, that that officer had overstepped the bounds of his calling, and by urging the Chinese to forcibly oppose the Mongols had contributed to the creation of a set of circumstances, which eventually led to the death of a Russian officer and the loss of other lives. On the other hand, it was admitted that, had Freiherr von Seckendorff held himself in restraint, the main result would have been the same—the Mongols, that is, would still have occupied Lu Pin Fu.

Though the gentleman with whom the above conversation was held is employed in the department of Foreign Relations of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, and has, accordingly, particularly good sources of information, I do not venture to assert that the statements which he made to me are necessarily correct in every respect or should be taken at their face value. They would, however, when considered in conjunction with known and suspected circumstances regarding recent happenings at Hailar and Lu Pin Fu, at least seem to show that the occupation of these places by the Mongols was not unwelcome to the local Russian authorities.

I have, &c.

H. E. SLY.

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Register No.

Put away with 537/12  
Secret Department.

Minute Paper.

Letter from F.O.

Dated 27 } March 1912.  
Rec. 28 }  
" 12 April "

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	15th.	JL+	<u>China</u>  Russian Policy in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan
Secretary of State.....	15	W	
Committed.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India 29 March 1912.  
+ 12 April

July C 16 TV 12

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers:—



1371

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[March 12.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 9.

[10696]

No. 1.

Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)

x P. 753/12

(No. 87. Confidential.)

Sir,

Peking, February 20, 1912.

IN my despatch No. 26 of the 14th January, I had the honour to report upon the state of affairs in Mongolia and the alleged Russian demands which were represented as being equivalent to the recognition of Mongolian independence and the establishment of a Russian protectorate over outer Mongolia. On the 17th of that month I received your telegram No. 8 of the previous day, in which you were good enough to repeat to me a summary of an official communiqué published on the 11th ultimo in St. Petersburg, announcing the Mongolian declaration of independence and their appeal to Russia for support. Your subsequent telegram No. 11 of the 17th ultimo informed me of the disclaimer made by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs of any intention on the part of his Government of annexing Mongolia and of his Excellency's explanations of Russian policy in the event of the declaration of independence being maintained.

Since that date I have received various telegrams and despatches from the acting consul at Harbin, reporting on the recent incursion of Mongolians into Manchuria. Copies of these despatches are enclosed.\*

The first event of importance recorded is the occupation of the Chinese town of Hailar on the 15th January. The Hulun Pei Erh district extends from a point east of Hailar to Manchuria Station, and the taotai of the circuit resides at the former place. Though not now included in the province of Mongolia, Changchun, Petuna (Bodune), Manchuria Station, and it appears Hailar also, which is an important Mongolian mart, were at one time all included within the confines of Mongolia, and the Mongols have always retained considerable interests, trading, grazing, &c., in the Hulun Pei Erh, Hsin Ch'eng (Petuna), and Changchun districts.

The immediate cause of the present trouble at Hailar seems to have been an increase in the amount of a special tax on cattle levied on market days, and the stoppage of the salaries and also the dismissal of subordinate local officials, mostly Mongols, in order to augment the Manchu funds for the prosecution of the struggle with the revolutionaries. To these causes might be added the disfavour with which the Mongols are thought to regard Chinese colonisation plans both in Manchuria and Mongolia. In the attack on Hailar the Mongols are stated to have been armed with new Russian rifles.

The success at Hailar was followed up by an attack on Dalainor and on the area of the proposed Chinese town at Manchuria Station. The attack on the latter (Lu Pin Fu) actually took place on the 2nd February. A telegraphic report of the fighting, which reached Mr. Sly from a confidential source, hinted that a Russian officer who was killed and Russian soldiers had been present amongst the attacking force of Mongols. This fact was discovered by the Commissioner of Customs, Herr von Seckendorff, a German subject, and subsequent information has, according to Mr. Sly, placed it beyond doubt that the Mongols, in their attack on Manchuria, were actively assisted by the Russians.

In endeavouring to explain the reason for this incursion, Mr. Sly considers that there are two facts in the situation which appear to be of considerable importance, and to which the step may very probably be attributed. These are:—

1. The encouragement which the Mongolians are reported to have received from Russia in connection with their demand for independence; and
2. The hostility which they are at present alleged to entertain towards the Chinese.

As regards the former, the Harbin taotai holds that the Mongolian claim for independence has been preferred at the instigation of the Russians, who desire to create

out of Mongolia a buffer State between China and Russia. In Mr. Sly's opinion, such a policy, the existence of which—having regard to the tenour of the Russian official communiqué summarised in your telegram No. 8 of the 10th January and quoted *in extenso* in Enclosure 1 to his despatch No. 1, Confidential, of the 22nd January—it is difficult to doubt, is in keeping with the Russian opposition to the Chinchow-Aigun Railway scheme. It accords, too, with the present attitude of the Priamur authorities, whose feelings towards the Chinese are said to be exceedingly hostile. The Russian authorities appear to view with considerable apprehension the plans of the Chinese Government for further colonisation of Mongolia and Manchuria, and the policy therefore of converting Mongolia into a buffer State would seem to be one which might serve the interests of Russia in the Far East better than any forward movement in Manchuria by agreement with Japan.

As regards the second of the two points above mentioned, Mr. Sly recalls the fact that the Mongols have considerable interests in the Hulun Pei Erh, and other districts of Manchuria bordering on Mongolia, and he considers it accordingly not unreasonable to assume that Chinese encroachments both in these districts and in Mongolia itself have been no more agreeable to the Mongolians than to the Russians. He also notes in regard to this aspect of the question that the Chinese have had it in contemplation to create at Manchuria Station, which now practically consists of two Russian settlements, a Chinese town with the object of diverting from Hailar Mongolian produce which at present makes an unnecessarily long journey eastward and joins the railway at Hailar.

In his despatch No. 4, Confidential, of the 8th instant, in reviewing, from a local point of view, the situation thus created, Mr. Sly expresses the conviction that it is not possible to doubt that the Mongols in their Manchurian adventures have been assisted and encouraged by the Russians, and in this connection he suggests:—

1. That the Russians and Japanese are manoeuvring to find sufficient pretexts for active intervention with the ultimate aim of partitioning the province between them;
2. That the Russian authorities are unwilling, in view of the sympathy and encouragement which they have extended to the Mongolians in their endeavour to secure an autonomous administration in Mongolia, to give offence or show indifference to them in their grievances against the Chinese respecting Manchuria; and
3. That the Russians, under cover of their general pronouncement in support of the Mongolian claim to autonomy in Mongolia proper, have incited and encouraged the Mongols to intervene in Manchuria, in the hope of obtaining advantages such as would accrue from the inclusion of Manchuria, Hailar, and other places in the Hulun district, within the limits of Mongolia, where Russian trade is free.

However correct these surmises may be, the Russian chargé d'affaires, who seems anxious to convey an impression of the correct attitude of his Government, called upon me a few days ago, and gave me a statement of Russian policy with regard to Mongolia. M. Shékine said that his Government wished to preserve Mongolia as an autonomous province forming an integral part of China. To facilitate this object, it was thought desirable that Russia should be made acquainted with any arrangements made by the Mongols and Chinese for the settlement of their differences. Russian consuls had received instructions to give their unofficial assistance to both sides in endeavouring to come to terms, but they were not to influence the nature of the settlement or to guarantee its fulfilment. Friendly mediation was to be the limit of their functions. M. Shékine proceeded to explain that the chief scene of the struggle was the region of Barga, of which Hailar is the capital—a district which originally formed part of Mongolia, but was conquered by the Chinese some eighteen years ago. In this part of the question the Russians considered that the right was on the side of the Chinese. The country along the River Argun for a distance of some 180 versts was in a state of great confusion. The Chinese garrisons had turned to brigandage, and such few authorities as were left had admitted to the Russian vice-consul that they were unable to protect the considerable Russian interests in this region. An appeal for protection had been made to the Russian authorities in Siberia. As to the trouble at Manchuria Station (Lu Pin Fu), M. Shékine spoke very bitterly about the conduct of the German commissioner of customs, Herr Seckendorff, which he had brought to the notice of the inspector-general of customs. He asserted that Herr Seckendorff, who alleged that he was acting under the instructions of the German consul at Harbin, had been guilty of acts of espionage, which were a capital offence by Russian law.

Russia, M. Shékine said, had no aggressive designs upon Mongolia, and only wished to have peace and quiet on her frontier. But China had shown profound distrust of every friendly overture that had been made to her.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

P.S.—Since the above was written a further despatch on this subject has been received from the acting consul at Harbin, copy of which is also enclosed.\*

J. N. J.

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\* Not printed.



1371

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[March 12.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 7.

[10671]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received March 12.)*

(No. 79.)

*St. Petersburg, March 9, 1912.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of the 17th January, I have the honour to report that the "Novoe Vremya" of the 8th March publishes another article urging immediate Russian action in Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.

The article says that the disorders in China proper do not directly affect Russian interests, but that unrest in Mongolia and eastern Turkestan threatens the whole length of the frontier. China in times past at least maintained some sort of order in these districts, but now she has too much to occupy her attention within her own borders.

The article closes as follows:—

"Mongolia and Turkestan need political advisers—we must send them. They need military instructors—we must furnish them. They are not in a position to organise an administration or create an army without money—we must advance it. Both districts are wealthy enough to offer ample security for money advanced. Time presses. Russian diplomacy has no skill in creating conditions favourable to itself. In this case the conditions have arisen of themselves, and all that remains to be done is to take advantage of them."

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2402 m—7]

COPY TO INDIA  
29 MAR 1912  
SECRETARY'S NO 13



1371

1912

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 16.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 3.

[2268]

No. 1.

*Sir C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)*

(No. 4. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Tokyo, January 16, 1912.*

I HAVE repeated the following to Peking :—

“Mongolia and revolution in China.

“The Japanese Government hear on trustworthy authority that the Mongolian situation has been a weighty factor in determining the abdication of the Court (see Sir J. Jordan's telegram No. 17 of the 14th January). They think that rival factions will be greatly influenced in the direction of agreement by the apprehension that a declaration of independence may be proclaimed in Mongolia, in which case Russia would sooner or later bring the province under her tutelage.”

The above is confidential.

[2324 q—3]

11 APR 1912

COPY TO INL  
12 APR 1912  
SECRETARY'S N2 15

MINUTE

1371/12

Extract of Despatch from

Sir E. Grey to Sir C. Mac Donald,  
Tokio.

No. 31, dated 15<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1912

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I then asked the [Japanese] *Chargé d'Affaires* whether his Government knew anything of Russian action in Mongolia.

He replied that the Russian Government had not said anything to his Government on this subject, and he did not seem to attach importance to the rumours of Russian action. Mongolia had been semi-autonomous, but recently the Chinese had shown a tendency to restrict the autonomy.

I said that I had noticed that there had been a report in a Japanese newspaper to the effect that there was some apprehension in Japan as to Russian action in Mongolia and British action in Tibet. As a matter of fact the Dalai Lama had taken refuge with us in India some time ago, and often pressed for our support, but we had steadily declined to interfere in Tibetan affairs, and we had no intention to interfere with them.

(sd) E. Grey

Register No.

753

Pay away with 539/12

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70.

Dated 21 } February 1912.  
Rec. 22 }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	28 Feb.	AK	Mongolia  Present situation; attitude of Russia
Secretary of State.....	1 3	KK	
Committee.....	4	—	
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India, 23 Feb. 1912.

FOR INFORMATION.

If the Dalai Lama does not move a little more rapidly it is to be feared that the eventuality suggested in Mr. Churchill's interesting note will never arise.

Secy-Pol Comtee.  
12 MAR 1912

Previous Papers:—

564

1.  
Mongolia and Tibet

Russia's recent action in Mongolia has a special interest for us at the present time, in view of possible eventualities in Tibet.

What Russia has proposed for Mongolia, viz:- complete internal autonomy, under Chinese suzerainty, is very much what we desire to see in Tibet. See statement of policy contained in F.O. despatch of 7 Feb. 1912 reporting a conversation with the German Ambassador, in which Sir E. Grey observed that "as for Tibet, we were not interfering with it, though our desire was similar to the Russian wish [i.e. in respect to Mongolia], as we should like to have Tibet as a buffer State under the suzerainty of China."

It is to be observed that Russia, though she appears to have remonstrated with the Chinese on their Mongolian policy (see Sir J. Jordan's despatch of 28<sup>th</sup> Sept. 1911), did not actively intervene until the Mongolians <sup>had</sup> precipitated a crisis by their own action, & both sides had appealed for Russian mediation. (see Sir G. Buchanan's telegram of 11<sup>th</sup> January 1912). It remains to be seen whether Tibet will follow the example of Mongolia. The Dalai Lama is now at Kalempong, and proposes



proposes to return shortly to Tibet. Our information about recent developments in Tibet is incomplete; but it appears to be the case that the Chinese troops at Lhasa & elsewhere have been seriously reduced in number by mutiny, &c., & that Chinese authority is in a precarious condition. In these circumstances the Dalai Lama's return may lead to a successful Tibetan rising, & a situation may then arise in which both sides would welcome, or acquiesce in, our mediation.

In that event, we should presumably work for a reversion to the status quo ante 1906, i.e. to a virtually independent Tibet, under the nominal suzerainty of China. The Russian attitude in regard to Mongolia would afford a useful precedent.

The main grievances of the Mongolians, which Russia proposes should be removed, were:—

- (1) Chinese interference in internal administration;
- (2) enforcement of military service from Mongols;
- (3) Chinese colonisation schemes, resulting in the ousting of Mongols from fertile regions in favour of Chinese.

The main grievances of the Tibetans may be summarised as follows:—

- (1) Chinese usurpation of government, &

- supersession of Tibetan authorities;
- (2) quartering of large bodies of Chinese troops in Tibet;
  - (3) ~~also~~ suppression of monasteries, & general oppressive action by Chinese against Tibetans.

Our proposals, should we be called upon to mediate, might be on the following lines:-

- (1) recognition of Chinese suzerainty, & retention of Chinese Amban at Lhasa, but on condition of his not interfering in administration;
- (2) withdrawal of Chinese troops from Lhasa & other parts of Tibet, only leaving a sufficient number at Lhasa to furnish a bodyguard to the Amban;
- (3) withdrawal of Chinese officials, trade agents, &c., from other parts of Tibet.† (Shigatse, Gyantse, Chumbi valley, &c.);
- (4) occasion might be taken to reassert our special treaty rights in Tibet.

† The question of Eastern Tibet (the scene of Chao-erh-feng's conquests) will probably require separate consideration.

It may be added that Russia has laid special stress on her "large commercial interests" in Mongolia, as justifying her intervention there. It can hardly be argued that our commercial interests in Tibet are of equal importance. But our special political interests, by reason of our geographical position, were recognised in the preamble of the Anglo-Russian Convention regarding Tibet, 1907, & would seem to afford ample justification for inter-  
vention

vention on our part, should circumstances require it.

By Article I of the Anglo-Russian Convention we are pledged "to respect the territorial integrity of Tibet and to abstain from all interference in its internal administration." This clause could hardly be held to preclude our acting as mediators in the circumstances contemplated, though it might render it desirable to keep Russia informed of our proceedings. [It is something of an anomaly that we are tied by engagements with Russia in respect of our action in Tibet, whereas Russia is under no engagements to us in respect of Mongolia; although, geographically & politically, Mongolia is to Russia, very much what Tibet is to us.]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[February 3.]

SECTION 4.

[4805]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received February 3.)*

(No. 26.)

*Peking, January 14, 1912.*

Sir,

THE reports recently put in circulation by the American press correspondents of a series of Russian demands in regard to Mongolia, which were represented as being equivalent to the recognition of Mongolian independence and the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Outer Mongolia, were accorded generally in Peking a readier credence than they would perhaps have obtained at times when the receptivity of the local atmosphere to political news of a sensational character is less accentuated.

As I had the honour to report in my telegram No. 12 of the 10th instant, this version of the Russian action was probably exaggerated. The evidence which it has been possible to collect goes to show that Russia has not essentially departed from her previous line of policy as described in my despatch No. 380 of the 28th September last, although the separatist tendency which has manifested itself in Mongolia, as a result of the general confusion to which the revolutionary movement has given rise, has no doubt induced the Russian Government to give that policy a clearer definition with a view to impress upon that of China the precise nature of her special interests in that region, and her determination that the situation there shall not be turned to her disadvantage.

The state of affairs was described to me in conversation some three weeks ago by the Russian chargé d'affaires, who has since made substantially the same statement to Dr. Morrison, the "Times" correspondent. It was upon my advice that Dr. Morrison, subsequently to the circulation of the American reports, sought an interview with M. Shékine, who professed complete frankness on the subject.



Russian policy had, he maintained, been reasonable and consistent throughout. For years past the Chinese had oppressed the Mongols, lending them money at usurious rates, and denying them all justice; demanding every year that debts owed, or alleged to be owed, by Mongols to Chinese should be paid by their chiefs at an enormous price. For example, for debts amounting to 3,000 dollars, it was customary for the Chinese to demand from the Aimak 60,000 taels, and when recently representations were made to the Chinese urging them to be more humane, they consented to reduce the fine in such cases to 30,000 taels. Unable to pay, the Aimaks found themselves dispossessed of their lands, cattle, and horses.

There was no mystery about the Russian position in regard to Mongolia. Early in June last year, Russia had warned the Chinese Government in an official communication that trouble was impending in Mongolia. Certain oppressed Mongol princes had gone to Russia (see my despatch already referred to) to plead for a Russian protectorate, but the Russian Government had unwisely declined the opportunity thus given them, and the Chinese had been emboldened by this to think they could do what they pleased in Mongolia. Three points had been urged in this note:—

1. That while the Mongols should remain under the control of the Chinese, there should be no interference in their domestic affairs.
2. That China should not levy military contributions on the Mongols, nor recruit them as soldiers.
3. That an end should be put to the schemes of colonisation which bore unjustly on the Mongols, the Chinese seizing the fertile valleys and driving the Mongols to the uplands, where their live stock starved.

China had, however, disregarded all warnings and proceeded to build barracks at Urga, and to organise the cadre of a division of the modern army. But when the revolution broke out no money was forthcoming to pay the men, who mutinied, and the Mongols declared their autonomy. Later they appointed as Great Khan the Taranatha Buddha. Now within the last few days the Prince Djassaktuhan, the most powerful prince of the Outer Mongols, had declared his independence, and has since placed himself under the supreme headship of the Taranatha Buddha, a pontiff who, in

[2367 c-4]





M. Shékine's opinion, will secure the headship of all Western Mongolia. The action of Prince Djassaktuhan was prompted by the surrender of all their rights by the Manchu Imperial Family, with whom he is closely connected by marriage, which compelled him to look out for himself; he is a prince of the first rank, equal in rank to Prince Ch'ing. The Amban of Uliassutai had been given protection in the Russian consulate, which has a small consular guard of 35 men, whereas in Urga Russia has 400.

Russia has, however, in no way altered her policy. She has pointed out that what was inevitable has happened, and now urges the Chinese to come to terms with the Mongols on the lines she had previously laid down; but she insists that the terms of the policy to be followed by China shall be submitted for her approval. Russia has immense interests in Mongolia, and if there is disorder she will require to march troops into the country to suppress it. The cost would be immense and would have to be met by China, and China has no money to pay it.

Russia, said M. Shékine, wants a stable Government in Mongolia and freedom from unrest. She does not want the territory. She does not desire the independence of Mongolia, only its autonomy, so that peace may reign between Chinese and Mongol. She wishes China to come to an agreement with the Mongols.

Now Ili had also revolted; the new troops had mutinied, the Manchus within the three cities had been massacred, and the yamens of the Tartar general and the commander-in-chief burned. In Urumchi also there was complete disorder.

M. Shékine has informed me that serious trouble has occurred at Moralbashi, where a Russian subject had been killed. There is no Russian consul at that place, only an "Aksakal," a "White Beard," or Elder: these men are, however, recognised as officials by the Russian Government.

He told me also, confidentially, that Russia had 25,000 troops mobilised for over a month in the neighbourhood of Vladivostock at the beginning of the Chinese troubles, but that owing to the expense of maintaining such a large body of troops, they had been partially disbanded. They could, however, be reassembled in a week or ten days.

M. Shékine declared to Dr. Morrison that no written communication had recently been addressed to the Chinese Government about Mongolia, and that he had only made verbal representations to Hu Wei-te, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, but other evidence goes to indicate that the views of the Russian Government had been put into the form of a memorandum.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo.

I have, &c.

J. N. JORDAN.

Register No.

564

Put away with 539/12

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 70.

Dated 14 } February 1912.  
Rec. 15 }


	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	16 Feb	JW	
Secretary of State.....	19	Ed	<u>China</u>
Committee.....			Progress of revolution; question of
Under Secretary .....			foreign intervention
Secretary of State.....			(Mongolia + Tibet).

Copy to India See within.

h 23 II 12

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers:—



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[February 7.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[5787]

No. 1.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.*

(No. 35.)

*Foreign Office, February 7, 1912*

Sir,

COUNT METTERNICH spoke to me to-day generally about China, remarking that the prospects there seemed to be improving, but that there was a unanimous opinion amongst all those who knew China that a monarchy was the most suitable form of government.

I said that my information was to the same effect, and yet the people in China seemed to be coming to an agreement in favour of a republic. I expressed to Count Metternich the views which I had previously expressed to the Japanese chargé d'affaires and others about non-intervention, and Japanese and Russian participation in any loan that might be made later on.

Count Metternich asked me whether I thought that all the Powers really desired to maintain the integrity of China, and he showed some interest in Russian views as to Mongolia and our views as to Thibet.

I said that the Russians had long wished Mongolia to be at least semi-autonomous, and a sort of buffer State between their territory and China proper. I did not think that they had departed from this policy. As for Thibet, we were not interfering with it, though our desire was similar to the Russian wish, as we should like to have Thibet as a buffer State under the suzerainty of China.


Count Metternich enquired as to Japanese action in Manchuria.

I told him that the Japanese did not seem to have interfered much there, though they would no doubt take steps to protect their interests if there were great disturbances.

I am, &c.


E. GREY.

[2367 g—1]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL



[January 27.]

SECTION 4.

[3811]

No. 1.

*Messrs. Myers and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received January 27.)*

Sir,

6, Throgmorton Street, London, January 26, 1912.


WE have been asked whether in the event of default upon the Imperial Chinese Government Customs loans, that, amongst others, if British troops could, under the terms of the loan, be landed to take possession of the custom-house, and collect the revenue hypothecated to the loans.

The contracting banks, agencies, and others interested, have referred us to your department, and we shall be glad if you could give us any information to answer our clients.

We are, &c.

MYERS AND Co.


[2324 dd—4]





AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 26.]

SECTION 2.

[3698]

No. 1.

*Sir. C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Tokyo, January 26, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 3 of 25th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me Japanese Government have discouraged Okura Specie Bank loan, which so far has not been completed. They have, however, ascertained on very reliable authority that [? Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank] have recently lent China Merchant Shipping Company 1,500,000 taels, 500,000 of which they know, as a fact, went to the revolutionaries. As the struggle continues, support, financial and otherwise, will be increasingly forthcoming from the private firms and subjects of other Powers, ostensibly given to private Chinese undertakings, but in reality to belligerents.



In the circumstances, it will be difficult for Japanese Government to prevent their nationals from embarking in similar enterprises. If it is intention of the Powers absolutely to prevent their nationals from assisting either side in this manner Japanese Government would of course associate themselves with this intention

(Confidential.)

I know that British merchants in Japan are desirous of selling arms to highest bidder in China, and though discouraged have probably done so.

(Repeated to Peking)

[2324 cc—2]



[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL

564

1912

[January 26.]

SECTION 1.

[3549]

No. 1.

*Sir C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)*

(No. 7. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Tokyo, January 26, 1912.*

JAPANESE Government are closely watching events in Manchuria. Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that several minor disturbances have taken place there, but Mukden Viceroy, Chao-erh-hsun, has behaved with energy and promptitude and, so far, suppressed all trouble.

Twelfth division is held in readiness, but will not proceed unless life and property become threatened, when His Majesty's Government will at once be informed.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[2324 cc—1]

TO INDIA  
13 FEB 1912

NO 7

15 FEB 1912

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

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1912

[January 25.]

SECTION 1.

[3528]

No. 1.

*Sir C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)*

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Tokyo, January 25, 1912.*

SIR J. JORDAN'S telegram No. 20 of 22nd January.



Foreign Minister has sent me a translation of telegraphic report from the Japanese representative at Peking regarding his interview with Yuan Shih-kai mentioned in the above telegram.

The last paragraph is as follows:—

"According to information received by Yuan Shih-kai, the intention of Sun seems to be to abolish Peking Government after Imperial abdication and to establish a new Government in Nanking. Yuan Shih-kai asked the Japanese representative at Peking whether the Japanese Government would recognise such a Government. On receiving the Japanese representative's answer that recognition of a Government was a very serious matter, and that it could not possibly be given until the new Government showed its capability and efficiency in every way, Yuan Shih-kai showed some uneasiness."

(Repeated to Peking.)

[2324 bb—1]



1  
564  
1912

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 23.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 4.

[3251]

No. 1.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Paris, January 23, 1912.*

MY telegram No. 8 of yesterday.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in memorandum dated 19th January, and received to-day, states that three communications have been received from Chinese Revolutionary Minister for Foreign Affairs asking for recognition of the republic. The last one was founded on probable abdication of Manchu dynasty. No reply was returned by French Government.

A young Chinaman in France has been designated as diplomatic representative of Nanking Government, and has tried on several occasions to open up official or semi-official relations with French Ministers, but his overtures were rejected.

[2324 s—4]


COPIED TO INDIA  
16 FEB 1912  
SECRETARY'S NO 7

RECORDED  
16 FEB 1912



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 23.]

SECTION 2.

[3263]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*Peking, January 23, 1912.*



YUAN SHIH-KAI'S secretary told me to-day that his position is becoming very precarious, and that Manchu princes, under the influence of Tieh-liang, formerly Minister for War, are working to displace him. Situation is strained, and may possibly become serious if, as secretary indicated, Yuan Shih-kai resigns or leaves Peking; but it is very difficult to arrive at the truth.

I have conferred with Japanese Minister, who, however, is not disposed to attach serious importance to secretary's statement, and seems disinclined to take any action.

French and American Legations were similarly approached by secretary, with what result I do not yet know.

(Sent to Tokyo.)


[2324 s-2]



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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 23.]

SECTION 1.

[3085]

No. 1.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)*

[By Post.]

(No. 8.)



(Telegraphic.)

*Paris, January 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 20th January to Peking.


The French Government have not made any answer to telegrams from Chinese Revolutionary Minister for Foreign Affairs asking for early recognition of his Government.

[2324 z-1]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 22.]

SECTION 11.

[3078]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Peking, January 22, 1912.*

YOUR telegram No. 14 of 21st January.



Situation has considerably changed, and there seem to be great difficulties in forming an amalgamated Government of the north and south owing to demands of southern leaders, which would apparently make it impossible to have any Government here during interval between the abdication of the Throne and the recognition of the republic.

Japanese Minister, who saw Yuan yesterday, expressed grave doubt of any solution without foreign intervention.

Representatives of America and France and most other Powers here would, I think, have favoured a temporary Government under Yuan, but that now seems expressly debarred by the uncompromising attitude of Sun and the Nanking leaders.

(Sent to Tokyo.)


[2324 y—11]



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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 2.]

SECTION 6.

[398]

No. 1.



*British Residents, Ichang, to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received January 2.)*

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

*Shanghai, January 2, 1912.*

PROTEST absence British gun-boat. Beg adequate protection.—BRITISH  
RESIDENTS, ICHANG.

[2324 b—6]





Register No.

539

1912

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O.

Dated } 8 Feb. 1912.  
Rec. }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	14 Feb.	WZ	<u>Mongolia</u> The present situation; attitude of Russia
Secretary of State.....	16	WZ	
Committee.....			
Under Secretary .....			
Secretary of State.....			

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COPY TO INDIA  
9 Feb. 1912  
SECRETARY'S IN 6

FOR INFORMATION.

(The Mongolian Princes are understood to be opposed to the establishment of a republic in China<sup>x</sup>)


x N. B. Yuan Shih-Kai, in an interview with Sir J. Jordan on 1 January 1912, said that the Mongol Princes had decided to declare their independence if a republic were established in China.  
(Encls in Sir J. J.'s despatch No. 13, 6 Jan<sup>y</sup>. 1912 : F.O.  
China Print Jan<sup>y</sup> 27<sup>th</sup>, h. 4. : P. 534/12)

Previous Papers :—

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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 22.]

SECTION 7.

[2964]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)*

(No. 18.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 17, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 11th January, I have the honour to report that the comments which have so far appeared in the St. Petersburg press on the official communiqué made by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with regard to the situation in Mongolia have not been favourable to the Government's declared policy in that region.

The Opposition "Retch" of the 12th January publishes a long article jeering at the official declaration that Russia has no designs on Mongolia. The archives of Europe are already full of such declarations as to the preservation of a formal suzerainty over some Asiatic or African State, and no official communiqué is required now-a-days to show how little they are worth.

The article then seizes upon the passage in the communiqué which speaks of Russia's readiness to assist Mongolia in her "administrative, economic, and cultural development," and declares that this is quite inadmissible. If Mongolia achieves her independence, Russia ought to support her with a view to forming an independent buffer State between herself and China. To go further than this, and institute any sort of protectorate, would be a violation of the *status quo* in the Far East, and would be contrary to the agreements concluded, not only with China, but with Great Britain and Japan, which would instantly demand compensation. Thus, the Far Eastern question in all its complexity would be reopened.

The "Novoe Vremya" of the 16th January takes an entirely different line, and upbraids the Government for endeavouring to persuade the Mongols to content themselves with autonomy under Chinese suzerainty. It declares that the Chinese Government, by entering into negotiations with the newly created Government at Urga, formally recognised that Government, and that Russia, instead of encouraging Mongolia's bid for independence, is now throwing her back into the arms of China.


News as to the general situation in Mongolia is still very vague; from time to time telegrams appear reporting the defection of this or that group of Mongol Princes, and to-day the "Novoe Vremya" publishes a sensational telegram from Peking, stating that the Chinese Government has offered to hand over Mongolia to Russia in exchange for a loan of 100,000,000 roubles.

News as to the situation in Chinese Turkestan is equally vague. The latest telegrams indicate that the revolutionary party, after considerable slaughter, has now won the upper hand at Kuldja, and is administering the affairs of the town in concert with the Russian consulate.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2324 y-7]



Register No.

419

1912

539/12

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from 7. O.

<sup>25</sup>  
Dated 31 January } 1912.  
<sup>25</sup>  
Recd Jan 1 February }

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	3 Feb.	Alt	<u>Mongolia</u> Question of Mongolian autonomy. Attitude of Russia.
Secretary of State.....			
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

6.2.2

Copy to India 2 February 1912  
 Secy. 5  
 26 Jan 12, Sec. 4

FOR INFORMATION.


Previous Papers:—

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 10.]

SECTION I.



[1418]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)*

(No. 12.)


(Telegraphic.) R.

*Peking, January 10, 1912.*

JAPANESE Minister spoke to me to-day about reported Russian demands in Mongolia, which formed the subject of to-day's telegram in the "Times." He said that Russia had not consulted Japan, and thought that reports that emanate from the American Legation are probably exaggerated. But as the evidence goes to show that the demands were embodied in a memorandum furnished to Wai-wu Pu by the Russian chargé d'affaires, Japanese Minister is telegraphing to Tokyo.

(Sent to Tokyo.)

[2324 k—1]






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AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.



[January 11.]

SECTION 2.

[1580]

No. 1.

*Sir C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) R.


*Tokyo, January 11, 1912.*


SIR J. JORDAN'S telegram No. 12 of 10th January.

Japanese Government know nothing at present about reported Russian demands in Mongolia.

(Repeated to Peking.)

[2324 L-2]





AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 11.]

SECTION 3.

[1581]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)*

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

*St. Petersburg, January 11, 1912.*

RUSSIA and Mongolia.

Following is a summary of an official communiqué published to-day :—

The Mongolians, having declared independence, appealed to Russia for support. Russian Government advised them to show moderation, and to endeavour to find basis of agreement with China. Subsequently Chinese plenipotentiary, appointed negotiator with Mongolians, asked for friendly mediation of Russian consul at [Urga], and Mongolians simultaneously asked for mediation. Russian Government considered it possible to accede to this request, but held that Mongolians must be guaranteed in their autonomous régime, and so for that purpose the following should be basis of negotiations :—


No Chinese administration to be established in Mongolia, no Chinese troops to be formed, and no Chinese to be settled in Mongolian territory.


At the same time, Russian Government recognised that permanent tranquillity could prevail in Mongolia only if Mongolians realised that measures taken for development of their country were approved both by Russia and China. Russian Government accordingly expressed readiness to give their friendly co-operation in bringing into existence in Mongolia all necessary measures, administrative, economic, and cultural. In informing Chinese Government of the above, Russian Government added that they would endeavour to induce Mongolians not to sever their connection with China, and to fulfil their obligations.

It depended on good-will of China whether mediation on these terms is accepted or rejected. Not wishing to intervene in struggle proceeding in China, and harbouring no aggressive designs on China, Russia cannot, nevertheless, but interest herself in establishment of lasting order in this province adjacent to Siberia where she has large commercial interests.

If Mongolia severs her connection with China, Russia will be compelled by force of circumstances to enter into business relations with Mongolian Government.

[2324 I-3]





AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

[January 14.]

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[1866]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)*

(No. 11.)

*St. Petersburg, January 14, 1912.*

(Telegraphic.)


MY telegram No. 8 of 11th January

On my speaking to Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday on the subject of Mongolia, his Excellency told me that Chinese Minister had asked him whether Russian communiqué meant that Russia was going to annex that province. He had, he said, replied that it would be madness for Russia to think of annexing such a vast territory; that she had been approached both by the Chinese and by the Mongolians, and that she had offered her good offices as mediator in order to prevent Mongolia declaring her independence and in order to secure from China such a grant of autonomy as would enable Mongolia to take administration of her own affairs in her own hands.

In reply to enquiries which I addressed to him, his Excellency said that Russia was not establishing a protectorate as she did not intend to take over the administration of the province. As regarded the friendly support which she had declared herself ready to give, his Excellency said that Mongolia wanted to organise an army, and had suggested that Russia might supply instructors. There did not seem to be at present any nucleus for an army, but if later on instructors were asked for they would probably be sent. Chinese have a resident at Urga, or some town where there was a Russian consul, but if a republican régime were established at Peking he doubted whether Mongolia would continue to recognise Chinese suzerainty. If she declared her independence Russia would have to recognise it.

I asked what was happening at Kulja, and his Excellency said that Manchus were being killed, and that anarchy prevailed. There was a large number of Russian subjects there, but none had so far suffered, and so long as they were not touched Russia would not intervene.

[2324 o—1]



AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 15.]

SECTION 8.

[1896]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)*

(No. 13.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, January 11, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose a translation of the communiqué, published by the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs in to-day's "Official Messenger," of which I forwarded you a summary in my telegram No. 8 of to-day, relative to Mongolia.

In the conversation with M. Nératof, on which I reported in my despatch No. 357 of the 7th of last month, his Excellency told me that the Imperial Government had no desire to see Mongolia independent or to assume a protectorate over it, and that they would, therefore, use all their influence to restrict any movement in such a direction to one for simple autonomy. M. Sazonof also told me a few days ago that he was most anxious that Mongolia should not sever her connection with China, and that the Imperial Government would lend its good offices as mediator in order to secure the maintenance of Chinese suzerainty, and at the same time to obtain for Mongolia a large measure of autonomy.

According to the enclosed communiqué the Russian Government has been approached both by the Chinese and Mongolian authorities, and has informed the former that abstention from the three measures to which the Mongols take exception, namely, 1 the establishment there of Chinese administration, 2 the formation there of regular Chinese troops, and 3 the settling of Mongolian territory with Chinese, should form the basis of a possible agreement. At the same time, in order that the Mongols may clearly realise that the measures which are being taken in their country meet with the approval of both the Chinese and the Russian Governments, it has expressed its readiness to give its friendly support in the carrying out in Mongolia of all necessary measures, whether administrative, economical, or cultural in character.

The Chinese Government, it would appear, has been given to understand that if it rejects the conditions on which Russia offers her mediation, and if, in consequence, Mongolia severs her connection with China, Russia will recognise Mongolia's independence.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Official Communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published in the "Official Messenger" dated December 29, 1911 (January 11), 1912.*

THE Mongols, having declared their independence at Urga, and having elected as khan their spiritual head, Schebtsun-Damba-Khutukhta, appeal to Russia for support. The Imperial Government, in reply to this request, advised the Mongols to act with moderation and endeavour to find a basis for an agreement with China. The Russian consulate at Urga by its advice prevented the destruction of the Kalgan-Kiakhta telegraph line and the plundering of the branch of the Daitsin Bank at Urga, and assisted the Chinese amban, Sando, by enabling him to leave Mongolia freely via Russian territory.

Subsequently the high official, Kueh-fan, appointed by the Peking Government to negotiate with the Mongols, inquired of the Russian chargé d'affaires at Peking whether he could rely on the friendly mediation of the Imperial consulate at Urga in these negotiations. Simultaneously, the Mongols begged the Imperial Government to mediate between them and the Chinese.

The Imperial Government considered it possible to meet these requests. Recognising that an agreement between the Chinese and Mongols is possible only if the latter are guaranteed their autonomous régime, the Imperial Government considered that this agreement should be embodied in some act guaranteeing the non-violation of this régime by the Chinese. As is known, the Mongols regard the

[2324 p—8]

2 FEB 1912

INDIA



following three measures, which have been taken by the Chinese Government in Mongolia, as infringements of this régime, namely, the establishment there of Chinese administration, the formation there of Chinese regular troops, and the settling of Mongolian territory with Chinese. In reply to the request for mediation made by the Peking Government through its representative, Kueh-fan, the Imperial Government therefore indicated the three points above-mentioned as a basis for a possible agreement between the Chinese and Mongols.

At the same time, the Imperial Government recognised that real tranquillity in Mongolia can prevail only if the Mongols clearly realise that the measures which are being taken in their country for its development meet with the approval of both the Imperial and the Chinese Governments, and that no differences of opinion exist between Russia and China in connection with Mongolian affairs.

For this reason, the Imperial Government deemed it in accordance with the interests both of Russia and China and of the Mongols to express its readiness to give its friendly support in the carrying out in Mongolia of all necessary measures, whether administrative, or economic, or cultural in their character.

The above-mentioned bases on which Russia would agree to mediate, as requested by the interested parties, between the Chinese and Mongols, were communicated by the Imperial chargé d'affaires at Peking to the Chinese Government, with the additional statement that should it agree to the establishment of Chinese-Mongolian relations on the above specified bases the efforts of Russian diplomacy will be directed towards inducing the Mongols not to sever their connection with China and to observe the obligations taken upon themselves.

It rests on the good-will of the Chinese Government whether the mediation of Russia on these conditions is accepted or rejected.

Not desirous of intervening in the struggle taking place in China, and harbouring no aggressive designs on Mongolia, Russia, however, cannot but be interested in the establishment of lasting order in this province adjoining Siberia, and in which Russia possesses large commercial interests. An armed struggle between the Mongols and the Chinese is not desirable for us, because our interests would inevitably suffer thereby. It is this consideration which has above all induced the Imperial Government to express its readiness to undertake the difficult task of mediation between the Chinese and the Mongols so hostilely disposed towards the former.

On the other hand, these large interests in Mongolia do not permit the Imperial Government to ignore the Government which has been practically established in that country. If Mongolia severs her connection with China, the Imperial Government, with every desire to see the Chinese Mongolian dispute ended, will be compelled by force of circumstances to enter into business relations with the Mongolian Government.

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1912

AFFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[September 27.]

SECTION 2.

[37979]

No. 1.

*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)*

(No. 214.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

*Peking, September 27, 1911.*

MONGOLIA.

Copies of correspondence which has recently passed between the Board and the Russian Legation were communicated to me yesterday confidentially by the Wai-wu Pu.

The military and administrative changes which were being introduced by the Chinese Government in Mongolia formed the subject of a note addressed to them on the 28th August by the Russian Government, which stated that in the Russian view the existing balance of power on the frontier was menaced by these changes, more especially by the creation of a Chinese regular army in that region.

After some verbal explanations offered by the Chinese had been transmitted to St. Petersburg, the Russian Government sent in a second note, dated the 16th September, complaining that the residence of the Hutukhtu had been surrounded with Chinese soldiers by the Amban at Urga, and adding that a reinforcement of their consulate guard there had been decided upon; 200 cavalry are, I understand, to constitute this reinforcement.

All knowledge of the Amban's alleged action is denied by the Wai-wu Pu in their reply of the 19th September, but, at the same time, they have given him instructions that the movements of the Hutukhtu are not to be interfered with. The increase of the Russian guard, the Board continue, is neither consonant with friendly relations nor justified by precedent, and they cannot but deprecate the step.

[2190 dd-2]

2190 dd-2

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26 Jan/12.  
Leg 4.

Register No.

156

Put away with 539/12

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from

FO

Dated

Rec.

16 January 1912.

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	16 Jan	led	China
Secretary of State.....			question of autonomy of Mongolia.
Committee.....			Attitude of Russia
Under Secretary .....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India

COPY TO INDIA  
26 JAN 1912  
SECRETARY'S NO 4

FOR INFORMATION.

Previous Papers :—

In any further communication on this subject, please quote

1587.

and address—

The Under-Secretary of State,  
Foreign Office,  
London.

756


15

*The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents  
his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for India  
and, by direction of the Secretary of State,  
transmits herewith copy of the under-mentioned papers*

*Foreign Office,*


*January 16, 1912.*

*Reference to previous letter:*



*Description of Inclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<i>Lt G Buchanan St Petersburg Tel. No 8 January 11</i>	<i>Russian attitude towards Mongolia.</i>
<i>Lt C. MacDonald Tokio Tel. No 1 January 11</i>	
<i>and Lt J. Jordan Rekin No 12 January 12/12.</i>	





CONFIDENTIAL.

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*Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10, 3:50 P.M.)*

(No. 12.) R.

*Peking, January 10, 1912, 5:40 P.M.*

JAPANESE Minister spoke to me to-day about reported Russian demands in Mongolia, which formed the subject of to-day's telegram in the "Times." He said that Russia had not consulted Japan, and thought that reports that emanate from the American Legation are probably exaggerated. But as the evidence goes to show that the demands were embodied in a memorandum furnished to Wai-wu Pu by the Russian chargé d'affaires, Japanese Minister is telegraphing to Tokyo.

(Sent to Tokyo.)

16 JAN 1912

CONFIDENTIAL

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11, 8:30 P.M.)*

(No. 8.) R.

*St. Petersburg, January 11, 1912, 7:30 P.M.*

RUSSIA and Mongolia.

Following is a summary of an official communiqué published to-day :—


Urza, The Mongolians, having declared independence, appealed to Russia for support. Russian Government advised them to show moderation, and to endeavour to find basis of agreement with China. Subsequently Chinese plenipotentiary, appointed negotiator with Mongolians, asked for friendly mediation of Russian consul in Dalmatia [sic], and Mongolians simultaneously asked for mediation. Russian Government considered it possible to accede to this request, but held that Mongolians must be guaranteed in their autonomous régime, and so for that purpose the following should be basis of negotiations :—

No Chinese administration to be established in Mongolia, no Chinese troops to be formed, and no Chinese to be settled in Mongolian territory.

At the same time, Russian Government recognised that permanent tranquillity could prevail in Mongolia only if Mongolians realised that measures taken for development of their country were approved both by Russia and China. Russian Government accordingly expressed readiness to give their friendly co-operation in bringing into existence in Mongolia all necessary measures, administrative, economic, and cultural. In informing Chinese Government of the above, Russian Government added that they would endeavour to induce Mongolians not to sever their connection with China, and to fulfil their obligations.

It depended on good-will of China whether mediation on these terms is accepted or rejected. Not wishing to intervene in struggle proceeding in China, and harbouring no aggressive designs on China, Russia cannot, nevertheless, but interest herself in establishment of lasting order in this province adjacent to Siberia where she has large commercial interests.

If Mongolia severs her connection with China, Russia will be compelled by force of circumstances to enter into business relations with Mongolian Government.



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*Sir C. MacDonald to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11, 6 P.M.)*


(No. 1.) R.

*Tokyo, January 11, 1912, 6.40 P.M.*

SIR J. JORDAN'S telegram No. 12 [ ].

Japanese Government know nothing at present about reported Russian demands in Mongolia.

(Repeated to Peking.)



Register No.

Put away with 539/12

Minute Paper.

Secret Department.

Letter from F.O.

Dated 10<sup>th</sup> Jan<sup>y</sup> 1912.  
Rec. " 11

	Date.	Initials.	SUBJECT.
Under Secretary.....	15 Jan.	all	<p><u>Mongolia</u> LHW</p> <p>The present situation; declaration of Mongolian independence of China. Attitude of Russia.</p>
Secretary of State.....			
Committee.....			
Under Secretary.....			
Secretary of State.....			

Copy to India  
*See in*

FOR INFORMATION.

Recent telegrams that have appeared in the Press indicate that the Mongolians have taken a further step in the direction of autonomy by proclaiming the High Lamaist Dignitary of Urga ruler of their country (29<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1911). It also appears that Russia has offered to mediate between the Mongolians & the Chinese on condition (1) that Mongolia continues to recognise the sovereignty of China; (2) the China recognises the autonomy of Mongolia in domestic affairs.

The principal grievances of the

Seen Pol LHM CC  
23 JAN 1912

Previous Papers:—

China 17 Oct 20-11



Mongolians against the Chinese appear to  
be

- (1) interference by Chinese officials in the internal administration of Mongolia;
- (2) enforcement of military service from Mongols;
- (3) Chinese methods of colonization in Mongolia, the effect of which is stated to be to dispossess Mongols of fertile valleys in favour of Chinese, & to compel the former to remain on the grazing uplands.





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AFAIRS OF CHINA.

CONFIDENTIAL.

[January 3.]

SECTION 2.

[460]

No. 1.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey. — (Received January 3, 1912.)*

(No. 393.)

Sir,

*St. Petersburg, December 29, 1911.*

THE "Official Messenger" of to-day's date publishes a communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, denying the truth of a statement which is alleged to have been published in the Peking "Official Gazette," to the effect that M. Sazonoff has declared to the Chinese Minister here that the Russian troops sent to Mongolia have no intention of occupying that province, but are only sent to protect the interests of Russian subjects there. The communiqué states shortly that M. Sazonoff has had no detailed conversation with the Chinese Minister, and that no Russian troops have entered Mongolia.

At the same time, the St. Petersburg press is showing considerable interest in the future of Mongolia and, incidentally, in that of Thibet.

The "Novoe Vremya" of to-day represents Chinese rule in Mongolia as a tyranny which has enslaved the Mongols and enabled privileged Chinese companies to acquire a monopoly of the whole trade of the country. Russia, on the other hand, is interested in the economic development of Mongolia, and should welcome the effort of the Mongol princes to free their land. The writer urges the Russian Government to recognise immediately the autonomy of Mongolia. Should the Mongol princes succeed in establishing their autonomy, they will then be in a position to conclude commercial treaties with Russia.

The same paper publishes an article on Thibet, and hails the prospect of the early return to Lhasa of the Dalai Lama. The Lama, it says, will henceforth be practical ruler as well as spiritual head of the country, a result which it attributes in large measure to the energy of the Russian Buriat Dorjjeff, who has worked incessantly for his master.

In discussing the Mongolian question, the "Bourse Gazette" is even more outspoken than the "Novoe Vremya." It urges the utility to Russia of the creation between her and China of a buffer State, which would, while recognising the suzerainty of China, be independent of that Power and under the influence of Russia. "For various reasons," says the article, "Mongolia has always been favourably disposed towards Russia, and an increase of Russian influence would be the natural result of the creation of an independent Mongolia. Mongolia, in becoming independent, must draw closer to Russia. There is no other course open to her. Whether the declaration of her independence by Mongolia induces Thibet to follow her example or causes Japan to take action can make no difference to the actual facts. Mongolia will turn towards Russia, and Russia cannot renounce the rôle which is thus thrust upon her." The article closes with a note of warning, to the effect that Russia must not interfere actively in the internal affairs of Mongolia, but must, in order to preserve the harmony of her Far Eastern policy, content herself with offering good advice.

I have, &c.

GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2324 c—2]



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#### Source Citation

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